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ABSTRACT 
PLACED PEOPLE: ROOTEDNESS IN G. K. CHESTERTON,  
C. S. LEWIS, AND WENDELL BERRY 
 
 
David Harden 
 
Marquette University, 2013 
 
 
This dissertation examines how G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, and Wendell Berry 
answer one of the central questions of modernity: “What are people for?” Their answers 
are crucial to a humanities that is increasingly individualistic and fragmented. Charles 
Taylor and other virtue and communitarian philosophers are used to help explain the 
connections between these three authors. Examining how the writings of Chesterton, 
Lewis, and Berry confront the increasingly commercial, materialist, utilitarian, ends-
justify-the-means culture of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries will help underscore 
the relevance of such literature to our current humanities. The authors deserve to be 
considered because they provide unique insights to contemporary questions. 
 Their insights are unique because these authors acknowledge and privilege the 
role that the teleological Aristotelian and Judeo-Christian traditions have had in shaping 
Western thought and thus they see a rooted return to these traditions, or at least the values 
of these traditions, as central to restoring health to our communities. Specifically, this 
rooted perspective leads to loving things (including people) for themselves, embracing 
limits, and having a communal, rather than individualistic, view of the world. The first 
part of chapter one discusses how Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry rejected the 
contemporary modern narrative for humanity and returned to a rooted perspective in a 
tradition approximating orthodoxy. The second part of chapter one looks at examples of 
this homecoming in their fiction. The second chapter first explores the relationship 
between the rooted perspective of these authors and ethics, and then shows how this 
ethical theory informs their similarly rooted and localized economic theories. The third 
chapter argues that their ethics allows them (and us) to have respect for other individuals, 
communities, and the natural world. The fourth chapter seeks to answer the question, 
“What does it mean to be human?” It examines what Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry say 
about “wholeness,” and then suggests that their emphasis on wholeness should be an 
important inclusion in the humanities. A brief concluding chapter summarizes the entire 
argument and underscores the importance of including Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry in 
the canon of the humanities.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 As many others have pointed out, there is much confusion about the purpose of 
humans in the (post)modern world in which we live. Advertisers tell us we are 
consumers. Politicians often tell us the same thing: better consumers create a better 
economy. Clergy tell us we are souls whose purpose is to be saved. Lawyers tell us we 
are individuals with rights who deserve big settlements when we have been wronged. 
Environmentalists tell us we are part of a larger community and need to downplay our 
specio-centrism. Hollywood, ESPN, and other media outlets tell us our purpose is to be 
consumers of entertainment. The Pentagon, NRA, gun-control advocates, and security 
companies all tell us our purpose is to keep ourselves, our loved-ones, and possessions 
safe, though by markedly different means. With all of these competing and often 
contradictory messages, the question remains unanswered: “What are people for?” 
 Classically, humans were considered to have a telos towards which to order their 
lives. Their telos was some purpose reserved especially for humans that was distinct from 
the teloi of animals and nature. According to Aristotle, understanding their telos was 
essential for humans in order for them to live a “good life.” In other words, knowing the 
purpose of humans was essential to defining the “goods” required to achieve this purpose. 
According to Charles Taylor, Aristotle distinguished two levels of a “good life.” The 
essential level shared by all is what Taylor calls the “ordinary life” concerned with the 
day-to-day needs for shelter, food, and other family provisions (Sources 211). After this 
base level of the “good life” is achieved, humans can then pursue the higher goods of 
contemplation and politics (212).  
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 However, Taylor says, Aristotle’s prioritizing was reversed in the Reformation 
and Enlightenment and so for moderns1 the “ordinary life” is privileged over 
contemplation and politics. As a result, two important shifts took place. First, the Church 
(which borrowed from Aristotle) was rejected in favor of the individual (Sources 216). 
Second, the “instrumental stance” was made “central” (233). This “transform[ed] the 
understanding of the cosmos from an order of signs or Forms, whose unity lies in their 
relation to a meaningful whole, into an order of things producing reciprocal effects in 
each other, whose unity in God’s plan must be that of interlocking purposes” (233). This 
change in perception opened the door for individuals to engage the world and each other 
instrumentally, as they sought to define and achieve “ordinary life” as the highest good. 
 Rejecting a shared belief in an over-arching cosmic order, modern humans are left 
to make sense of the “goods” left to them from the old order. For Taylor, this makes such 
individualistic “frameworks” “inescapable” and “problematic” (17). He states, “What is 
common to them all is the sense that no framework is shared by everyone, can be taken 
for granted as the framework tout court, can sink to the phenomenological status of 
unquestioned fact” (17). These problematic frameworks create three types of people for 
Taylor: those who “self-conscious[ly]” accept a traditional position, those who accept 
their framework while “pluralist[ically]” allowing others to hold different frameworks, 
                                                
1 I use this term broadly to mean what Taylor means, signaling a fundamental shift in the 
way post-Enlightenment humans view themselves as individuals each possessing a “self” 
distinct and divorced from their environment. 
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and those who “are aware of their own uncertainties” and are “seeking” (17).2 Borrowing 
Alasdair MacIntyre’s term, Taylor says of this third type that they are on a “quest” (17).  
 Many moderns fall into this third category. This third group of modern 
individuals, influenced by the culture of the late 19th and early 20th century, might also be 
seen as including within it the cultural sub-group called the High Modernists (people like 
Eliot, Pound, Fitzgerald, and Woolf, hereafter referred to as modernists). Modernists 
primarily consist of the rapidly disappearing high culture within the larger group of the 
modern everyday population. The modern everyday population, post-Reformation, had 
demolished the old hierarchical public order that placed politics and contemplation 
(public life) as the highest form of the good life, privileging the ordinary life (private life) 
instead.3 As a result, says Taylor: 
Virtually nothing in the domain of mythology, metaphysics, or theology 
stands in this fashion as publicly available background today. But that 
doesn’t mean that there is nothing in any of those domains that [High 
Modern] poets may not want to reach out to in order to say what they want 
to say, no moral sources they descry there that they want to open for us. 
What it does mean is that their opening these domains, in default of being 
a move against a firm background, is an articulation of personal vision. 
(Sources 491-92) 
 
Therefore, people in the modern age have dealt with these issues of human purpose by 
setting out on quests of discovery, rejecting and leaving the traditions and orthodoxies 
they inherited in order to forge for themselves a “new” identity. In their quest they often 
lived mobile or transient lives, divorced from a community and personal vision. At its 
most extreme, perhaps, is the desire held by some moderns to escape the Earth 
                                                
2 Perhaps British rock band The Who best summed up this ethical dilemma of modern 
culture in their 1970 single “The Seeker” with the line: “I’ve got values but I don’t know 
how or why.” 
3 See Arendt, The Human Condition and Taylor, Sources of the Self, chapter 13, “‘God 
Loveth Adverbs’.” 
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completely, famously discussed by Hannah Arendt4 and explored extensively in science 
fiction from War of the Worlds to Battlestar Galactica. Less extreme, perhaps, was the 
desire in modernist literature for a new form to reflect a new framework. For example, F. 
Scott Fitzgerald sought for "something really NEW in form, idea, structure—the model 
for the age that Joyce and Stein are searching for, that Conrad didn't find" (47). Likewise, 
Woolf sought a “voyage out,” away from stultifying traditions and orthodoxies. As a 
result, many modernists on this risky quest physically rejected institutions and nations, 
becoming expatriates like Joyce and Hemingway. 
 Likewise, many modern Christians embrace a “tradition” of longing for heaven as 
an escape from this world. Basing their beliefs on the passages in the Bible that describe 
Christians as strangers and aliens on earth, they limit their theology by making heaven 
the real “home” for humans—an other and outer place. This tradition has many of its 
roots in the post-Enlightenment era, arguably from the same foundations used by 
moderns longing to escape the problems of life here on earth. In fact, one way post-
Enlightenment Christians distance themselves from earthly problems is to avoid 
community with other Christians. This theology of escape and individualism (i.e., a 
spiritual “personal vision”) ignores scripture that also talks about a new earth—a 
redeemed, restored earth—as well as places emphasis on community. Recently, Christian 
authors such as Randy Alcorn and N. T. Wright have sought to restore a holistic view of 
heaven to popular Christian theology.  
                                                
4 Arendt writes: “In 1957, an earth-born object made by man was launched into the 
universe…. The immediate reaction…was relief about the first ‘step toward escape from 
men’s imprisonment to the earth’” (1).  
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 Of course, there were also modernists who, embarking on “quests” of their own, 
re-discovered their inherited traditions and, in accepting them, chose to set down roots in 
a place. For example, T. S. Eliot said in the fourth section of Four Quartets, titled Little 
Gidding:  
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And to know the place for the first time. (208) 
 
Eliot is here reflecting as an older poet who, after all of the explorations in his early 
poetry, found his place in orthodox traditions of the past. Eliot is not alone in his rejection 
of youthful modernism for a return to orthodox tradition. Three other such authors are G. 
K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, and Wendell Berry.  
 Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry are key literary figures both because of the 
relationship of their ideas to each other and for the breadth of their writings, stretching 
from the turn of the twentieth-century to this day. Chesterton, perhaps best known for his 
Father Brown stories, would have considered himself first a journalist. He published 
prolifically from the turn of the century until his death in 1936. He wrote essays, poems, 
short stories, novels, biographies, and even a successful play. Besides writing, he is also 
well-known for his spirited debates with H. G. Wells and George Bernard Shaw. Unlike 
Chesterton, Lewis was a “scholar” in the traditional sense, earning three firsts at Oxford, 
then tutored and taught as a fellow for three decades at Magdalen College, Oxford before 
becoming Professor of Medieval and Renaissance English at Cambridge near the end of 
his life. After publishing a couple of unsuccessful volumes of poetry, he switched to 
prose, writing both fiction and essays. He is perhaps best known for his series of BBC 
talks about Christianity during the Second World War (later published as Mere 
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Christianity) and for his Chronicles of Narnia stories. Both Chesterton and Lewis are also 
known for their volumes of apologetics, which they wrote throughout their careers. For 
Lewis, the religious nature of these essays and talks cost him professionally, when he was 
passed over for a professorship at Oxford. Though Chesterton and Lewis both wrote 
Christian apologetics, the traditions to which they converted in adulthood and from which 
they wrote out of differed: Chesterton became Roman Catholic and Lewis became 
Anglican. 
Though to some it may seem odd to include Berry with possibly the two central 
Christian apologists of the twentieth century, I believe that Berry is rooted in orthodox 
Christianity and that the disparaging statements he has made about Christianity have been 
about the corrupted institution, not about biblical tenets. He, like Lewis and Chesterton 
before him, is a prophetic voice calling for Christians and non-Christians alike to return 
home. Many others, both Protestant and Catholic, have acknowledged this resistance 
Berry has towards institutionalized Christianity, while still embracing him as an orthodox 
Christian. Allan Carlson, for example, acknowledges that Berry has “been iconoclastic 
toward organized Christianity,” especially regarding “the dualism of orthodox Christian 
eschatology—setting this world off against the next—[that] has been the source of 
agricultural and environmental crises” (100). Nevertheless, Carlson also acknowledges 
that Berry’s solution is “derived from the Kingdom of God” (101). Even more forcefully, 
P. Travis Kroeker states, “Wendell Berry’s prophetic cultural criticism is rooted in a 
sacramental imagination” (120). Kroeker continues: 
It may ring strange to call Berry’s imagination “sacramental,” since he is 
neither a Catholic like Flannery O’Connor (in whose writing explicitly 
sacramental symbolism is in prominent display) nor, indeed, very overtly 
“religious” at all. I expect that Berry would strongly resist any attempt to 
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locate him religiously, or perhaps identify him as a “religious” or 
“Christian” writer. In these regards perhaps Berry is typically liberal 
Protestant—deeply suspicious of institutional Christianity, especially its 
claims to authority, and of the separation between the sacred and the 
secular…in everyday life. (120) 
 
As evidence, Kroeker refers to Berry’s disparaging comments in The Long-Legged 
House, explored below in chapter one, and also to Berry’s interview with Katherine 
Dalton, discussed below. Nevertheless, after this lengthy qualifier Kroeker still places 
Berry squarely in the Christian tradition, asserting: “In this essay I shall nevertheless 
attempt to ‘claim’ his work for membership in the Christian community—not in an 
ideological, triumphalist form (whether Protestant or Catholic, liberal or conservative) 
but in the form that bears witness to the messianic or Christic mystery that would restore 
all creation to its intended ordering of love in God” (120). In a sense, then, we see a 
hesitation by members in the academic community to define the religious aspect that 
pervades Berry’s writing. 
This hesitation has not gone unnoticed. In a review of the collection within which 
Carlson’s and Kroeker’s essays appear, Wendell Berry: Life and Work, Howard Benson is 
astute to point out the elephant in the room, hesitantly stepped around by most of the 
authors in the collection: the role of religion in Berry’s writings. Benson states:  
The question of the importance of religion in Berry’s work remains vexed, 
and neither Berry nor the contributors to this volume have been precisely 
helpful…. Though reluctant in some way to deal with it directly and 
occasionally confused by it, many of the essayists in this collection call 
attention to the strong religious element in Berry’s work. Reluctance and 
confusion are sometimes the result of the metaphysical uncertainty of 
some of the contributors, but Berry himself is not entirely settled in his 
convictions, and his take on Christianity is hard to pin down. (279) 
 
He even specifically mentions Carlson and Kroeker, saying of their religious language, 
for example: “The word orthodox is certainly misleading in this context and can only be 
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taken to refer to a certain brand of American Protestantism, and a phrase such as 
‘sacramental imagination’ loses meaning in the context of liberal Protestantism” (279). 
Referring to Catholic authors like Chesterton, Sayers, and other Distributists, Benson 
shows how Berry’s religious views align themselves with true orthodox Christianity. He 
concludes: 
It is plain that, from the precise and explicit biblical matter in such 
collections as Watch with Me to the vision of Heaven at the end of A 
World Lost, Berry’s fiction takes the religious life of Port William 
seriously; and in his political and social commentary Berry again and 
again holds up the imitation of Christ as the standard against which we 
measure our political and moral judgments. (280) 
 
In sum, Benson sees Berry’s writing in “fundamental agreement with Catholic social 
teaching” (281).  
In this view, Benson is not alone. The Catholic journal Communio recently 
featured a special issue on the topic of money that included a reprinted essay by Berry 
and two essays that explore Berry’s economic thought. According to Mark Shiffmann, 
“[W]e find in Berry, as in Aristotle, a vision of the profound intertwining of the first two 
parts of practical philosophy (Ethics and Œconomics)” (493).5 In the other essay on 
Berry, Nathan Schlueter draws connections between Berry’s novel Remembering and 
John Paul II’s The Theology of the Body. Of course, while Berry’s writings are not 
intentionally or overtly Catholic, that such orthodox Catholic thinkers as those in 
Communio do take seriously his thoughts on such issues as economics and sexuality is 
intriguing and speaks to the importance Berry places on religion, specifically 
Christianity. 
                                                
5 The third part is Politics, which Shiffmann claims Berry neglects “except to the extent 
that he identifies the causal role of public policies in the destruction of the productive 
household” (493). 
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Certainly, Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry share views that suggest a common 
conception of orthodoxy that acts as the foundation on which they build their similar-but-
distinct worldviews. In order to define what I mean by “orthodoxy,” I will begin with the 
definition Chesterton offers in his book of the same title. Chesterton prefaces his book by 
stating: “These essays are concerned only to discuss the actual fact that the central 
Christian theology (sufficiently summarized in the Apostles’ Creed) is the best root of 
energy and sound ethics. They are not intended to discuss the very fascinating but quite 
different question of what is the present seat of authority for the proclamation of that 
creed…” (Orthodoxy 7). Here we see Chesterton defining orthodoxy by emphasizing the 
beliefs held in the Apostle’s Creed, while dismissing any specific institutional particulars 
that he himself may have at the time believed. Even Berry, who is so critical of 
institutionalized Christianity, upholds the pre-institutional credal elements of a Creator, 
Creation, and the importance of looking to Christ as a model for living. Nevertheless, 
when many critics discuss Berry’s religious beliefs, his critique of Gnosticism in 
contemporary Christianity tends to dominate their discussion. Yes, Berry does seriously 
believe we are in peril if we accept a dualism that separates body and spirit. However, we 
must keep separate this modern version of Western Christianity from the comparable 
forms of orthodox Christianity that Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry emphasize. Once again, 
Benson is useful. He states, “Traditional Christianity has been naming and condemning 
the dualist heresy in all its forms for centuries” (279). In all of his condemnations, then, 
Berry is recovering an orthodoxy that precedes the dualism born out of the Enlightenment 
and the Industrial Revolution. 
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For sure, Berry’s writings align well with Chesterton’s definition of orthodoxy, 
because they again and again give Christian theology central importance in discussions of 
ethics, while at the same time remaining neutral toward any specific Christian 
institution.6 One could argue that Berry’s disdain for institutions is a natural by-product 
of his 1960s early adulthood. This is where Berry parts ways with Chesterton and Lewis. 
Though all three see many of the same problems, Chesterton and Lewis have found a 
place within institutions of the Church to voice their critiques. Berry, perhaps ironically, 
emphasizes the importance of place and community in his worldview and yet also largely 
rejects institutionalized forms of community. He makes no claims to regular church 
attendance, and his Sabbath poems involve his personal reflections that stem from 
Sabbath walks in nature. In other words, he chooses to participate in some communities, 
like those of nature and neighbor, while distrusting others, like Protestant denominations 
that appoint non-community members as pastors of rural churches. However, adherence 
to institutions is not absolutely necessary for orthodoxy. Rather, adherence to a common 
doctrine (tradition) by a community is the essence of orthodoxy. One cannot be orthodox 
to himself or herself, but rather only in relationship to someone else (who is by definition 
not orthodox). Therefore, orthodoxy is something only a community can do. It is the 
comparable orthodox vision these authors articulate in their writings, regardless of their 
particular institutional practice, that have important implications for our own 
understanding of our fragmented modern worldviews. Taken together, these authors show 
                                                
6 Orthodoxy, with a lowercase “o,” is the right term to describe Berry because he shares 
with Chesterton and Lewis the Judeo-Christian tradition and many specific social 
practices. He is not “Orthodox” (situated in specific affiliation like Roman Catholicism or 
Anglicanism) but is “orthodox” (conforming to the traditionally accepted Judeo-Christian 
beliefs and practices). Therefore, I am claiming that all three authors share “orthodoxy,” 
not “Orthodoxy.” 
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Christians confronting the identity crisis of modern humans, described above in the 
opening paragraph.  
 What do Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry offer as an alternative? In other words, 
how do they confront the assumptions of our modern technological and science-as-
religion culture? First, they place an emphasis on returning home, both spiritually and 
physically. The authors demonstrate this both in their own lives and in their writings. 
Second, they emphasize the important connection between place and ethics. At its roots, 
this connection is about economics. The OED defines “economy” as “[t]he way in which 
something is managed; the management of resources; household management.” From the 
Classical period to Middle Ages, the word meant “[t]he proper management of the body; 
(also) the rules which control a person's mode of living; regimen, diet” as well as “[a] 
household; a society or other structure ordered after the manner of a family” (OED), and 
it is telling that after science ushered in industrialism “economy” is now almost 
exclusively used to discuss money. Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry would have us return to 
the original meaning of the word. Third, they emphasized the importance of contentment 
with boundaries, arising from the self-limiting aspect of choosing to be rooted in place. 
This contentment allows us to respect others, including other humans, communities, and 
the natural world, and it allows us to reject all forms of imperialism. Fourth, they 
emphasize that liberal education (and especially the humanities) plays a crucial role in 
helping us integrate the previous three things and they warn against the dangers of 
“specialization.” 
Their returns to Christianity plunged them deeper into the life of this world and its 
traditions and problems. In other words, while many secular and Christian moderns alike 
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sought to escape the Earth and its problems, these authors chose to go back to a pre-
modern, or at least pre-Enlightenment Christian tradition that sent them deeper into the 
Earth, giving them a new way to see and interact with all that surrounded them. 
Each one’s re-discovery of a comparable conception of orthodox Christianity 
provided a new imaginative perspective with which to view the world. They saw the 
world with a sacramental imagination. That is, everything they saw in the world around 
them was connected in their imaginations to a larger cosmos ordered toward a supreme 
being. This sacramental imagination helped them view the world in a much less 
utilitarian way, setting them apart and opposed to many modernist elites who 
instrumentally use people, places, and the natural world. 
Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry write against the modern age, returning to a set of 
beliefs derived from orthodox religion, and accepting limits within a largely Judeo-
Christian context.  In doing so, they critique the scientific, technological milieu that 
sought (and seeks) to escape such limits. Examining how Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry 
confront the increasingly commercial, materialist, utilitarian, ends-justify-the-means 
culture of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries will help underscore the relevance of 
such literature to our current culture. Perhaps most of all, we need to include in our 
understanding of the humanities these authors’ insights into the importance that place, 
community, and orthodoxy hold in ethics. Their insights function as a crucial balance to 
our all-too-common tendency towards individualism and utilitarianism in our modern 
age. Studying these authors’ writings, therefore, allows us to understand and envision the 
contemporary relevance of the countercultural values that they propound. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
I: Departures and Returns in the Lives of Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry 
 Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry all experienced major returns in their lives, returns 
to roots and limits. “Return” refers to the way in which all three authors were born into 
families that were culturally Judeo-Christian, were then challenged as young adults by 
modern narratives of limitless progress to reject this tradition, but finally chose to reject 
these modern narratives in favor of something resembling a rooted orthodox Judeo-
Christian worldview and the limits that go with it. These returns were brought about in 
ways unique to the authors, but one major commonality among them is that the returns 
happened when they discovered and chose to embrace an idea of “the Good” that 
transcended the merely material. Charles Taylor calls “higher-order goods of this kind 
‘hypergoods’, i.e., goods which not only are incomparably more important than others 
but provide the standpoint from which these must be weighed, judged, [and] decided 
about” (Sources 63). These “hypergoods” are the ideals that contribute to the wholeness 
of a place, including those who dwell in it. This concept of “wholeness” derives from the 
Judeo-Christian account of creation in Genesis—everything God created was deemed 
good and existed within an assigned place, but humanity rejected this order and thus 
broke apart the original “wholeness.” Therefore, the Judeo-Christian teleology includes 
consideration of an eventual restoration and return.7  These “goods” led these authors to 
                                                
7 Though even a post-structuralist like Jacques Derrida may consider the issue of totality, 
most postmodern writers are suspicious of what they would call meta-narratives that 
enforce a false sense of wholeness or closure. I am arguing, following Taylor, that these 
meta-narratives are really “inescapable frameworks,” even for postmoderns. See Sources 
of the Self, chapter one. Near the end of Sources of the Self, Taylor states: “For Derrida 
there is nothing but deconstruction, which swallows up the old hierarchical distinctions 
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various homecomings, categorized loosely as spiritual and physical. For Chesterton and 
Lewis, discovering and accepting a return to Christian beliefs helped lead them to an 
imaginative perspective rooted in place. For Berry, discovering and accepting his 
vocation as a placed farmer/writer led him physically back home to Kentucky early in his 
career where he was able to ask religious questions about place that allowed him to 
wrestle with his inherited Baptist faith.  
 As a young man, Chesterton rejected his religious cultural roots and set out on a 
journey to discover some new philosophy as a replacement. He, like many others at the 
turn of the twentieth century in England, was hoping to escape the stultifying Victorian 
values and the version of Christian religion that went with them. However, in setting out 
on a journey of discovery or progress, Chesterton ironically realized when he finished 
that he had actually returned past his Victorian upbringing and rediscovered orthodox 
Christianity. As he puts it in Orthodoxy, “I did try to found a heresy of my own; and 
when I had put the last touches to it, I discovered that it was orthodoxy” (6). 
 What seeds of orthodoxy were planted in Chesterton’s childhood that made 
escape impossible when he tried to found, or discover, his heresy? Briefly, Gilbert Keith 
Chesterton was born on 29 May 1874 to Edward and Marie Chesterton. Chesterton’s 
parents were bohemian types (Oddie 18) who, as good Victorians, retained the Christian 
                                                                                                                                            
between philosophy and literature, and between men and women, but just as readily 
could swallow up equal/unequal, community/disorder, uncoerced/constrained dialogue, 
and the like. Nothing emerges from this flux worth affirming, and so what in fact comes 
to be celebrated is the deconstructing power itself…pure untrammelled freedom” (489). 
He continues, “The very claim not to be oriented by a notion of the good….reflects that 
the underlying ideal is some variant of that most invisible, because it is the most 
pervasive, of all modern goods, unconstrained freedom” (489). Finally, he states, “To the 
extent that this kind of freedom is held up as the essence of ‘post-modernity’, as it is by 
Jean-François Lyotard, it shows this to be a prolongation of the least impressive side of 
modernism” (489).  
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virtues while dismissing the Christian creed (Ward 6). Mocking modern psychology, he 
says in his Autobiography:  
I regret that I have no gloomy and savage father to offer to the public gaze 
as the true cause of all my tragic heritage; no pale-faced and partially 
poisoned mother whose suicidal instincts have cursed me with the 
temptations of the artistic temperament… And I am compelled to confess 
that I look back to that landscape of my first days with a pleasure that 
should doubtless be reserved for the Utopias of the Futurist. (38)  
 
One of his earliest and most influential memories was of a toy theater his father built for 
him, which helped instill in him a love for limits: “Apart from the fact of it [the toy 
theater] being my first memory, I have several reasons for putting it first… All my life I 
have loved edges; and the boundary-line that brings one thing sharply against another. All 
my life I have loved frames and limits; and I will maintain that the largest wilderness 
looks larger seen through a window” (Autobiography 41). In chapter four I will address 
the issue of limits. Summing up his childhood, Chesterton states, “In a word; I have never 
lost the sense that this was my real life; the real beginning of what should have been a 
more real life; a lost experience in the land of the living” (59). He would have to journey 
through a period of psychological and spiritual hell in his adolescence and young 
adulthood before he “discovered” that his love for limits had helped him rediscover 
orthodoxy. This is not unlike the mission of the humanities, for which rediscovery is as 
important as discovery is to the sciences—a necessary task. 
 Chesterton refers to his adolescence as “the period of youth which is full of 
doubts and morbidities and temptations; and which, though in my case mainly subjective, 
has left in my mind for ever a certitude upon the objective solidity of Sin” 
(Autobiography 87). He further states, “…I am not proud of believing in the Devil. To 
put it more correctly, I am not proud of knowing the Devil. I made his acquaintance by 
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my own fault; and followed it up along lines which, had they been followed further, 
might have led me to devil-worship or the devil knows what” (88). This period is 1892-
94, during which Chesterton took a year off after finishing at St. Paul’s public school and 
then attended the Slade School of Art at University College, London.8 It was during this 
period that Chesterton dabbled in spiritualism, even using an Ouija board with his 
younger brother Cecil. He also learned about modern art at the Slade School, especially 
the then-popular Impressionism. His dislike of Impressionism (remember, he always 
loved “edges”) and the prevailing mood of pessimism he encountered during this period 
produced real internal turmoil.  
 This prevailing mood of pessimism primarily, for Chesterton, stemmed from 
Walter Pater’s “art for art’s sake” and his influence on a major emblem of the early 
1890s, Oscar Wilde (Oddie 108-10). Chesterton viewed this philosophy’s not-too-subtle 
motive to do away with morality and any external good to focus on immediate pleasure 
as a nightmare, because of the pessimistic mood that inevitably accompanied it. For 
Chesterton, Pater’s regard for temporal pleasure as the aim of art only leads to a never-
ending pursuit of greater and greater pleasures—it is a pursuit that cannot be fulfilled, 
leading to despair, even of life itself.9 This despair of life was the ultimate evil of the fin 
de siècle for Chesterton. Disgusted, Chesterton fought against it:  
But I was still thinking the thing out by myself, with little help from 
philosophy and no real help from religion, I invented a rudimentary and 
makeshift mystical theory of my own. It was substantially this; that even 
mere existence, reduced to its most primary limits, was extraordinary 
enough to be exciting. Anything was magnificent as compared with 
                                                
8 See Oddie, who clears up inaccuracies in previous biographers’ timelines. 
9 To be fair, Pater was also after “dignity” and worth, but Chesterton does not discuss 
these aims. Perhaps Chesterton feels they are lost in the public outworking of Pater’s 
philosophy of art in the lives of its adherents. 
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nothing. Even if the very daylight were a dream, it was a day-dream; it 
was not a nightmare. (Autobiography 98) 
 
Chesterton emerged from this period as an optimist, and his life’s work from this point on 
can be viewed as a battle against the pessimism of the fin de siècle.10 
 This philosophy concerning optimism perhaps is best demonstrated in 
Chesterton’s companion works Heretics (1905) and Orthodoxy (1908). Heretics is 
loosely structured around many chapters that individually address writers whom 
Chesterton deems heretics, thinkers of his time such as Rudyard Kipling, H. G. Wells, G. 
B. Shaw, and George Moore. Chesterton respects these individuals for having a creed 
(being dogmatic) but believes their ideas are wrong. Due to the nature of his task, 
Chesterton does not lay out a sustained argument, but various statements throughout can 
be pieced together to build the framework of his philosophy regarding topics such as 
ethics, science, progress, and place.  
 One significant problem in modern ethics, felt Chesterton, was that it had lost or 
rejected all notions of an ideal, a good, towards which to point.11 Even if our best efforts 
to attain “the ethical ideal” are “hopeless,” they are still more “wholesome” than “modern 
morality, on the other hand, [which] can only point with absolute conviction to the 
horrors that follow breaches of law; its only certainty is a certainty of ill. It can only point 
                                                
10 Oddie states, “His hostility toward ‘the Pessimists’…continued to define his own 
literary identity” (375). 
11 MacIntyre traces this problem to the failure of the Enlightenment Project. Whereas the 
classical conception of human nature had three components: “untutored human nature, 
man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his telos and the moral precepts which enable him to 
pass from one state to the other,” the Enlightenment Project rejected “both Protestant and 
Catholic theology and the scientific and philosophical [aspects of] Aristotelianism” (54). 
This “eliminate[d] any notion of man-as-he-could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos” and “[left] 
behind a moral scheme composed of two remaining elements whose relationship 
becomes unclear” (54-55). 
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to imperfection. It has no perfection to point to” (Heretics 9). This does not mean that 
people cannot be good, “[f]or many such are good only through a withering knowledge of 
evil” (9). This negative moral philosophy had crept into art, especially in modern realism. 
Chesterton despised this type of writing, saying polemically, “Modern realists are indeed 
Terrorists, like the dynamiters; and they fail just as much in their effort to create a thrill. 
Both realists and dynamiters are well-meaning people engaged in the task, so obviously 
ultimately hopeless, of using science to promote morality” (12). This part about science 
and morality is important; it helps explain why he was so opposed to privileging science 
as a replacement for religion. He was rejecting the modernist tendency to leave religion 
and embrace science as a substitute to derive morality. Chesterton was instead favoring a 
return to the integrative, ordered, hierarchical world view with its set of values based in 
Greek and Judeo-Christian tradition provided by orthodox religion as an alternative. 
 This rejection of religion as source for a world view sums up much of the 
pessimism of the fin de siècle: a philosophy with no positive ideal towards which to strive 
leaves only “unconstrained freedom” as its goal, leading to destructive lifestyles and a 
despair about life itself (Taylor Sources 489).12 For example, Shaw once said in praise of 
Ibsen’s morality, “The golden rule is that there is no golden rule” (qtd. in Heretics 12). 
Chesterton strongly disagreed with this statement. Eliminating all positive moral ideals 
from one’s philosophy of life left one vulnerable to committing evil.13 This is because, 
Chesterton says, “[the] absence of an enduring positive ideal […] does leave us face to 
                                                
12 See fn. 3, above. 
13 As MacIntyre states, “What is abundantly clear is that in everyday life as in moral 
philosophy the replacement of Aristotelian or Christian teleology by a definition of the 
virtues in terms of the passions is not so much or at all the replacement of one set of 
criteria by another, but rather a movement towards and into a situation where there are no 
longer any clear criteria” (235-36). 
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face with the problem of a human consciousness filled with very definite images of evil, 
and with no definite image of good” (12-3). The modern ethical philosophy, then, varied 
considerably from past ages which, says Chesterton, “have sweated and been crucified in 
an attempt to realize what is really the right life, what was really the good man” (13). 
Certainly Aristotle’s ethical philosophy sought to achieve this. In contrast, “Every one of 
the popular modern phrases and ideals is a dodge in order to shirk the problem of what is 
good” (13).  
 For Chesterton, therefore, lack of a moral ideal rendered meaningless the popular 
concept of “progress.” Chesterton, taking an Aristotelian perspective, believed that in 
order to progress there has to be an ideal to progress towards. In his characteristic 
polemical manner, he states, “Nobody has any business to use the word ‘progress’ unless 
he has a definite creed and a cast-iron code of morals. Nobody can be progressive without 
being doctrinal” (Heretics 15). However, this does not rule out any possibility of 
progress: “I do not, therefore, say that the word ‘progress’ is unmeaning; I say it is 
unmeaning without the previous definition of a moral doctrine, and that it can only be 
applied to groups of persons who hold that doctrine in common” (15). Chesterton’s moral 
philosophy at this point again appears similar to Aristotle and our own modern day 
Aristotelian philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, who hold a communitarian 
understanding of ethics, which believes ethics should be rooted in a commonly held 
belief of the ideal or good. An example of this communitarian understanding would be 
the Amish, who hold the same Judeo-Christian tradition as other communities, but they 
more narrowly define it. Amish communities are not relativist, because their ideal goes 
back to a source. 
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There is a big difference between orienting one’s life according to a telos and 
ordering one’s life according to a vague idea of “progress.” A telos presupposes a 
specific End and therefore a map can be made to help us reach that End. Progress, as the 
term is popularly used, rejects any traditional understanding of an End, and therefore, 
whatever maps are created has no way to provide orientation. We need a larger 
framework and orthodoxy, or a worldview that can be taken as an “unquestioned fact,” is 
a necessary condition for a viable telos (Taylor Sources 17). In other words, in order for 
us to have a shared public telos, we need to have a common foundational framework. 
Until we have something like such a shared background to help us shape an ideal, our 
public selves will likely tend towards the individualistic and we will work at cross-
purposes. 
 Finally, in Heretics Chesterton shows how adherence to place makes edges 
“disappear.” What I mean is not that the edges actually disappear, but that we cease to 
notice them because we are looking inward, rather than outward. In fact, edges can be 
important because they can focus to stay put and look inward at our place. A great 
example of this phenomenon is seen in the Disney classic The Swiss Family Robinson. 
Though at first the ocean surrounding the island on which the Robinsons shipwreck 
seems like a limiting edge, after a while they realize the wealth and beauty of the island 
and create their own society, a society that we (the audience) find rich and adventurous—
thus the appeal.14 Chesterton had already explained this phenomenon, “The moment we 
are rooted in a place, the place vanishes. We live like a tree with the whole strength of the 
universe” (Heretics 22). What Chesterton means by “place vanishes,” is that we no 
                                                
14 In fact, we almost forget about the ocean until some pirates show up near the end of the 
movie.  
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longer see it from the outside, as a separate thing with edges. From the inside, place 
phenomenologically “disappears.” One thing striking about this statement is that it 
sounds so much like how deep ecologists might talk about the symbiotic relationship 
between humans and nature, though written more than a century ago. This similarity is no 
coincidence.  
 Perhaps the “tree” metaphor resembles environmental language because the 
ecological worldview takes rootedness in place as Taylor’s “unquestioned fact” (Sources 
17). In other words, the ecological worldview accepts without question a part of the prior 
orthodoxy—a public framework that used to be common to all. Another striking aspect is 
that it emphasizes a significant part of Chesterton’s philosophical outlook: by using 
paradox, he has highlighted a simple truth about the way our imaginations perceive 
space. Only when we stop and view a place from the inside do we see the various things 
that make up the place—a complete world within a world. In fact, Chesterton states, “The 
telescope makes the world smaller; it is only the microscope that makes it larger” 
(Heretics 23).15 He therefore views the then new technological invention of the motorcar 
as a symptom of the modern outlook of his time that privileges motion—progress—rather 
than appreciating (loving) what is already there. Unfortunately, we miss so much if we do 
not allow ourselves to become rooted. He states, “It is inspiriting without doubt to whizz 
in a motorcar round the earth, to feel Arabia as a whirl of sand and China as a flash of 
rice-fields. But Arabia is not a whirl of sand and China is not a flash of rice-fields. They 
are ancient civilizations with strange virtues buried like treasures” (23). He continues, 
“The man standing in his own kitchen-garden, with fairyland opening at the gate, is the 
                                                
15 Here is an example of where Chesterton shows that he is not totally dismissive of all 
science or technology. 
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man with large ideas. His mind creates distance; the motorcar stupidly destroys it” (23). 
This image is reminiscent of George MacDonald, one of Chesterton’s favorite authors 
and one of the authors who helped save him from the pessimism of his youth. Finally, 
Chesterton says : “And [motorcar civilization] watches from its splendid parochialism, 
possibly with a smile of amusement, …going its triumphant way, outstripping time, 
consuming space, seeing all and seeing nothing, roaring on at last to the capture of the 
solar system, only to find the sun cockney and the stars suburban” (24).16   
 For Chesterton, the motorcar was the type of technology that best exemplified the 
fast-paced lifestyle of modern humans. Obviously, this lifestyle has not slowed down but 
only become faster as technology has “improved.” Our cars have become faster, we now 
rely on supersonic jets for transportation, and we can even launch humans into space so 
that they have an outside perspective on the earth, providing us all with an iconic image 
of earth as an abstract mix of blues, browns, greens, and swirling whites. Of course, this 
“blue marble” image can be seen as working both for and against an ecological view—a 
fragile world that must be saved, or used up, or abandoned altogether.17 This “motorcar 
civilization” mindset lends itself to important ethical problems. What is fascinating is that 
Lewis and Berry both make similar negative remarks about this type of modern 
“motorcar” thinking. We will explore their comments and the ethical issues raised a little 
later in the chapter. 
                                                
16 Once again, this last statement is reminiscent of Arendt: “The most radical change in 
the human condition we can imagine would be an emigration of men from the earth to 
some other planet” (10). 
17 Perhaps to populate the moon, as one American presidential primary candidate 
suggested in 2012. 
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 Chesterton’s contemporaries, especially satiric nineties novelist and playwright, 
G. S. Street, criticized Chesterton for attacking others’ philosophies in Heretics without 
laying out his own. In response to this “challenge,” Chesterton wrote Orthodoxy (1). In 
the book’s introduction, Chesterton reveals another crucial part of his philosophy of life: 
I have often had a fancy for writing a romance about an English 
yachtsman who slightly miscalculated his course and discovered England 
under the impression that it was a new island in the South Seas. […] This 
at least seems to me the main problem for philosophers, and is in a manner 
the main problem of this book. How can we contrive to be at once 
astonished at the world and yet at home in it? (3, italics mine) 
 
What is it about this quote that has allowed it to live on for over a hundred years? The 
answer lies in a teleologically coherent worldview that allows for the astonishment of 
homecoming. This astonishment at homecoming is related to the importance of place 
from Heretics. There, place became larger once one set down roots and began to look 
around. Here, Chesterton is taking this idea a step further: he adds the welcome feeling of 
“home” to the astonishment at enjoying the newness, or uniqueness of observing one’s 
immediate place. This drama finds its fullest expression in Chesterton’s novel Manalive, 
discussed below. As noted earlier, Chesterton connects this parable to his philosophy by 
declaring, “The man from the yacht thought he was the first to find England; I thought I 
was the first to find Europe. I did try to found a heresy of my own; and when I had put 
the last touches to it, I discovered that it was orthodoxy” (6).  
 
Like Chesterton, Lewis also rejected his religious upbringing as an adolescent. As 
Lewis puts it, “I ceased to be a Christian” (Surprised 58). This led him on a journey to 
discover his philosophy of life on his own, like his other contemporaries from 1918 to 
1930. He was first an atheist, then an agnostic, before finally becoming “the most 
 24 
 
dejected and reluctant convert in all England” (Surprised 229). Just as Chesterton’s, 
Lewis’s quest to discover a new framework led him to return to orthodox Christianity, 
though his journey took him a bit longer. Also, like Chesterton, the roots for his return 
began in his childhood, especially with regards to a fascination with “joy” and its 
relationship to place, as we shall see. Lewis sought to build his framework around the 
concept of “joy,” but his quest led him to re-discover the religious tradition and 
orthodoxy from which he thought he could escape. 
Clive Staples Lewis was born in November 1898 in Belfast, Ireland to Albert and 
Flora Lewis. When Lewis was seven his family moved into a larger house, which they 
called “New House.” As his health was delicate, he was not allowed outside for long 
periods of time and thus spent most of his childhood in the house (Sayer 35-6). In fact, 
said Lewis, “The New House is almost a major character in my story. I am a product of 
long corridors, empty sunlit rooms, upstairs indoor silences, attics explored in solitude, 
distant noises of gurgling cisterns and pipes, and the noise of wind under the tiles. Also, 
of endless books” (Surprised 10). Spending so much time in the “New House” provided 
Lewis with two important things. First, it helped foster in him an appreciation for place 
and the imaginative largeness of his limited world.18 Second, it provided him later with 
the setting for one of his best-loved books, The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, which 
he expanded into a series of seven books that deal to a large degree with the issues of 
place and ethics, as I discuss in chapter three. 
                                                
18 Though he came from a middle-class background, his frugality and—for a time—his 
tendency to give away a large portion of his income shows that Lewis’s imaginative 
vision was not monetarily unfettered. Throughout his life, he fostered his imagination 
through books and nature walks, while still working full-time and living frugally. See 
Sayer, chapter nine, “Into Poverty.” 
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 Just as Chesterton’s fascination with limits as a child acted as a key to fit the lock 
of his rediscovered orthodoxy, Lewis was also given a key, though of a different sort. 
Lewis’s key was the experience of “joy.” As a child, Lewis had three foundational 
episodes in which he experienced “joy” for the first time. The first occurred when his 
brother Warren showed him his toy garden consisting of a “biscuit tin filled with moss” 
(Surprised 16). This took place when they still lived at the Old House. The toy garden 
awakened “desire,” but for what he did not know, and the sensation was over in a 
“moment of time” (16). A second episode that reawakened the sensation of “joy” for 
Lewis came from reading Squirrel Nutkin by Beatrix Potter. Of this book and its 
corresponding emotions, Lewis states: 
And one went back to the book, not to gratify the desire (that was 
impossible—how can one possess Autumn?) but to reawaken it. And in 
this experience also there was the same surprise and the same sense of 
incalculable importance. It was something quite different from everyday 
life and even from ordinary pleasure; something, as they would now say, 
“in another dimension.” (17) 
 
The third encounter with “joy” occurred for Lewis from reading these lines in an 
“unrhymed translation of Tegner’s Drapa: “I heard a voice that cried, | Balder the 
beautiful | Is dead, is dead—” (17).  This third episode awakened a lifelong love for 
Northernness in Lewis. Of these three episodes, Lewis states, “[I]n a sense the central 
story of my life is about nothing else” (17). Lewis named this feeling he experienced 
“joy” and defined it as “that of an unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than 
any other satisfaction… and must be sharply distinguished both from Happiness and from 
Pleasure” (17-8). Throughout his childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood, Lewis 
pursued “joy” religiously, but found, much like John in his semi-autobiographical 
Pilgrim’s Regress, that the experiences of “joy” became less frequent and intense. Once 
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converted to Christianity, “the subject [had] lost nearly all interest to [him]” (238). He 
viewed “joy” simply “as a pointer to something other and outer” (238).  
 What seems significant about the first glimpse of “joy” that Lewis felt as a child 
and what also links it to Chesterton’s own childhood key is that it occurred through the 
medium of a toy, in this case a toy garden. The garden represented a small place, with 
very definite limits, but upon close imaginative inspection could open itself up as a whole 
world in and of itself. Unlike Chesterton, who found pleasure in his actual toy theater, 
Lewis seemed only interested in the feeling of “joy” brought on by the garden, thinking 
of the joy as another-worldly. For Lewis, the toy garden was a vehicle for the experience 
of desire, instead of a finite and physical object possessing its own value and beauty. He 
would learn to distinguish the difference later in his life. 
 Unlike Chesterton, whose childhood remained pleasant until he left home to go to 
school, Lewis’s childhood gave way to sorrow much sooner. Perhaps the last key event 
that took place in Lewis’s childhood that planted the seeds for his quest away from 
religious tradition and orthodoxy was the death of his mother in 1908 from abdominal 
cancer (Sayer 47). This traumatic event occurred when Lewis was eight and, as he 
described later, “was the occasion of what some (but not I) might regard as my first 
religious experience” (Surprised 20). This is because, though he prayed fervently for his 
mother’s healing during her decline towards death, and even after she died, hoping for a 
miracle, he “had approached God, or [his] idea of God, without love, without awe, even 
without fear” (21). In essence, he treated God as a “magician” and the disappointment left 
no lasting impression upon him (21). With his mother’s death the “old security” of home 
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was lost and “[i]t was sea and islands now; the great continent had sunk like Atlantis” 
(21). 
 After his mother’s death his father sent him away to school, where the seeds of 
his journey of discovery, away from religious tradition and orthodoxy, were nourished. 
He was sent to Wynyard School, where he was “taught” by a probably insane headmaster 
and was mentally and emotionally abused, as he extensively outlines in Surprised by Joy. 
However, it was here that he “first…became an effective believer” (33). To Saint John’s, 
an Anglo-Catholic church, he was taken twice each Sunday. Though as an “Ulster 
Protestant” he chafed at the outward Catholic leanings of the church, it was there “that 
[he] heard the doctrines of Christianity (as distinct from general ‘uplift’) taught by men 
who obviously believed them” (33).  Lewis’s exposure to the “doctrines” and people who 
believed them suggest that the “influence of the church upon his intellect…became far 
more important than its influence on his feelings” (Sayer 54). This period of religious 
fervor did not last long, however, as Wynyard was closed and Lewis was sent to 
Cherbourg School, where he was influenced by an occultist named Miss Cowie, the 
Matron. It is at this point that he “ceased to be a Christian” (Surprised 58).  
This rejection of Christian tradition and orthodoxy came about for two reasons. 
First, he prayed fervently, as before, but this time when his prayers were not answered, he 
began to doubt his faith and look elsewhere. His relationship with Cowie helped develop 
in him a “passion for the Occult,” which he described as “a spiritual lust; and like the lust 
of the body it has the fatal power of making everything else in the world seem 
uninteresting while it lasts” (Surprised 60). Here we see a similar principle at work as 
when he pursued “joy.” Both goals were to experience something other-worldly, to take 
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him out of his hum-drum experience and into something greater. This emphasis on 
feelings and discovering new things led him to “[alter] ‘I believe’ to ‘one does feel’” 
(60). Lewis during this period experienced the lingering Gnosticism in modernity that 
separates body and spirit. He had not yet gained a non-dualistic appreciation for the 
world that would form the foundation for a sacramental view, a view shared by 
Chesterton and Berry. This dualism is the second reason he lost faith in Christian doctrine 
and eventually began to call himself an “atheist.” 
  There are many factors that contributed to Lewis’s return to faith. Two of the 
most influential authors that helped were George MacDonald and Chesterton. 
Interestingly, MacDonald was a significant influence on Chesterton, so in essence he 
really influenced them both. For Lewis, this influence sprang from reading Phantastes, a 
faerie Romance. Lewis’s later reflection on his experience with the book deserves to be 
quoted at length because it shows a significant development in his imagination regarding 
place: 
The woodland journeyings in that story, the ghostly enemies, the ladies 
both good and evil, were close enough to my habitual imagery to lure me 
on without the perception of a change…. For in one sense the new country 
was exactly like the old…. But in another sense all was changed…. That 
night my imagination was, in a certain sense, baptized; the rest of me, not 
unnaturally, took longer. I had not the faintest notion what I had let myself 
in for by buying Phantastes. (Surprised 179-81) 
 
The type of imagination awakened in Lewis through his reading of MacDonald is a 
sacramental imagination. As stated earlier, a sacramental imagination is one that views 
the world as “good” and pointing to God as Creator. In other words, a sacramental 
imagination is implicitly teleological. A tree, for example, is not just millions of tightly 
packed atoms, but a visible signpost to a Creator who in goodness holds those atoms in 
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place. A sacramental imagination places things within a larger cosmic order ordained by 
God. This imagination allowed Lewis, like Chesterton, to see and appreciate the world 
around him. Like the fairy tales that endow the commonplace with magical qualities, 
Lewis was able to see the good in his surroundings. He was able to see the inherent worth 
of things. Of course, I do not mean to imply that other traditions and faiths cannot see the 
worth in things or that their views are instrumentalizing. I am simply trying to show how 
a sacramental imagination allowed my authors to reject such views. 
 Chesterton’s influence on Lewis’s reasoning, however, was even greater than his 
influence on Lewis’s imagination. Pre-Christian Lewis believed that “Chesterton had 
more sense than all the other moderns put together, bating, of course, his Christianity” 
(Surprised 213). Chesterton, among others, helped Lewis to doubt his age’s insistence on 
rejecting the past as outmoded, barbaric, and wrong compared to modern philosophies. 
Lewis’s love for the classics helped add to this belief of his age, but he could not see how 
to bridge the past with the present. Here Chesterton helped Lewis bridge the gap: “Then I 
read Chesterton’s Everlasting Man and for the first time saw the whole Christian outline 
of history set out in a form that seemed to me to make sense” (223). Chesterton helped 
Lewis see how Christianity did not completely reject paganism, as the popular modern 
Christianity did, but instead fulfilled and built upon it as a foundation. For Lewis, “The 
question was no longer to find the one simply true religion among a thousand religions 
simply false. It was rather, ‘Where has religion reached its true maturity? Where, if 
anywhere, have the hints of all Paganism been fulfilled?’” (235). Lewis, of course, 
decided that Christianity accomplished this and famously became, through some 
hyperbole of his own, “the most dejected and reluctant convert in all England,” 
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completing his journey home (228-9). One could surmise that the dejection and 
reluctance came from swallowing his pride in accepting an orthodoxy he had resisted for 
so long. Lewis was persuaded because he recognized in orthodoxy not an outright 
rejection of history, but rather a fulfillment of it. In this sense orthodoxy is not a tiny box 
keeping safe its dogma from the world, but more like water, which permeates the world 
around it, providing life and health.  
 After accepting Christianity and its coherent worldview, Lewis was able to 
appreciate the present world around him, including “place.” We can see this appreciation 
for place demonstrated in his cautions against rapid mobility. Like Chesterton, Lewis had 
a disdain for modern transportation for what it did to our ability to appreciate place. He 
states: 
The truest and most horrible claim made for modern transport is that it 
“annihilates space.” It does. It annihilates one of the most glorious gifts we 
have been given. It is a vile inflation which lowers the value of distance, 
so that a modern boy travels a hundred miles with less sense of liberation 
and pilgrimage and adventure than his grandfather got from traveling ten. 
(Surprised 157) 
 
Lewis, like Chesterton, sees the rush of the modern age as an inhibitor to the ability to 
appreciate the world around us. Interestingly, he never learned to drive a car, though he 
tried to learn a couple of times and his groundskeeper often drove him back and forth 
between Oxford and his home (Sayer 202). Primarily, though, Lewis’s feet were his main 
form of transportation, and he enjoyed both daily walks and occasional walking tours that 
afforded him the chance to enjoy the natural world. These daily walks offered Lewis the 
opportunity to exercise his sacramental imagination and see things not as instrumental, 
but as good. We will discuss in chapter three the implications of this new way of seeing 
things. 
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*** 
Like Chesterton and Lewis, Berry also faced a moment of crisis as a young man. 
Though many of his contemporary authors and artists in the United States during the mid-
twentieth century were leaving their rural roots and congregating in major metropolitan 
areas to further their careers, he chose to reject this narrative in favor of returning to his 
native place. He was rejecting a cultural narrative that privileged mobility over 
rootedness and the city over the country. Over the course of the years following his 
return, Berry realized “how false and destructive and silly those ideas are” (Long 175). In 
order to understand how Berry came to this countercultural point of view, one needs to 
look at his childhood and adolescence to see his development of a philosophy that 
privileges place.  
Wendell Berry was born in Henry County, Kentucky in 1934. The son of a 
lawyer, he grew up in the rural community of Port Royal, along the Kentucky River. 
Regarding religion, Berry states, “I was raised as a Southern Baptist. But I’ve always felt 
myself an outsider to the sects and denominations” (Christian Century 118). As anyone 
familiar with Berry would know, the town of Port William in which almost all of his 
fiction is set is based on the model of Port Royal, though of course it is not strictly 
autobiographical. Needless to say, Berry is a self-professed “placed” writer and, except 
for a few years of his early adulthood, he has resided within the same few miles of 
Kentucky. Those few years away from Henry County constitute a crucial moment in 
Berry’s life narrative, as he could have easily chosen to remain away and become an 
“exiled” writer. Instead, he says, “I myself have traveled several thousand miles to arrive 
at Lane’s Landing, five miles from where I was born, and the knowledge I gained by my 
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travels was mainly that I was born into the same world as everybody else” (Long 169). 
This rediscovery is similar to the phenomenon described earlier by Chesterton in 
Orthodoxy, of a man shipwrecked on a seemingly strange island only to discover that 
island is his English home.  
  Berry, like Chesterton and Lewis, also had a “key” passed on to him as a child. 
For Berry, this key was a cabin built along the Kentucky River by his great-uncle Curran 
Mathews. The cabin became known as the Camp. The significance of this dwelling was 
so great that Berry devoted a fifty-page autobiographical essay to it early in his literary 
career. Though his knowledge of Mathews from personal interaction was limited, as 
Mathews died when Berry was twelve or thirteen (Long 119), Berry imaginatively pieced 
together a narrative of Mathews’ life through his interaction with the cabin and 
landscaping he left behind. In fact, Mathews helped nurture young Berry’s imagination 
by telling him “adventure stories,” often borrowed from Tarzan or Zane Grey (109). An 
adult Berry, though, imagines Mathews’ thoughts as he built his two-room cabin by the 
river, interestingly acknowledging the imaginative impact of limits. He states: 
As soon as he [Mathews] marked out the dimensions of his house on the 
ground the place would have begun to look different to him, would have 
begun to have an intimacy for him that it could never have had before. 
Earlier, any place he stood was more or less equal to any other place he 
stood; he would move on to another place. But once those boundaries 
were marked on the ground, there would have begun to be a permanent 
allegiance. (113) 
 
This “permanent allegiance” to the place has a direct metaphorical parallel in marriage 
and, like Chesterton, Berry seems to view both allegiances as a sort of romance. This 
romance is not unlike that felt by a young Chesterton with his toy theater or a young 
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Lewis with his toy garden—the boundaries enhanced, to twist a phrase, “captive 
imaginations.” 
  Like Chesterton and Lewis, Berry had discovered a “world” of fixed limits, and 
this similarly shaped his imagination. Though Mathews’ decision to build the Camp 
along the river was partially due to health reasons, Berry insisted that “the best reason for 
the cabin he built…must be that it was in his nature to have a house built in the woods 
and to return now again to live in it. For there was something deep about him, something 
quiet-loving and solitary and kin to the river and the woods” (Long 110). One would 
think Berry was describing himself. How did Berry’s relationship with the Camp begin? 
Interestingly, as a boy he found the cabin an escape from adult supervision, a retreat in 
which he could make his own rules, much as his bachelor great-uncle did. To Berry “[i]t 
was the family’s wilderness place, and lay beyond the claims and disciplines and 
obligations that motivated my grownups” (115). It was here that he escaped, often alone, 
sometimes with his brother or friends, and canoed, read Walden, and camped. When he 
was “nearly fourteen” he slept there alone one night and it was then, he says, that there 
“began a conscious relation between me and the Camp, and it has been in my mind and 
figured in my plans ever since” (119-20). So much so that he fixed up the Camp in the 
days leading up to his wedding and he and his new bride Tanya made it their first home 
together the summer they were married. Of this he says, “Our marriage became then, and 
has remained, the center of our life. And it is particularly true that the Camp is the center 
of our marriage, both as actuality and as symbol” (130).  
 However, the seeds had already been planted in his mind to move away from the 
Camp. An earlier memory of when he was fishing in the river highlights this change. As 
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he was fishing, enjoying the moment, he suddenly became aware of what he was doing, 
causing him to be “deeply uneasy, even distressed” (Long 123). He attributes this unease 
to the messages taught to him by culture: “My cultural inheritance had prepared me to 
exert myself, work, move, ‘get someplace.’ To be idle, simply to live there in the sunlight 
in the middle of the river, was something I was not prepared to do deliberately” (123). 
This cultural demand of oughts caused the “spell” to be “broken” (123). A major cultural 
narrative that influenced Berry was the narrative that all rural children should go to 
college, get educated, move permanently to the city to get jobs, and thus “advance” their 
positions. So, in the fall of 1957 Berry and Tanya moved to Georgetown, KY where he 
taught at Georgetown College for two years. Then, from 1959 to 60, Berry taught 
creative writing at Stanford University in California. He then spent a year traveling 
Europe on a Guggenheim Fellowship, before teaching at New York University from 1962 
to 64 (Grubbs xviii).  
 While in New York, Berry decided to return to Kentucky and accepted a teaching 
position at the University of Kentucky. Understandably, this decision was not an easy one 
and numerous family, friends, and colleagues tried to convince him to stay in New York. 
He says, “The decision to leave had cost me considerable difficulty and doubt and hard 
thought—for hadn’t I achieved what had become one of the most traditional goals of 
American writers? I had reached the greatest city in the nation; I had a good job; I was 
meeting with other writers and talking to them and learning from them; I had reason to 
hope that I might take a still larger part in the literary life of that place” (Long 174). 
However, Berry, who was still writing about Kentucky, could not “escape” it: “Kentucky 
was my fate” (174). He says, “ I still had a deep love for the place I had been born in, and 
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liked the idea of going back to be a part of it again” (174). A senior faculty member in his 
department, “speak[ing]…as a representative of the literary world,” tried to convince him 
to stay (175). Of this faculty member’s mindset, Berry states: 
I do not pretend to know all about the other man’s mind… His argument 
was based on the belief that once one had attained the metropolis, the 
literary capital, the worth of one’s origins was cancelled out; there simply 
could be nothing worth going back to. What lay behind me…had become 
“subject matter.” And there was the belief, long honored among American 
intellectuals and artists and writers, that a place such as I came from could 
only be returned to at the price of intellectual death… Finally, there was 
the assumption that the life of the metropolis is the experience, the modern 
experience…” (175) 
 
Central to this urban assumption is an implied rootlessness (“cancelled out”) that suggests 
a person’s development—intellectual, creative, or otherwise—exists in a vacuum, as if a 
person could make him or herself from nothing. Also implied here is a clear utilitarianism 
about “one’s origins,” as they are only extrinsically meaningful as steps along the way to 
the “modern experience.” 
In contrast, says Berry, “the life of the rural towns, the farms, the wilderness 
places is not only irrelevant to our time, but archaic as well because unknown or 
unconsidered by the people who really matter—that is, urban intellectuals” (Long 175). 
Berry labels these ideas “false and destructive and silly” (175). He acknowledges his 
awareness that there was literary precedent for what he decided to do: “if there was 
Wolfe, there was also Faulkner; if there was James, there was also Thoreau” (175-76). 
What made the “greatest difference” in his decision “was the knowledge of the few 
square miles in Kentucky that were mine by inheritance and by birth and by the intimacy 
the mind makes with the place it awakens in” (176). So he returned to Kentucky and, 
once “settled,” he “began to see the place with a new clarity and a new understanding and 
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a new seriousness” (177). He “began to see the real abundance and richness of it” (177). 
Eventually, he reached the point where he viewed himself “as growing out of the earth 
like the other native animals and plants” (178), just as Chesterton did when he noted 
earlier that when “we are rooted in place….[w]e live like a tree with the whole strength 
of the universe” (Heretics 22).  
 After he returned to his home along the Kentucky River, Berry began to ask 
questions: “What is this place? What is in it? What is its nature? How should men live in 
it? What must I do?” (Long 199). He viewed these questions as “a part of the necessary 
enactment of humility, teaching a man what his importance is, what his responsibility is, 
and what his place is, both on the earth and in the order of things” (199). He calls these 
questions “moral,” “aesthetic,” “practical,” and “religious,” though he is “uneasy” using 
the term “religious” (199).19 Unlike many Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment 
thinkers who do not reflect upon the Judeo-Christian tradition foundational to their 
beliefs, Berry in his reflecting has reached this foundational “religious” level.20 Here he 
                                                
19 As discussed in the introduction, many scholars see Berry as orthodox and Christian, 
acknowledging that even though he might not explicitly declare his faith like Chesterton 
and Lewis do in their apologetics, that does not mean his writings do not implicitly 
exhibit these religious beliefs. For example, David Cloutier states, “What do we need to 
see in the American context, specifically, especially to make the connections among the 
grammar of these often-separated areas of Catholic ethics? In the American context, I 
contend that there is no better interpreter than the farmer, poet, and essayist Wendell 
Berry” (614). Likewise, Jason Peters labels Berry’s anti-Gnosticism “orthodox” (274-75). 
See also the recent edited collection of essays Wendell Berry and Religion: Heaven’s 
Earthly Life. 
20 For example, Taylor claims, “The story of the Exodus has inspired movements of 
reform and liberation throughout the centuries, even those which claim to reject the 
theological outlook which the original story proclaims…. Even where the theology is 
lost, the story marches on. Northrop Frye shows how the Bible as a whole has been a 
tremendous source of such empowering stories in Western history” (Sources 96). The 
writings of Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry can be seen as asking, “What if the theological 
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wrestles with his own culturally Baptist religious heritage, that “has promoted and fed 
upon the destructive schism between body and soul, heaven and earth” and “encouraged 
people to believe that the world is of no importance, and that their only obligation in it is 
to submit to certain churchly formulas in order to get to heaven” (199). For Berry, this 
type of religion has led to the thoughtless destruction of nature, because it removes “the 
creator” from “the creation” (199). “For these reasons,” says Berry, “though I know that 
my questions are religious, I dislike having to say that they are” (200). He next explains 
how his questions spring from a different religious philosophy: 
But when I ask them my aim is not primarily to get to heaven. Though 
heaven is certainly more important than the earth if all they say about it is 
true, it is still morally incidental to it and dependent on it, and I can only 
imagine it and desire it in terms of what I know of the earth. And so my 
questions do not aspire beyond the earth. They aspire toward it and into it. 
Perhaps they aspire through it. They are religious because they are asked 
at the limit of what I know; they acknowledge mystery and honor its 
presence in the creation; they are spoken in reverence for the order and 
grace that I see, and that I trust beyond my power to see. (200) 
 
This insight, in some ways, seems similar to what Lewis learned from reading 
Phantastes: to not look for joy by despising the earth through looking always beyond it, 
but instead to see how it is expressed all around us on earth. This statement is the 
expression of a sacramental imagination, which values things for themselves and not as 
instruments to help us get along to our “real home.” 
 Finally, like Chesterton and Lewis in their caution about the modern fascination 
with automobiles, Berry is also resistant to fast technology that reduces “place” to 
“scenery” (Long 40). In the early essay “The Nature Consumers,” Berry laments the 
weekender/vacationer pleasure boating that takes place on and along the Kentucky River, 
                                                                                                                                            
component of this tradition is essential to helping moderns understand and navigate their 
world?”  
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of which he has a front-row view from his house. In this case, then, the technology that 
Berry sees as harmful to our perception of place is speedboats. He admits that racing a 
powerful engine can have a thrill in and of its own and he has no problem with this, 
though he thinks if this thrill is all boaters are after they should limit themselves to a 
small stretch of river in which to race and leave the rest of the river at peace (Long 38). 
The problem, though, is that these boaters do not limit themselves and they become 
“consumers of the river” (35). Berry likens their “destructiveness” to that “of certain 
industries, and it has the same causes: the use of powerful machines, and the discarding 
of more or less imperishable refuse” (35). This makes the boatman “what more and more 
seems the ideal man of our society: a superconsumer” because his “pursuit of pleasure is 
determined and limited not by his and his family’s need but by the size and speed of his 
boat, and so he takes far more than he needs” (38). For Berry, the boatman “has become a 
symbol…of an alienation from the world that I believe to be common among us, and on 
the increase. Because he could not be still, the place could not exist for him” (32). This is 
because, “[l]ike all country places, [Berry’s valley] is both complex and reticent. It 
cannot be understood by passing through” (33), just as Chesterton stated earlier that 
China and Arabia “are ancient civilizations with strange virtues buried like treasures” and 
should not be abstracted to scenery (Heretics 23). The boatman has turned the places 
around him into “scenery,” defined by Berry as “an oversimplification and falsification of 
nature” (40). This perspective divorces humans from nature, turning nature into an 
“other,” which of course often leads to abuses. This modern mentality is a false 
dichotomy, says Berry: 
Man cannot be independent of nature. In one way or another he must live 
in relation to it, and there are only two alternatives: the way of the 
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frontiersman, whose response to nature was to dominate it, to assert his 
presence in it by destroying it; or the way of Thoreau, who went to the 
natural places to become quiet in them, to learn from them, to be restored 
by them. To know these places, because to know them is to need them and 
respect them and be humble before them, is to preserve them. To fail to 
know them, because ignorance can only be greedy of them, is to destroy 
them. (42) 
 
Unlike the popular strain in Christianity that sees in Genesis a command to subdue and 
take dominion of the earth, Berry is here offering a significant corrective that emphasizes 
the non-dualistic, interdependent relationship between humans and nature.  
 Thus far, we have examined how Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry wrestled with 
questions of identity in their young adult lives. These questions led them first away from 
their spiritual roots but then eventually back to them, not through resigned acceptance, 
but after careful intellectual consideration. For Berry, this return was physical as well. 
This theme of homecoming is evident not only in the personal biographies and non-
fiction writings of the three authors, but also in their fiction. Three good examples are 
Chesterton’s Manalive, Lewis’s Pilgrim’s Regress, and Berry’s Jayber Crow. Examining 
the theme of homecoming in these three novels will help us understand the sought-for 
integration of their lives and values within particular times, situations, and places. 
Understanding the particularities of this integration is a valuable component of the 
humanities.  
 
II: Homecoming and Return in Manalive, Pilgrim’s Regress, and Jayber Crow 
 Chesterton’s 1912 novel Manalive is a key text in his canon because it presents us 
with two competing philosophies of life—that of its protagonist Innocent Smith and the 
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despair of the fin de siècle. In fact, it is Smith’s rejection of this opposing philosophy that 
leads him to appreciate places and limits. 
The novel is divided into two parts. In part one, Smith chases his hat on an 
extremely windy day into the yard of Beacon House, where he surprises its seven 
inhabitants by his spontaneous exuberance for life and eccentric behavior. He requests a 
room for the night. While he is there, one of the other lodgers, Mary Gray, becomes 
smitten with Smith and agrees to leave with him by hansom cab to go visit his aunt. 
Before they can leave, however, another lodger returns with an American detective and 
four criminal charges against Smith. In part two, a trial is held in Beacon House, whereby 
the four charges against Smith are explained, but dismissed when new evidence is 
introduced by the defense. Cleared, Smith and Gray leave with another strong gust of 
wind. 
  For Chesterton, Smith represents a celebration of life and the limits that go along 
with it. Smith is a direct affront to the modern pessimism of the age that, having rejected 
the orthodoxies and traditions of the past and having no clear vision of the future, finally 
despairs of life itself. As his name implies, Innocent is wide-eyed and childlike in his 
appreciation of the world around him. “Smith” implies he represents everyman and his 
initials on his suitcase, “I. S.,” emphasize Chesterton’s main philosophical point: the 
wonder of birth, of existence. This personality trait alone would cause one to think of 
Chesterton; Smith’s description does so as well, as he is described as “a large light-haired 
man in gay green holiday clothes” who had a “shape generally gigantesque” (Manalive 
270). Iain T. Benson says of this similarity, “They are both larger than life, outside any 
 41 
 
academic rule, and sweep exuberantly onto the scene with a mission to wake up an 
altogether sleeping world around themselves” (26).  
 Depicting a malaise similar to that found in Woolf’s as yet unwritten Voyage Out, 
Chesterton’s sleeping world consists of seven characters aimlessly residing in the 
boarding house. Having rejected an orthodoxy that might have provided them with a 
telos, they instead mindlessly busy themselves with the details of “ordinary life,” from 
the mundane to the shocking.21 In the novel, Smith’s character is described as bringing 
these seven separate people together: “An hour ago, and for four years previously, these 
people had avoided each other, even when they really liked each other. They had slid in 
and out of dismal and deserted rooms in search of particular newspapers and private 
needlework. Even now they all came casually, as with varying interests; but they all 
came” (Manalive 276). One of the lodgers, Michael Moon, who is known for being 
“wild,” demonstrates the impact Smith has on all of them when he says to another lodger, 
Arthur Inglewood, “If you have heard that I am wild, you can contradict the rumour… I 
am tame… I drink too much of the same kind of whisky at the same time every night. I 
even drink about the same amount too much” (283). After saying the same things about 
going to the “same public-houses,” “meet[ing] the same damned women” and “hear[ing] 
the same…dirty stories,” he states matter-of-factly, “You may reassure my friends, 
Inglewood, you see before you a person whom civilization has thoroughly tamed” (283). 
                                                
21 Taylor states, “‘Ordinary life’ is a term of art I introduce to designate those aspects of 
human life concerned with production and reproduction, that is, labour, the making of the 
things needed for life, and our life as sexual beings, including marriage and the 
family….For Aristotle the maintenance of these activities was to be distinguished from 
the pursuit of the good life. They are, of course, necessary to the good life, but they play 
an infrastructural role in relation to it. You can’t pursue the good life without pursuing 
life. But an existence dedicated to this latter goal alone is not a fully human one” 
(Sources 211, emphasis mine). 
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In reply, Inglewood claims Moon’s behavior is normal in a world he “finds…a bit dull” 
(283). Here Moon interrupts, “That fellow doesn’t… I mean that fellow Smith. I have a 
fancy there’s some method in his madness. It looks as if he could turn into a sort of 
wonderland any minute by taking one step out of the plain road… Perhaps that is the real 
key of fairyland” (283). 
 Eventually, the motley crew discovers the “method in his madness”: Chesterton is 
fictionalizing the astonishing homecoming from Orthodoxy. We see this throughout 
Smith’s trial. After Smith quickly woos one of the lodgers, Mary Gray, the two of them 
plan to take a trip together. However, before they can do so, another lodger, Dr. Warner, 
returns to the house with a “criminal specialist” from America named Dr. Cyras Pym 
(Manalive 310). The two of them accuse Smith of (attempted) murder, burglary, 
deserting his family, and polygamy. Moon takes up Smith’s defense and in each case is 
able to show how Smith is indeed innocent of the charges, though admittedly by living an 
unconventional life. The three charges that are most concerned with homecoming are the 
latter three: in each case he has left his home and returned, so therefore he is 
“burglarizing” his own house, returning (after a period) to his family, and “remarrying” 
his own wife by wooing her as if she were a stranger. In fact, Mary Gray turns out to be 
his wife, though under an assumed name. Why does Smith do these unconventional and 
seemingly crazy things? He does them so that he can appreciate his home and wife with 
that sense of wonder one feels with new things—he does not want to become accustomed 
to them, or bored with them, as Inglewood and Moon are bored with the world. In other 
words, Smith is living out the feeling of discovering a “new” place only to discover it is 
an old, familiar place, like Chesterton’s fictional man who discovered England at the 
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beginning of Orthodoxy. Chesterton wants to underscore through Smith’s life the 
importance of loving and appreciating not only life, but one’s home, or place on the earth. 
 Perhaps the clearest example of the connection between love of place and love of 
existence for Chesterton is found in one of the letters read for Smith’s defense of the 
desertion charge. The letter writer, Louis, narrates a conversation he had with Smith 
while they stood on a rock formation overlooking a ravine under the stars. Louis tells 
Smith: 
“‘My grandmother,’ I said in a low tone, ‘would have said that we were all 
in exile, and that no earthly house could cure the holy homesickness that 
forbids us rest.’ […] 
 Then he said: ‘I think your grandmother was right,’ and stood up 
leaning on his grassy pole. ‘I think that must be the reason,’ he said—-‘the 
secret of this life of man, so ecstatic and so unappeased. But I think there 
is more to be said. I think God has given us the love of special places, of a 
hearth and of a native land, for a good reason.’ 
 “‘I dare say,’ I said. ‘What reason?’ 
 “‘Because otherwise,’ he said, pointing his pole out at the sky and 
the abyss, ‘we might worship that.’ 
 “‘What do you mean?’ I demanded. 
 “‘Eternity,’ he said in his harsh voice, ‘the largest of the idols—-
the mightiest of the rivals of God.’ (Manalive 398) 
 
Here Smith, a clear representative of Chesterton himself, emphasizes the necessity of 
places and “native land” in the lives of humans. It is significant that God’s absolute 
transcendence is in tension with the Incarnation, giving value to things of earth, because 
this underscores the necessity of place in the teleology of humans. Also, the contrast 
between places and eternity is important. As mentioned earlier, Arendt made a similar 
claim in The Human Condition, that one of the “commonplace” desires of modern 
humans was expressed in a current newspaper report about a 1957 satellite launch: to 
“‘escape from men’s imprisonment to the earth’” (1). This desire to escape the human 
condition, she explains, can be seen in the distinction between “immortal” and “eternal.” 
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Classically, humans were concerned with being immortal: living forever through their 
deeds expressed generation after generation on earth (19). In contrast, eternity is a state 
unique and separate from the human condition: it is a quality of God, whereas 
immortality was a quality of gods (18-20). Arendt and Chesterton seem to be in 
agreement that by striving after eternity, humans desire to rival God by escaping their 
human condition. Last, we can see in this passage a summing up of a central component 
to Chesterton’s homecoming, by bringing together two important points of emphasis. 
First, this passage emphasizes the desire for something eternal and therefore unattainable 
on earth. Second, this passage also emphasizes, and draws our attention to, the good of 
the world. Bringing these two emphases together counterbalances the excessive pride 
pervading the pursuit of the infinite. 
 
 In 1933, Lewis published The Pilgrim’s Regress, one of his earliest published 
works. As the title indicates, it is an allegory in the vein of Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s 
Progress. The story centers on John, who was born into Puritania, a land run by Stewards 
for the Landlord. As a youth, John discovers a vision of an island that awakens in him 
desire. He decides to reject and disobey the Landlord and leave Puritania to search for the 
Island. He meets numerous characters on his journey, such as Mr. Enlightenment, Mr. 
Mammon, Mr. Sensible, Savage, and Mr. Broad, who all try to help him view the world 
as they do. Mr. Vertue joins John in his quest and they find that a Grand Canyon 
separates them from their destination. Mother Kirk offers to carry them across, but they 
refuse and suffer on their own for quite some time. Eventually, the hermit History helps 
instruct John about the Pagans, Shepherds, and the man Nomos who bridges the two, and 
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John accepts the help of Mother Kirk. He finds that Mr. Vertue has done the same, and 
each is instructed to slay the North and South Dragons, respectively. After slaying his 
dragon, John is sent back home to Puritania to live until the Landlord calls him across the 
Grand Canyon again. 
 As seen earlier, Lewis credited George MacDonald’s Phantastes with “baptizing” 
his imagination. Recently, Jeffrey Bilbro has shown extensive parallels between 
MacDonald’s Phantastes and Lewis’s The Pilgrim’s Regress.22 He states, “Where 
MacDonald lays out this path without attempting to justify it, Lewis traces this path on 
the map of western philosophy, arguing for its validity and attempting to show how the 
themes present in MacDonald—romanticism, selfless action, and Christian redemption—
can be synthesized with this philosophic tradition” (22-23). According to Andrew Wheat, 
“The Pilgrim's Regress is one of the best guides to Lewis' thought because, in spite of its 
apparent shortcomings, it is a masterful illustration (not simply codification) of a 
conversion. It shows that life is a quest, not merely a string of questions” (36).  
 However, Lewis allows for completing the journey in a much shorter way than 
John (and Lewis). As a child, John watched his Uncle George cross a brook and enter the 
Landlord’s estate, while he, his parents, and their Steward saw him off. In contrast, John 
went the opposite direction of the Landlord’s estate, in search of the Island. Thus he 
began a long and painful journey in which he had to confront and battle the numerous 
philosophies of the present and past. He finds, however, that he ironically ends up where 
he had hoped to escape: 
                                                
22 Bilbro summarizes the similarities as such: “The protagonists of both books travel 
similar paths: both are drawn on their journeys by an inexplicable longing, both are 
linked to a knight or armed man, and both must embrace death before accomplishing 
deeds of valor on their journey home” (22). 
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 ‘Thank you,’ said John. ‘Pray, do we take ship from here?’ 
 But Slikisteinsauga [John and Vertue’s Guide] shook his head: and 
he asked them to look at the Island again and specifically to consider the 
shape…to which it rose at its highest point. 
 ‘I see,’ said John presently. 
 ‘What do you see?’ said the Guide. 
 ‘They are the very same shape as that summit of the Eastern 
Mountain which we called the Landlord’s castle as we saw it from 
Puritania.’ 
 ‘They are not only the same shape. They are the same.’ 
 ‘How can that be?’ said John with a sinking heart, ‘for those 
mountains were in the extreme East, and we have been travelling West 
ever since we left home.’ 
 ‘But the world is round…the Island is the other side of the 
Mountains, and not…an Island at all.’ (Pilgrim’s 131) 
 
Here John asks how they are to go forward with their journey. He gets some 
disappointing news, as the Guide who “looked at him as a merciful man looks on an 
animal which he must hurt” tells him, “The way to go on…is to go back” (131). To this 
John resigns himself: “What must be must be…I deserve no better. You mean that I have 
been wasting my labour all my life, and I have gone half-round the world to reach what 
Uncle George reached in a mile or so” (131). The Guide replies, “Who knows what your 
uncle has reached, except the Landlord? Who knows what you would have reached if you 
had crossed the brook without ever leaving home? You may be sure the Landlord has 
brought you the shortest way: though I confess it would look an odd journey on a map” 
(131).  
 Interestingly, what Lewis discovered in his own journey and what he 
communicates through John’s is that in pursuing Joy or an Island to fulfill the longing 
inside of them, they thought they would escape their homes, earth, or in Arendt’s terms 
“the human condition.” Instead, once converted or baptized, Christianity sends them back 
into the very condition they thought they were escaping. Christianity sends them home, at 
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least until death (Pilgrim’s 132).23 This is because the Kingdom of God is not “out of this 
world,” but rather coexists with reality. It is the “present, not yet,” forecasting Christ’s 
return as the telos for the creation. So Christianity gives its adherents new eyes to see the 
world in its relationship to its creator (sacramentally, as we saw earlier in Berry). 
Therefore, both Lewis and John’s view of the world is changed: as the Guide tells John, 
“I should warn you of one thing—the country will look very different on the return 
journey” (132). According to Slikisteinsauga, they see “the land as it really is” (134). 
This change is not completely welcome, either. John states, “I think Mother Kirk treats us 
very ill. Since we have followed her and eaten her food the way seems twice as narrow 
and twice as dangerous as it did before” (134). The Guide replies, “You all know…that 
security is mortals’ greatest enemy” (134).  
 After retracing their steps and slaying their respective dragons, the three find 
themselves before an “empty and ruinous” cottage in Puritania (151). John cries, because 
it is his “father’s house” and his parents have “gone already beyond the brook” (Pilgrim’s 
151). The Guide informs him that he will join his parents by nightfall, whereupon Vertue 
seeks to comfort him by reciting a poem that embraces Gods’ sovereignty over death. 
John replies, “I thought all those things when I was in the house of Wisdom. But now I 
                                                
23 Relevant to his view of the afterlife, Lewis in Letters to Malcolm states: “I do not think 
that the life of Heaven bears any analogy to play or dance in respect to frivolity. I do 
think that while we are in this ‘valley of tears,’ cursed with labour, hemmed round with 
necessities, tripped up with frustrations, doomed to perpetual plannings, puzzlings, and 
anxieties, certain qualities that must belong to the celestial condition have no chance to 
get through, can project no image of themselves. For surely we must suppose the life of 
the blessed to be an end in itself, indeed The End: to be utterly spontaneous; to be the 
complete reconciliation of boundless freedom with order—with the most delicately 
adjusted, supple, intricate, and beautiful order….Joy is the serious business of Heaven” 
(92-3). In light of this view of heaven, Lewis’s mature view of the Christian life is that it 
does not cease to have labor, but that after conversion Christians can see glimpses of 
Heaven even in the frivolities of life. 
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think better things. Be sure it is not for nothing that the Landlord has knit our hearts so 
closely to time and place—to one friend rather than another and one shire more than all 
the land” (152). Then he recites his own poem: 
‘Passing to-day by a cottage, I shed tears 
When I remembered how once I had dwelled there 
With my mortal friends who are dead. Years 
Little had healed the wound that was laid bare. 
 
‘Out, little spear that stabs. I, fool, believed 
I had outgrown the local, unique sting, 
I had transmuted away (I was deceived) 
Into love universal the lov’d thing. 
 
‘But Thou, Lord, surely knewest Thine own plan 
When the angelic indifferences with no bar 
Universally loved but Thou gav’st man 
The tether and pang of the particular; 
 
‘Which, like a chemic drop, infinitesimal, 
Plashed into pure water, changing the whole, 
Embodies and embitters and turns all 
Spirit’s sweet water to astringent soul. 
 
‘That we, though small, may quiver with fire’s same 
Substantial form as Thou—-nor reflect merely, 
As lunar angel, back to thee, cold flame. 
Gods we are, Thou has said: and we pay dearly.’ (152) 
 
In this poem, John expresses a significant difference between humans and angels. Part of 
being made in the image of God means that humans, unlike angels, can feel “[t]he tether 
and pang of the particular.” Seeing the home of his youth, John is reminded that humans 
are given the “local” and “unique sting” of feeling sadness for the loss of “mortal friends” 
with whom one has “dwelled.” This “unique” aspect is shared by God and humans and is 
manifest in humans when God (the Landlord) “knit[s] our hearts so closely to time and 
place—to one friend rather than another and one shire more than all the land” (152). This 
aspect of humanity brings with it both joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain, but is not 
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something that John (or Lewis) seems to despise. Rather, Lewis seems to accept this 
aspect of humanity as a part of the human condition, much as Berry does when he tries to 
explain why he has chosen to live in the part of Kentucky where he grew up. For both, 
the being born into a place makes this connection—not chance, per se, because both 
believe that God does the “knitting.” This emphasis on the particular stands in contrast 
with the universal rights and freedoms many push for today, which do not recognize the 
contradictions often inherent in particularities.  
  
 Wendell Berry’s 2000 novel, Jayber Crow, continues the theme of returning to 
place that he discussed in The Long Legged House. The novel is the first-person account 
of Jayber Crow, the barber of Port William. Jayber is born in 1914 in the small town of 
Goforth, Kentucky, just outside of Port Royal. After the death of his parents he is placed 
under the care of first his aunt and then, when she dies, a religious orphanage called The 
Good Shepherd “in the central part of the state” (30). This religious environment helps 
him feel the “call” to be a pastor; so when Jayber is old enough he goes to Pigeonville 
College to study to become one. However, while there he discovers he does not really 
have the “call;” so he drops out and moves to the city of Lexington where he finds work 
as a barber and takes a couple of classes at the university there. Jayber decides to give up 
the academic life and he returns home to Port Royal, where he finds it is in need of a 
barber. All of this takes place in the first hundred pages of the novel. The remaining three 
hundred pages deal with his life as the barber of the community of Port William, 
specifically with his relationship with Mattie Keith. Due to its meager salary, Jayber’s 
role as the community barber condemns him to bachelorhood in the eyes of the 
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community. Therefore, though he falls in love with Mattie, he must watch helplessly as 
she marries Troy Chatham, who rejects her father’s traditional farm ways to become a 
modern agribusiness farmer, though it financially ruins them. Jayber never reveals his 
feelings to Mattie and his “marriage” to her is platonic, only existing in his thoughts. 
However, the story ends with Mattie’s slow death in a hospital while Jayber, not Troy, is 
by her side because Troy is cutting down her favorite forest to pay off financial debts. 
 In this novel, the concept of homecoming manifests itself in two primary ways: 
first, literally in that Jayber returns to the community he was born into, Port William, and 
second, metaphorically in that Jayber decides to return to and commit to Mattie in his 
secret “marriage.” This metaphorical reading is no surprise, as Berry has long stressed the 
similarities of marriage between people and choosing one place over another (or all 
others). For example, one of his best short stories, discussed below in chapter four, is 
titled ”Fidelity.” Also, as mentioned earlier, Berry said marriage “has remained, the 
center of our life” (Long 130). 
 Once Jayber had decided to live in Port William and be its barber, his journey 
homeward was still not complete. He physically resided in one specific place by making 
a home in Port William, but mentally he had not yet devoted himself to that place. As he 
was a young bachelor, he had the desire for the company of women (Jayber 171) and to 
go carousing in night spots. As he puts it, “Back in those days I still wanted to take an 
active part in the ongoing life of the twentieth century, and so two or three years after the 
war [WWII] I bought a car” (166). Why did he need a car, a symbol of twentieth century 
technological modernity that, as we have seen, was a concern for Chesterton, Lewis, and 
Berry? Cars were symptomatic of a larger modern social issue:  
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The old homemade Saturday nights, when they would carry the furniture 
out into the yard and roll up the rugs and dance until sunup, were gone and 
done for. Now especially the young ones wanted to jump into a car on 
Saturday night and run down to Hargrave where whiskey and beer were 
legal and there were picture shows and places where you could drink and 
listen to the jukebox and dance. (166)  
In other words, rural people in twentieth century America were no longer entertaining 
themselves in their local communities, but were driving to cities to socialize for a price: 
“There was always something of interest going on that you had to pay to get into” (167). 
So Jayber bought himself a Dodge Zephyr.  
 Purchasing this new technology and incorporating it into his life bring about 
several changes. First, he does not really need it. When the car’s previous owner asks, 
“Boy, where have you got any business going?,” he has no answer (Jayber 167). 
Previously, Jayber had travelled almost exclusively by walking and this is still sufficient 
to meet his needs, as everything from food, to shelter, to business, to socializing is 
available to him within Port William. In fact, even Hargrave is within walking distance. 
Second, having a car takes resources such as energy, attention, and money from Jayber 
just by being in his possession. He states, “After I had bought it, I was secretly a little 
horrified by it. When I was not driving it, which was nearly all the time, it sat with a 
complacent expression in the driveway beside the shop, seeming to be eating and 
digesting my money” (167). Financially, Jayber has to pay for fuel, maintenance, repairs, 
and to keep it clean. Mentally and emotionally, he worries over his car, babying it by not 
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driving it very far or very fast. The car is a liability. Eventually, Jayber decides to forsake 
this technology and tether himself to the community of Port William. 
 Significantly, this decision to give up his car coincides with his decision to 
commit to Mattie and be faithful. Through Jayber’s escapades in Hargrave, he meets and 
begins dating a woman named Clydie. Jayber likes Clydie, perhaps even loves her, but he 
has already fallen in love with Mattie before he met Clydie. While at a Christmas dance 
in Hargrave with Clydie, Jayber sees Troy dancing with a woman who is obviously not 
Mattie. Troy sees Jayber and gives him “a wink and a grin, raising his hand to [Jayber] 
with the thumb and forefinger joined in a circle” (237). This causes Jayber to stop 
dancing with Clydie and feel sick to his stomach. He is sickened because of the 
knowledge that Troy was unfaithful to Mattie, but that is not all. He is also sickened by 
the realization that he and Troy may be more similar than he wants to admit: “But I was 
thinking too, as Troy winked at me and raised his sign: ‘We’re not alike!’ And that was 
what sickened me, because I wasn’t sure” (238). Admittedly, Jayber is drunk, so that may 
explain his next actions, but I think the depth of his inner thought shows enough clarity 
for us to take his decisions seriously. Jayber excuses himself from Clydie and goes to the 
men’s room, where he decides to climb out of the window and walk back to Port William 
rather than face her in his intoxicated, sickened state. Perhaps we are to read in his 
actions that Jayber feels guilt for being as unfaithful as Troy, both to Mattie and to 
Clydie. Before he walks home, he leaves a farewell message in the front seat of his car 
for Clydie, leaving the keys to the car for her. The Zephyr becomes a parting gift. 
 On his walk home that night, Jayber makes two commitments that forever alter 
the course of his life. He decides that he does not want to end up like Troy and that 
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Mattie deserves to have a faithful husband. He therefore decides to commit to her, to 
become that faithful husband that she needs, even if she never knows. The decision works 
itself out in a moving internal dialogue that ends in a wedding vow:  
 “You love her enough to be a faithful husband to her? Think what 
you’re saying, now. You’re proposing to be the faithful husband of a 
woman who is already married to an unfaithful husband?” 
 “Yes. That’s why. If she has an unfaithful husband, then she needs 
a faithful one.” 
 “A woman already married who must never know that you are her 
husband? Think. And who will never be your wife?” 
 “Yes.” 
 “Have you foreseen how this may end? Can you? 
 “No.” 
 “Are you ready for this? Think now.” 
 “Yes. I am ready.” 
 “Do you, then, in love’s mystery and fear, give yourself to this 
woman to be her faithful husband from this day forward, for better for 
worse, for richer for poorer, in sickness and in health, till death?” 
 “I do. Yes! That is my vow.” 
 
In committing to Mattie, Jayber also commits to Port William, because he has 
relinquished both his car (symbolic of the freedom and means to engage with the modern 
world) and his girlfriend (and any future chance of having a family). Jayber’s vow 
becomes his double homecoming, manifested in his commitments to a person and a 
place. Jayber keeps his vow and the novel ends with Jayber, not Troy, by Mattie’s side 
when she breathes her last in a hospital bed.  
 
 After briefly looking at narratives of homecoming in the personal biographies and 
fiction of Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry, a few important similarities emerge in their deep 
attachment to and affection for place. First, all three authors emphasize that the process of 
accepting one’s place involves an often difficult but necessary choice. Second, this choice 
involves accepting the limits that necessarily accompany place and therefore certain 
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modern things, such as automobiles, may need to be rejected or more thoughtfully used. 
Third, one’s perception of the world changes when one chooses to stay rooted in a place, 
be it religious, physical, or both.  
For the common-place person, leaving one’s home to return may be necessary to 
see it in this new way. A mobile lifestyle of discovery rejects and depreciates the 
past/home and this leads to problems, like those found in the Christian trope of longing 
for heaven (as the real home) at the expense and detriment of the earth (a necessary evil). 
As we will see more fully in a moment, we cannot label our environment as other, if we 
choose to stay rooted in our commitment to it. However, choosing to return home is only 
the first step, because doing so necessitates certain philosophical and ethical 
consequences, as we will explore in the next two chapters.  What we have yet to learn is 
the place of the humanities in the shared public framework that is created when we 
choose to be placed. We will explore the role of the humanities toward the end of chapter 
four. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
I: Space and Place: The Ethical Importance of Understanding Where We Are 
 Choosing to return home and set down roots forces us to spend time with our 
surroundings and, if we allow ourselves, to see them not merely with a utilitarian 
imagination or as meaningless scenery, but with a sacramental imagination. In other 
words, when we see our surroundings not as stuff to please us but let ourselves see their 
intrinsic value instead, we create the opportunity to see our surroundings as sacramental 
pointers to goodness outside of our interests and ourselves. Seeing things sacramentally, 
therefore, has the potential to transform our values. Specifically, this new placed 
perspective informs our ethics and, as an extension, economics. This is no less true for 
Chesterton and Lewis than it is for Berry. They all wrote extensively about ethical and 
economic concerns, and their interest can be seen as a working-out of their rooted lives.  
 As at least one interviewer, Anne Husted Burleigh, has noted, Berry has an 
“Aristotelian-Thomistic view of the world” (135). By this she means “a world that 
[Berry] sees as a created order for which the Creator has appointed us stewards and 
trustees” (135). The base model for this view is the Great Chain of Being, which Berry 
discusses in his essay “Poetry and Place.” In this essay, Berry contrasts classical poets 
like Pope, who held that humans needed to stay within their place in the created order, 
with Romantic poets like Shelley, who privileged the poet’s ability to filter everything 
through his or her mind, essentially separating humans and their ability to think from 
everything else that can be perceived or imagined. For example, in response to 
Wordsworth, Berry states: “The disembodied individual mind is seen as occupying the 
space or perhaps the difference between the extremes of private conscience and supreme 
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intelligence, also disembodied. The mind is not only individual here, but solitary; this 
difference or middle space is both natureless and cultureless” (186). A natureless and 
cultureless solitary human being is anti-teleological. That is, such a human being is not 
defined by a particular purpose or goal. According to Berry, this concept of the 
“disembodied individual mind” was enormously influential on our own modern views 
concerning humans and their environment. His views seem to coincide with those of 
Taylor, though Taylor sees the roots extending further back. A well-designed humanities 
curriculum, including these authors, will go a long way towards reducing the number of 
natureless, cultureless, and anti-teleological human beings. 
 In Sources of the Self, Taylor states, “The subject of disengagement and rational 
control has become a familiar modern figure… As it develops to its full form through 
Locke and the Enlightenment thinkers he influenced, it becomes what I want to call the 
‘punctual’ self” (160). “The key to this figure,” says Taylor, “is that it gains control 
through disengagement… always correlative of an ‘objectification’” (160). Taylor then 
argues Locke’s influence on the creation of the modern “self,” whereby we are able to, 
within our first-person perspective, think about ourselves in the third-person, separate 
from all other matter around us. In other words, we make our “selves” into its own 
distinct category, giving us “instrumental control,” through science, over the earth (161). 
This creates for moderns a paradox: “Radical objectivity is only intelligible and 
accessible through radical subjectivity,” as Taylor points out many contemporary thinkers 
have said (176). Ultimately, then, “It is a self defined by the powers of disengaged 
reason—with its associated ideals of self-responsible freedom and dignity—of self-
exploration, and of personal commitment” (211). Taylor’s definition of the punctual self 
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shares similarities with Hannah Arendt’s discussion of the Archimedian point and is one 
explanation of how our modern conception of self has become essentially rootless, 
divorced from a communal place (257-68).  
 In contrast, Berry’s view is that humans must see themselves as part of a created 
order. As Anne Burleigh stated above, this view is Aristotelean-Thomist and helps us see 
how Berry arrives at seeing humans as “stewards” and “trustees.” Coinciding with this 
ordered view is Berry’s emphasis on “goods.” For Berry, one way we can define “good” 
is things achieving their purposes. In his essay “Two Economies,” he contrasts our 
modern industrial economy with what he terms the Great Economy (loosely based on the 
Kingdom of God and other religious traditions). He states, “When the virtues are rightly 
practiced within the Great Economy, we do not call them virtues; we call them good 
farming, good forestry, good carpentry, good husbandry, good weaving and sewing, good 
homemaking, good parenthood, good neighborhood, and so on” (135). This concept of 
what is good, tied to the idea of a thing’s proper purpose, is very similar to Alasdair 
MacIntyre’s philosophy of internal goods, drawn as well from Aristotle. MacIntyre 
believes: 
[M]oral arguments within the classical, Aristotelean tradition—whether in 
its Greek or its medieval versions—involve at least one central functioning 
concept, the concept of man understood as having an essential nature and 
an essential purpose or function… That is to say, ‘man’ stands to ‘good 
man’ as ‘watch’ stands to ‘good watch’ or ‘farmer’ to ‘good farmer’ 
within the classical tradition. Aristotle takes it as a starting-point for 
ethical enquiry that the relationship of ‘man’ to ‘living well’ is analogous 
to that of ‘harpist’ to ‘playing the harp well’ (Nichomachean Ethics, 1095a 
16). (After 58) 
 
Goodness in people and things implies that there is some telos for those things. In other 
words, people and things have ideal purposes, ends—teloi—to strive towards and doing 
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so makes them “good.” With respect to predicating “good” of anything, MacIntyre—
following Aristotle—believes, “Human beings, like members of all other species, have a 
specific nature; and that nature is such that they have certain aims and goals, such that 
they move by nature towards a specific telos” (148). Aristotle called the telos of humans 
eudaimonia, which can be roughly translated as “blessedness, happiness, [and/or] 
prosperity” (148). Not all humans start out on the same footing: some are more equipped 
from birth towards reaching this telos than others, and a system, virtues, are therefore 
needed to help. So virtues, for Berry, MacIntyre, and Aristotle, are those qualities that 
help us achieve our purposes and make us good. As MacIntyre puts it, “The virtues are 
precisely those qualities the possession of which will enable an individual to achieve 
eudaimonia and the lack of which will frustrate his movement toward that telos” (148).24 
For Berry, this movement towards the telos affects more than just humans or other 
animals; the land and communities also have a telos that can either be approached 
through an awareness and correct relationship between humans and their environment or 
discouraged through wrong modes of thinking and living. As he says in one interview, 
“The standard is the health of the community” (Pennington 41). The natural world can 
operate on its own, distinct from humans, moving towards a collective telos. Human 
beings, as rational creatures, are unique in their ability to choose whether to move 
towards or away from their telos. Also, the choices humans make can help or hinder the 
natural world’s movement towards a telos. For Berry, this means that a primary working 
out of the telos of humans manifests itself in their work and “the necessary work of the 
world… [is t]o take what we’ve got and make it better” (Smith 92).  
                                                
24 One way we might view the works of these authors is to see them as enactments of 
virtues or critiques of virtuous actions. 
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 In this sense, Berry’s vision for healthy communities resembles a 
communal/patriotic community, rather than an atomistic/welfarism25 community, to use 
Charles Taylor’s contrasting terms (Philosophical 188). Taylor makes a distinction 
between “common” and “convergent” goods, where common goods are goods that are 
shared, while convergent goods are goods that we all have, but don’t share (190). An 
example of a common good would be friendship, while an example of a convergent good 
would be a fire department. We share friendship in a personal space in a way much 
differently from how we share a fire department that is there to help us individually in an 
impersonal way. Common goods have a shared language that is unique to individual 
communities. Taylor claims, republics “are animated by a sense of a shared immediate 
common good. To that degree, the bond resembles that of friendship, as Aristotle saw [in 
Nicomachean Ethics]” (191). He continues: 
The citizen is attached to the law as the repository of his and others’ 
dignity. That might sound like the way I’m indebted to the Montreal 
Urban Community for its police service. But the crucial difference is that 
the police relationship secures what we all understand as a merely 
convergent good, whereas the identification of the citizen with the 
republic as a common enterprise is essentially the recognition of a 
common good. My attachment to the MUC for its police service is based 
on enlightened self-interest. My (frequently inoperative) moral 
commitment to the welfare of all humans is altruistic. But the bond of 
solidarity with my compatriots in a functioning republic is based on a 
sense of shared fate, where the sharing itself is of value. This is what gives 
this bond its special importance, what makes my ties with these people 
and to this enterprise peculiarly binding, what animates my “vertu” or 
patriotism. (191-92) 
 
                                                
25 “Welfarism” is Amartya Sen’s term that means, “The judgement of the relative 
goodness of alternative states of affairs must be based exclusively on, and taken as an 
increasing function of, the respective collections of individual utilities in these states” 
(qtd. in Taylor Philosophical 127). 
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Therefore, says Taylor, “patriotism involves more than converging moral principles; it is 
a common allegiance to a particular historical community. [It involves] a love of the 
particular” (198). Of course, one of the main ways citizens can understand and share this 
love for a particular historic community is through the teachings of the humanities. Our 
literature can help us remember and learn from our shared tradition, what Chesterton calls 
“the democracy of the dead” (Orthodoxy 64). Then we may see ourselves not only as 
individuals trying to live out our own version of the American (or Western) dream, but 
also recognize a particular, shared common good. 
 This link between patriotism and love for the particular is a theme that can be 
clearly seen in much of Chesterton’s writings, even from the earliest. The essay “A 
Defence of Patriotism,” reprinted in the 1902 collection of his essays, The Defendant, is 
possibly the most-often cited with regards to his views supporting local, small 
communities. This essay contains the oft-quoted statement, “‘My country, right or 
wrong,’ is a thing that no patriot would think of saying except in a desperate case. It is 
like saying, ‘My mother, drunk or sober’” (125). This well-known quip expresses a belief 
shared by both Chesterton and Berry: we will only really want to change the things that 
we love. This is why the love for particular things is so important, because without these 
deep attachments, there will be no true impetus to improve them. That both Chesterton 
and Berry despise the term “progress” when it is applied in the abstract is no surprise, 
because progress can only occur in the particular; we must care enough about a particular 
something to want to improve it and we must also have some notion of an ideal for the 
progress to achieve. In Orthodoxy, Chesterton states, “This adds a further principle to our 
previous list of principles. We have said we must be fond of this world, even in order to 
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change it. We must now add that we must be fond of another world (real or imaginary) in 
order to have something to change it to” (156). A teleological view of the world is 
crucial, therefore, because it provides an ideal against which our progress can be 
measured as we, in Berry’s terms, do “the necessary work of the world” which is “[t]o 
take what we’ve got and make it better” (Smith 92). An overarching purpose, like a 
return to orthodoxy, seems to be necessary for progress. 
 Chesterton further emphasizes the important connection between love and 
patriotism when he continues, “What we really need for the frustration and overthrow of 
a deaf and raucous Jingoism is a renascence of the love of the native land” (Defendent 
126). He argues (like Taylor) that the reason true patriotism can only be felt towards our 
local environments is because we have a connection to them, not only in our particular 
place and time, but extending back into tradition: “We fall back upon gross and frivolous 
things for our patriotism, for a simple reason. We [the English] are the only people in the 
world who are not taught in childhood our own literature and our own history” (128).26 
Taylor states:  
Patriotism is somewhere between friendship or family feeling, on one side, 
and altruistic dedication on the other. The latter has no concern for the 
particular: I’m inclined to act for the good of anyone anywhere. The 
former attaches me to particular people. My patriotic allegiance doesn’t 
bind me to individual people in this familial way; I may not know most of 
my compatriots, and may not particularly want them as friends when I do 
meet them. But particularity enters in because my bond to these people 
passes through our participation in a common political entity. Functioning 
                                                
26 Though Chesterton was primarily referring to being taught a national history, his 
insight should also be applied on an even more local level. How would our citizens see 
themselves and each other differently if in their education (especially in the humanities) 
they were taught to understand their local history and culture instead of only the history 
and culture of such foreign (for most) places as New York City, London, Paris, or even 
Hollywood?  
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republics are like families in this crucial respect, that part of what binds 
them together is their common history. (Philosophical 188) 
 
Failing to educate citizens about their shared history as part of a nation, state, or local 
community undermines patriotism because it neglects the particular places and events 
that bind a people together in a shared telos. Granted, this shared history may be 
debatable and indeed such debates need to take place. A past that is not reflected upon 
can introduce its own set of problems. What concerns us here are citizens divorced from 
any past, and thus unable to share any history with each other. In other words, both 
Chesterton and Taylor see the importance of teleology on philosophical, religious, and 
political levels. 
 Another early essay in which Chesterton works out his views of the importance of 
place is “The Patriotic Idea,” from 1904. In it, Chesterton elaborates in much more depth 
some of his earlier ideas in pieces such as “A Defence of Patriotism.” Throughout this 
piece, Chesterton defends the local place against the imperialistic cosmopolitanism of his 
modern age. He states, “The truth is, of course, that real universality is to be reached 
rather by convincing ourselves that we are in the best possible relation with our 
immediate surroundings” (227). Doing so, he says, makes us more human and have true 
love for other humans and the natural world. This is because, “The fundamental spiritual 
advantage of patriotism and such sentiment is this: that by means of it all things are loved 
adequately, because all things are loved individually” (227). Such love enables a tradition 
to be established, a tradition that could only exist because it is rooted in particular things. 
Chesterton continues, “To the cosmopolitan, therefore, who professes to love humanity 
and hate local preference, we shall reply: ‘How can you love humanity and hate anything 
so human?’” (229). 
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 One novel of Chesterton’s that works out these themes is The Flying Inn (1914). 
In it, Chesterton emphasizes the importance of place to memory/tradition in humans and 
also his orthodox teleology that differs from the modern technocratic utilitarianism of his 
age. The novel’s tension centers on contradictory views of the human highest good. 
Chesterton’s novel concerns a member of Parliament who is intent on closing every 
public inn in England by taking away their rights to sell liquor. Chesterton sides with the 
rights of the English countrymen, who are able to evade the authorities because of their 
particular knowledge of the countryside. They revolt against a law that denies them the 
pleasures of pubs because this denies them one possible way to achieve eudaimonia, 
which is to live and fare well (Aristotle Nicomachean 1095a19). Throughout the novel, 
Chesterton emphasizes a love for local places and traditions that we will examine further 
in the next chapter. 
 Besides emphasizing love of the local in each particular human’s story, 
Chesterton also discusses what he feels is the historical story for humanity in The 
Everlasting Man.  The teleology inherent in Chesterton’s reading of history is that 
Christianity was the fulfillment of paganism. One of the first assumptions about history 
that Chesterton overturns is the belief that civilization replaced barbarism: “According to 
the real records available, barbarism and civilization were not successive states in the 
progress of the world. They were conditions that existed side by side, as they still exist 
side by side” (62). This is the “chronological snobbery” that Lewis is cured of in 
Surprised by Joy (207). For Chesterton, therefore, there is no story of Progress for 
humans. He states: 
One of the ablest agnostics of the age once asked me whether I thought 
mankind grew better or grew worse or remained the same. […] I asked 
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him whether he thought that Mr. Smith of Golder’s Green got better or 
worse or remained exactly the same between the age of thirty and forty. It 
then seemed to dawn on him that it would rather depend on Mr. Smith; 
and how he chose to go on. It had never occurred to him that it might 
depend on how mankind chose to go on; and that its course was not a 
straight line or an upward or downward curve, but a track like that of a 
man across a valley, going where he liked and stopping where he chose, 
going to church or falling drunk in a ditch. The life of man is a story; an 
adventure story; and in our vision the same is true even of the story of 
God. (Everlasting 245-46).  
 
This relationship between the story of humanity and the story of God is what makes 
Christianity, for Chesterton, the necessary rival of Paganism. Chesterton continues, “The 
Catholic faith is the reconciliation because it is the realization both of mythology and 
philosophy. It is a story…. It is a philosophy…. But above all, it is a reconciliation 
because it is something that can only be called the philosophy of stories” (246).27 In other 
words, Christianity appeals to Chesterton because it simultaneously encourages humans 
to live good individual stories and invites them into a larger, communal story. 
 
 Similarly, Lewis deals with these issues of humans, their telos, ethics, and 
community in his writing. As discussed earlier, Chesterton’s writings, especially The 
Everlasting Man, were a significant influence on Lewis’s conversion to Christianity. In 
Surprised By Joy, Lewis explains that he was trying to reconcile paganism with 
Christianity (235-36). After reading The Everlasting Man he “for the first time saw the 
whole Christian outline of history set out in a form that seemed to…make sense” (223). 
He states, “The question was no longer to find the one simply true religion among a 
thousand religions simply false. It was rather, ‘Where has religion reached its true 
                                                
27 Chesterton’s point has further bearing on the humanities because much of literature 
teaches in the mode of narrative. 
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maturity? Where, if anywhere, have the hints of all Paganism been fulfilled?’” (235). We 
might define “maturity” by using the “three axes” of “moral thinking” that Taylor 
defines: “our sense of respect for and obligations to others, …our understanding of what 
makes a full life…[and] the range of notions concerned with dignity” (Sources 15). Lewis 
eventually agreed, of course, that the answer is Christianity.  
 Lewis’s fiction also speaks to these issues. In The Pilgrim’s Regress the hermit 
History tells John a narrative of history that clearly sets forth Lewis’s teleological belief 
that Christianity is the bridge between the historical progressions of both the Gentiles and 
the Jews. Likewise, Lewis wrestles with differing teleological philosophies in his Space 
Trilogy, which consists of Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra, and That Hideous 
Strength. We will more closely examine these issues in these novels in chapter three. 
Before we look at them, however, we should first explore the intersections of orthodoxy 
and ethics in Lewis’s philosophy at the time that he wrote them. 
 Contemporaneous with the Space Trilogy is Lewis’s philosophical work The 
Abolition of Man, first published in 1944. The book is a collection of three lectures he 
delivered. The first lecture and the impetus behind Lewis’s writing are his concerns with 
a current and popular English rhetoric book, The Control of Language: A Critical 
Approach to Reading and Writing (1940), by Alex King and Martin Ketley (Sayer 252). 
He disguises the authors’ identities by referring to them as Gaius and Titius, authors of 
The Green Book. Lewis’s contention with the authors is their assertion that when people 
make value claims, people are really making claims about their feelings. For example, the 
person who says, “This is sublime” really means, “I have sublime feelings” (3, italics 
removed). Lewis asserts that this removal of an objective property to a subjective feeling 
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is false and has dangerous consequences in how students are taught. He states, “For every 
one pupil who needs to be guarded from a weak excess of sensibility there are three who 
need to be awakened from the slumber of cold vulgarity. The task of the modern educator 
is not to cut down jungles but to irrigate deserts. The right defence against false 
sentiments is to inculcate just sentiments” (14).28 This discussion of an English textbook 
leads to a much larger discussion of ethics in parts two and three, where Lewis asserts the 
importance of an objective truth behind all of our value judgments that, if ignored, will 
lead to a powerful minority in control of a willing majority. Of course looming over the 
whole discussion is World War Two and the problem of fascism but, as we will see, 
Lewis views fascism as a symptom of a larger modern ethical problem. 
 For Lewis, there exists such a thing as an absolute ethical standard 
transhistorically held by humans, regardless of their civilizations and religions.29 Some 
names given to this standard include “Natural Law or Traditional Morality or the First 
Principles of Practical Reason or the First Platitudes” (Abolition 43). However, to 
simplify the discussion, Lewis chooses the Tao as his term for this universal morality. 
Lewis states, “This thing which I have called for convenience the Tao…is not one among 
a series of possible systems of value. It is the sole source of all value judgements. If it is 
rejected, all value is rejected. If any value is retained, it is retained” (43). He continues, 
“What purport to be new systems or (as they now call them) ‘ideologies’, all consist of 
fragments from the Tao itself, arbitrarily wrenched from their context in the whole and 
                                                
28 Lewis is using the term “sentiments” in the stronger sense that Taylor relates to 
Shaftesbury and 18th century philosophy (Sources 248). 
29 For Taylor, this shared ethical standard stems from Plato: “Plato’s distinction stands at 
the head of a large family of views which see the good life as a mastery of self which 
consists in the dominance of reason over desire” (Sources 21). 
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then swollen to madness in their isolation, yet still owing to the Tao and to it alone such 
validity as they possess” (43-44). This “swollen to madness in their isolation” that Lewis 
attributes to the “fragments” of the Tao is very similar to Taylor’s concept of 
“hypergoods,” discussed above. Both Lewis and Taylor see that if a shared public ethical 
framework is rejected, the fragments of the ethics that remain will be promoted to the 
exclusion of others. These resulting hypergoods then compete with one another, because 
they are divorced from the original framework that made sense of them and kept them 
from overstepping their boundaries. 
 Thus debates will arise about whose hypergoods, or “swollen fragments” should 
be central to our lives and issues of control will be inevitable. Lewis states, “A dogmatic 
belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny or an 
obedience which is not slavery” (Abolition 73). He continues, “The process which, if not 
checked, will abolish Man goes on apace among Communists and Democrats no less than 
among Fascists” (73). Lewis states: “The belief that we can invent ‘ideologies’ at 
pleasure, and the consequent treatment of mankind as mere ΰλη, specimens, preparations, 
begins to affect our very language. Once we killed bad men: now we liquidate unsocial 
elements” (74). The metaphor Lewis uses to best describe the modern scientist is that of a 
magician. He states, “If we compare the chief trumpeter of the new era (Bacon) with 
Marlowe’s Faustus, the similarity is striking….[Bacon] rejects magic because it does not 
work; but his goal is that of the magician” (77-78). In contrast, for Lewis a re-imagined 
Natural Philosophy would be different: “When it explained it would not explain away. 
When it spoke of the parts it would remember the whole. While studying the It it would 
not lose what Martin Buber calls the Thou-situation” (79).  
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 Many of the institutional/societal problems we struggle with as moderns stem 
from a rejection of traditional orthodoxy in favor of competing “hypergoods.” These 
modern issues can be seen as tangible examples when we look at Lewis’s fiction in the 
next chapter. Certainly we would expect these concerns to be prevalent in the Space 
Trilogy, written at the same time these lectures were given. Interestingly, though, Lewis 
returns to these issues throughout the Chronicles of Narnia, written a decade later. Before 
we look to Lewis’s works, let us examine a community that shares a common public 
framework by turning again to Berry. 
 
 Perhaps we can best see the link between humans, their telos, ethics, and 
community through an examination of the community Berry seems most to admire: the 
Amish. Berry recognizes that his admiration of the Amish leaves him vulnerable to the 
charge of being a Luddite. In fact, he embraces this term: “I am indeed a Luddite, if by 
that I may mean that I would not willingly see my community—to the extent that I still 
have one—destroyed by any technological innovation” (“Simple” 58). According to 
Berry, the Amish act regardless of who is their neighbor—they treat their neighbors with 
respect and provide them with help based on the fact that they are neighbors. Also, they 
do not seek to buy out their neighbors to enlarge their own farms, but respect them and 
see the importance of a connected group of neighbors that share in the fate of the larger 
community. This respect and privileging of community can perhaps be seen most clearly 
in the resistance of the Amish to most forms of modern technology. As Berry has stated 
several times, the primary question the Amish asked when faced with a new technology 
is, “What will this do to our community?” 
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 According to Donald Kraybill and Marc Olshan in The Amish Struggle with 
Modernity, “[T]he Amish are engaged in a war against the spirit of progress—against 
arrogance, against progress as a goal, and against the social fragmentation and alienation 
that often accompanies some forms of ‘progress’” (vii). They continue:  
Their battle has been against a particular concept of progress—one that 
has been enthusiastically embraced by much of the rest of the world since 
the Enlightenment. This notion of progress rests on the perfectibility of 
human institutions. It is founded on the confidence that reason and its 
handmaiden, technology, will eventually eradicate war, hunger, poverty, 
and all other evils that plague human beings. For the Amish such a view of 
progress is only one more expression of arrogance. (vii) 
 
In modern culture, this “arrogance” often goes hand in hand with rugged individualism. 
In contrast, “the Amish argue that genuine satisfaction comes not from an unbridled 
individualism but from giving oneself up in service of an orderly community” (Kraybill 
“Introduction” 7). Above all, they see pride as the enemy of community (7).  
 Due to these beliefs, one of the key issues the Amish have continuously and 
consistently faced is if and how to implement new technologies into their communities. 
To other Americans, implementing time and labor-saving devices may seem like a no-
brainer. In fact, advertisers constantly convince consumers that these two factors 
outweigh all others to the extent that they, combined with the term “new,’ are perhaps the 
three most touted criteria by which new technologies are sold. In contrast, states Jameson 
Wetmore, “Like many scholars of technology, the Amish have rejected the idea that 
technologies are value-free tools. Instead, they recognize that technology and social order 
are constructed simultaneously and influence each other a great deal” (298). One member 
of the Amish community put the matter this way, “Machinery is not wrong in itself, but if 
it doesn’t help fellowship you shouldn’t have it” (qtd. in Wetmore 300). The Amish are 
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thus willing to accept limits to the technology that they use in order to protect their 
communities. 
 Of course, this acceptance of limits runs directly counter to the norms of modern 
society. According to Hannah Arendt, one consequence of scientific technology is that 
the “industrial revolution has replaced all workmanship with labor, and the result has 
been that the things of the modern world have become labor products whose natural fate 
is to be consumed, instead of work products which are there to be used” (124). Another 
consequence is a heavy reliance of humans on machines, about which she states, “The 
question therefore is not so much whether we are the masters or the slaves of our 
machines, but whether machines still serve the world and its things, or if, on the contrary, 
they and the automatic motion of their processes have begun to rule and even destroy 
world and things” (151). Thus, “[f]or a society of laborers, the world of machines has 
become a substitute for the real world, even though this pseudo world cannot fulfil the 
most important task of human artifice, which is to offer mortals a dwelling place more 
permanent and more stable than themselves” (152). So for Berry and the Amish, as for 
Arendt, places should be valued more than technology and be seen as more permanent, 
outlasting those who dwell in them. In order to privilege places in such a worldview, 
humans must recognize that technology—by its very nature quickly obsolete and meant 
to be used up and discarded—is categorically opposed to permanence. If used 
unreflectively, therefore, technology will use up, rather than improve, places. 
 Besides his comments in essays and interviews, Berry explores the ethical 
philosophy of the Amish that resists technology and limitless expansion in his fiction, 
particularly the short novel Remembering. This novel follows the story of Andy Catlett, a 
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resident of Port William, KY. Andy grows up in Port William, the son of a farmer. When 
he is old enough he goes off to college and, after earning his degree, marries and moves 
to San Francisco to become a journalist. After a short time there he moves to Chicago to 
become a writer for the journal Scientific Farming, whose editor is an old high school 
friend named Tommy Netherbough. However, Andy becomes restless and, seeing the 
destructive ways of agribusiness, refuses to write a story about a modern farmer and 
consequently loses his job. He returns to Port William to farm in between speaking 
engagements at conferences, where he is called to represent the unpopular position of 
traditional farming. While harvesting corn in his community, Andy loses his hand to a 
corn picker. This trauma causes him to become angry with his wife and his children and 
so, while on a trip to speak at a college in San Francisco, he skips his commitment to 
speak and checks into a hotel, where he wrestles with his injury and his memories, trying 
to decide whether to return to his family or not. After taking an early morning walk 
through the city to the coast and reflecting on various memories of his family and 
community, he returns home. 
 In Remembering, Berry contrasts the ethical philosophy of agribusiness with the 
Amish method of farming when Andy is sent by his editor at Scientific Farming to Ohio 
to interview Bill Meikelberger, the magazine’s Premier Farmer for that year. After 
interviewing Meikelberger, Andy travels to Pittsburgh, but on the way his attention is 
caught by an Amish farmer, Isaac Troyer, whom he sees plowing in a field. Andy stops 
and spends much of the day with Isaac, doing an informal interview. Andy is drawn to 
the Amish way of life and decides to write his article on Troyer instead of Meikelberger, 
thus leading to the confrontation with his editor that costs him his job.  
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 In the span of a few pages, Berry lays out two contrasting ways of farming, that of 
Meikelberger and that of Troyer. Examining their differences can help illuminate some of 
the key aspects of Amish life that Berry so admires. Meikelberger sought to escape the 
limits placed upon him by the farm he inherited from his parents. In contrast, Troyer 
accepted and respected the limits his farm placed upon him. The differing philosophies of 
the farmers can be seen in three categories: isolation versus community, sterility versus 
virility, and poverty versus wealth.  
 First, Meikelberger buys out his neighbors’ farms, while Troyer respects his 
neighbors and accepts limits on what he can reasonably farm himself. In consequence, 
Meikelberger relies on a “herd of machines” (180), while Troyer uses animals that he 
breeds himself. These points are not mutually exclusive: Meikelberger’s decision to 
enlarge his own farm by buying out his neighbors forced him to have to adopt technology 
and replace his animals with machines in order to farm the additional ground by himself. 
Meikelberger has therefore clearly chosen to isolate his family, both by eliminating his 
immediate neighbors and by using machines instead of hiring workers and animals to 
share in the work on his farm. By doing so he has adopted a system that is 
consequentially not renewable: his machines will not reproduce and, in order to run, must 
consume fossil fuels that do not come from the farm. In contrast, Troyer’s farm is much 
more self-sufficient, while also less isolated because of its proximity to neighbors and 
therefore community. 
 Second, Meikelberger has a sterile, empty house and fields, while Troyer’s house 
and fields are full of the life of his family, including his livestock. Because of the ever-
increasing overhead to upkeep technology on the farm and to pay debts, Meikelberger’s 
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wife must go into town to work a second job, while Troyer’s wife can stay at home and 
participate in the life of the farm. Also, the technology of the farm has eliminated roles 
for Meikelberger’s children, so they have gone to college and moved away, while 
Troyer’s children will (probably) continue in the life of the farm and inherit it one day. 
These contrasting points further emphasize the sterility of Meikelberger’s farm in 
contrast to Troyer’s.  
 Third, because of the ever-increasing debt to upkeep machines and maintain a 
large agribusiness, Meikelberger stays busy all of the time between working and fighting 
off creditors, while Troyer and his family rest on Sundays and after dinner each day. In 
contrast, Meikelberger is very much in debt, while Troyer nets “about half” in an average 
year (187). This means that after Troyer subtracts his expenses from his gross (or total) 
profit, he is left with approximately half of his gross profit each year. In consequence, 
Meikelberger’s stress and worrying have given him an ulcer, while Troyer appears to be 
healthy and vibrant. Finally, we are told that “Meikelberger’s ambition had made 
common cause with a technical power that proposed no limit to itself, that was, in fact, 
destroying Meikelberger, as it had already destroyed nearly all that was natural or human 
around him” (182). In stark contrast, when Andy tells Troyer he hopes they will “meet 
again,” Troyer replies, “I’ll be here,” and we believe him because he does not have debt 
and his farm is very much alive (188).  
 Here we can clearly see the ethical consequences that result from one’s 
relationship with a place—whether that place is seen as something to be escaped and 
exploited or to be accepted and respected. Both Meikelberger and Troyer wanted to 
achieve eudaimonia for their families, but their belief about the places in which they 
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lived and consequently how they farmed those places brought about very different ends. 
Ironically, Meikelberger pursued wealth to achieve eudaimonia for his family but has lost 
his family from his farm and is in debt. Troyer, on the other hand, made the health of his 
place his standard and as a consequence is debt free and has a net profit of about half. 
The relationship between place, ethics, and economy is therefore very closely connected, 
as we will see in the next section.      
 
II: Recovering the Meaning of Economy 
 Today, when we hear the term “the economy,” we likely think about an abstract 
superstructure that encompasses the relationship between consumers and businesses, 
made concrete by representation in dollar amounts. However, this particularly modern 
definition of “economy” is not the only definition, but has replaced an older, classical 
definition. In essence, there are two key differing understandings of “economy.” The 
Greek word for economy is “oikonomia,” which refers to the management of households. 
This is because the ancients separated households from political life and relegated 
economic dealings with this private sphere of life, while politics were in the public 
sphere. Aristotle separated the art of household management from the art of getting 
wealth: “Now it is easy to see that the art of household management is not identical with 
the art of getting wealth, for the one uses the material which the other provides” (Politics 
1256a1-1256b25). Aristotle clearly separates the two economic goals:  
Hence some persons are led to believe that getting wealth is the object of 
household management, and the whole idea of their lives is that they ought 
either to increase their money without limit, or at any rate not to lose it. 
The origin of this disposition in men is that they are intent upon living 
only, and not upon living well; and, as their desires are unlimited, they 
also desire that the means of gratifying them should be without limit. 
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Those who do aim at a good life seek the means of obtaining bodily 
pleasures; and, since the enjoyment of these appears to depend on 
property, they are absorbed in getting wealth: and so there arises the 
second species of wealth-getting. For, as their enjoyment is in excess, they 
seek an art which produces the excess of enjoyment; and, if they are not 
able to supply their pleasures by the art of getting wealth, they try other 
causes, using in turn every faculty in a manner contrary to nature. (Politics 
1257b18-1258a14)  
 
Of the two, Aristotle privileged living well over merely living. Humans need to work in 
order to provide a living, but once that living has been obtained, they are free, in 
Aristotle’s thinking, to engage in the public realm. However, some humans continue to 
pursue wealth-getting, or making a living, even after their basic needs are met. Arendt 
states, “If the property-owner chose to enlarge his property instead of using it up in 
leading a political life, it was as though he willingly sacrificed his freedom and became 
voluntarily what the slave was against his own will, a servant of necessity” (65). For 
Aristotle, the worst form of rejecting freedom was found in usury:  
There are two sorts of wealth-getting, as I have said; one is a part of 
household management, the other is retail trade: the former is necessary 
and honourable, while that which consists in exchange is justly censured; 
for it is unnatural, and a mode by which men gain from one another. The 
most hated sort, and with the greatest reason, is usury, which makes a gain 
out of money itself, and not from the natural object of it.30 For money was 
intended to be used in exchange, but not to increase at interest. And this 
term interest, which means the birth of money from money, is applied to 
the breeding of money because the offspring resembles the parent. That is 
why of all modes of getting wealth this is the most unnatural. (Politics 
1258a39-1258b8)  
 
Clearly, for Aristotle usury was the most unethical form of securing eudaimonia, because 
it most violated the telos of money: it no longer was a direct representative for a natural 
object, securing private needs to free oneself for public life, but was made to unnaturally 
                                                
30 One needs only think of the recent collapse of the banking industry, caused by the 
unregulated “usury” of profit gains that had no correlation to reality. For a sobering 
summary of this example, see the 2010 Oscar-winning documentary Inside Job. 
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make more money. This aversion to usury and the original definition of “economy” seem 
to have been kept throughout the Middle Ages (OED).31 
Of course, this aversion did not last, as our modern understanding of “economy” 
is largely built upon usury: trading stocks to use money to make more money. According 
to the OED, the usage “the economy” first occurred in 1892, after the Industrial 
Revolution had firmly changed the economic structure of society. This has become the 
common usage of today, putting the emphasis on a collective national or supranational 
economy rather than the management of the individual households/communities that 
make them up. Today, we see this economy existing in two primary forms: socialism, 
where a centralized government controls the market exchange system and distributes 
wealth amongst its citizens; and, more commonly, capitalism, where a centralized 
government steps aside (theoretically) to let its citizens distribute wealth amongst 
themselves in a free-market, survival of the fittest, economy. 
This modern economy of free-market capitalism has not been without its 
detractors, one of whom was Marx in the 1840s. But starting in the 1890s, in response to 
worldwide “unchecked competition,” “rapacious usury,” and the mistreatment of workers 
as “slave[s],” and the growing gap between the upper and lower classes, Pope Leo XIII 
issued the encyclical Rerum Novarum (par. 3). Rerum Novarum was a refutation of 
socialism that tried to eliminate private property by preying on the lower classes’ “envy” 
of the upper classes (par. 4). Instead, the Pope claimed “every man has by nature the right 
                                                
31 I realize this view of usury is radical today. Today we acquiesce to a banking system 
built on making money from our debt, so much so that we protect and exempt it from 
punishment when it errs. Also, perhaps the best modern example of money’s symbolic 
power is our national debt—we use it in argument to sway each other to political sides, 
but none of us has actually seen this debt. In other words, its only reality to us is as 
symbol, albeit a powerful and persuasive one. 
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to possess property as his own” (par. 6). As such, Rerum Novarum was a criticism of both 
extreme free-market capitalism and socialism, because both extremes removed the 
possession of private property from the many to the few. In other words, the rich get 
richer and the poor get poorer. Building on this Catholic encyclical, in 1926 the 
Distributist League was founded by Chesterton. Primarily English and Catholic, the 
members sought to promote a third option to the too-similar communism and extreme 
capitalism (Naylor). The league included such writers as Hilaire Belloc, Arthur J. Penty, 
and Fr. Vincent McNabb. In the midst of the rapidly changing modern world, their voices 
were almost completely forgotten by the middle of the twentieth century. Perhaps their 
fizzling out is not without warrant—post-WWII was like a shot of adrenaline to industrial 
capitalism and the Distributists understandably appeared anachronistic, if not utopian and 
fanciful. Only recently have their works begun to be reprinted and their ideas discussed.32 
One such work is Arthur J. Penty’s 1937 pamphlet “Distributism: A Manifesto.” In it, 
Penty defines the purpose of Distributists as the following: 
…Distributists propose to go back to fundamentals, and to rebuild society 
from its basis in agriculture, instead of accepting the industrial system and 
changing the ownership, which is all that Socialists propose. Apart from 
their conviction that Industrialism is essentially unstable and cannot last, 
Distributists refuse to accept it as a foundation upon which to build, 
because they believe that large-scale industry may be as great a tyranny 
under public as under private ownership. They therefore seek to get the 
smallholder back into industry as they seek to get him back onto the land; 
and they accept all the implications which such a revolutionary process 
involves. (93) 
 
                                                
32 Also, though not usually intentionally Distributist, such increasingly popular practices 
like co-ops, food shares, and even eBay can be seen as derived from similar economic 
thought. 
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That Berry holds a similar position to this foundational belief of the Distributists 
is readily apparent.33 He begins a recent essay with these words: “My economic point of 
view is from ground-level. It is a point of view sometimes described as ‘agrarian.’ That 
means in ordering the economy of a household or community or nation, I would put 
nature first, the economies of land use second, the manufacturing economy third, and the 
consumer economy fourth” (“Money” 3). But Berry’s similarities do not stop there. In a 
1999 interview, Berry claims that “economic and intellectual independence… is founded 
on land ownership” (Burleigh 142). He continues, “Going back very far, it has to do with 
the belief in the importance of small ownership, the small holding. Jefferson’s 
agrarianism certainly has to do with that and so does Virgil’s… If you are going to take 
democracy seriously, there has to be a balance in favor of the small landowners” (142) 
Why are small landowners so important? Because, he says, “People who are 
economically independent can think and vote independently” (142). 
Ultimately, the “implications” of getting small business owners and farmers “back 
onto the land” involve one form or another of limiting. The importance of limits is a 
prominent theme throughout Berry’s essays and fiction. A close look at some of the 
Catholic Distributists reveals this theme as well. Although Lewis did not explicitly deal 
with economic issues in the same systematic ways as Chesterton and Berry, glimpses of 
his economic philosophy can be inferred from several places in his fiction. Greed and its 
coexistence with utilitarianism are both issues in the Space Trilogy, typified in the 
                                                
33 Berry’s similarity to the Distributists is important because it demonstrates that, though 
starting from very different historical and cultural periods, Berry and Chesterton share a 
belief in a return to the same orthodox tradition for the ideals underpinning their 
challenges to the corruptions of modern economic practice. 
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character or Devine/Lord Feverstone.34 Other works that explore this relationship 
between greed and utilitarianism include The Lion, the Witch, and the Wardrobe, The 
Magician’s Nephew, and The Last Battle. We will look at some of these examples in his 
Narnia stories in chapter three. For now, we will compare the ideas of the Distributists 
with Wendell Berry. Though by no means exhaustive, three important limits to our 
economic beliefs that the Distributists and Wendell Berry seem to share include limits to 
technology, limits to our use of money, and limits to our selves. 
First, both the Distributists and Berry view some technology as destructive to the 
culture of communities, and therefore feel it should be limited. Penty states in his 
manifesto that “Distributists would not only restrict the use of machinery where it stands 
in the way of widespread distribution of property, but also where it conflicts with what 
they are accustomed to regard as the permanent interests of life” (94). These include “the 
interests of society, religion, human values, art and culture” that should “come first, and 
that the use of machinery should be prohibited wherever it runs counter to them” (94). 
Likewise, in The Outline of Sanity Chesterton argues that humans can live without 
machines (162-66). Recalling what Aristotle said about what constitutes the good life, he 
states, “There is no obligation on us to be richer, or busier, or more efficient, or more 
productive, or more progressive, or in any way worldlier or wealthier, if it does not make 
us happier” (163). It is important to note here that the Distributists were not calling for 
the destruction of all modern technology, but were making the point that machines should 
be used only when they did not undermine some greater good of the community. 
                                                
34 Oyarsa says to Weston in Out of the Silent Planet: “He [the Bent One, or Satan] has 
only bent you; but this Thin One [Devine] who sits on the ground he has broken, for he 
has left him nothing but greed. He is now only a talking animal and in my world he could 
do no more evil than an animal” (138). Here Lewis implies that greed is dehumanizing. 
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Similarly, in praising the type of modern community he admires most, Berry claims that 
“the Amish are the truest geniuses of technology, for they understand the necessity of 
limiting it, and they know how to limit it” (Unsettling 212). He explains, “By living well 
without such ‘necessities’ as automobiles, tractors, electrical power, and telephones, the 
Amish prove them unnecessary and so give the lie to our ‘economy’” (Unsettling 212). 
Elsewhere, he uses the entertainment industry for an example. He says that through 
“remembering and telling stories, singing, dancing, playing games, and even by their 
work” humans entertained themselves until in the last seventy-five years, where now a 
small selection of overpaid people do those things for others’ “passive” enjoyment 
(“Money” 10). Communities are therefore letting technology—in such forms as 
television, DVDs, recorded music, the Internet—replace a valuable aspect of their 
culture. 
Besides undermining culture, the Distributists and Berry also agree that 
technology helps create unemployment. For example, Fr. McNabb shows in The Church 
and the Land that while machines allow a fixed number of humans to work them, the 
land is flexible and can accommodate many more humans, as long as agriculture remains 
unmechanized (121). Obviously, that has not remained the case post-World War II, and 
increased mechanization in agriculture has meant the need for fewer farmers and a large 
migration of farmers to the city to become part of the “permanently unemployable” that 
Berry laments (“What” 106-7). More recently, Berry writes, “At the root of our 
problem… is industrialism and the Industrial revolution itself. As the original Luddites 
saw clearly and rightly, the purpose of industrialism from the first has been to replace 
human workers with machines” (“Money” 19). As stated earlier, he claims to be a 
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Luddite in the sense that he “would not willingly see [his] community… destroyed by 
any technological innovation” (“Simple” 58). 
Second, both Berry and the Distributists view money as a “token” and not actual 
wealth. In his Manifesto, Penty claims that the problem with money is that people want to 
use it to make more money instead of as “a common measure of value” (96). “Thus,” 
says Penty, “the problem of money is seen to be primarily a moral issue” (96). Likewise, 
Fr. McNabb, in rebuking an agribusinessman, criticizes him for being “too deeply 
engaged in making a fair return for capital, that is, in making money,” failing to realize 
that “[m]oney is not primary wealth or even secondary wealth, because it is not real 
wealth, but only token wealth” (145). By primary wealth, McNabb means the four 
essentials of food, clothing, housing, and fuel for heating and cooking, while secondary 
wealth includes non-essentials, such as consumer goods and transportation systems 
(41).35 For the Distributists, the dilemmas of “property, usury, and credit” could be 
solved by fixing taxes, interest rates, and wages (Penty 97). Their fixation would slowly 
dismantle both “the capitalist and the banking system” (Penty 97).36  
Berry also believes our modern view and use of money needs to be corrected. He 
states, “Money, instead of a token signifying the value of goods, becomes a good in itself, 
which the wealthy can easily manipulate in their own favor” (“Money” 14-15). He calls 
us a “nation of fantasists,” because we “think that shopping is a patriotic act and public 
                                                
35 It may be difficult for us as moderns to think of transportation systems as non-essential, 
because they are so ingrained into our daily lives, from the goods that we buy to our daily 
commutes. However, humans were able to live and thrive before such systems existed, by 
living in much more localized economies that contained the essentials now spread out by 
our transportation systems. 
36 These claims, of course, are radical, but nevertheless relevant today. In American 
politics we are currently debating the widening gap between the rich and poor, bank 
regulations and interest rates, and even possible tax fixation among the wealthiest. 
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service. We tolerate fabulous capitalists who think a bet on a debt is an asset” (“Simple” 
56).37 Berry, like the Distributists, sees in our bank system the problem of usury, which 
he strongly opposes, calling it “a violence against God because it is a violence against 
nature” (“Money” 11). This belief echoes Aristotle, who called usury the most 
“unnatural” way to gain wealth. Berry’s solution to usury, like the Distributists’ solution, 
is to encourage bankers to be community members. Many people today are turning to 
local credit unions, for example, as an alternative to the large multi-national banks that 
have been unpopular since their “bail-outs” by the federal government. Local banking 
helps make this level of irresponsibility much more difficult to achieve. Berry states, “I 
don’t think a fair rate can be determined according to standards that are only financial. It 
would have to be determined by responsible bankers, acting also as community members, 
in the context of their community, local nature, and the local economy” (“Money” 13). 
This belief is similar to one Belloc proposes, when he says that co-operative banks, 
protected by law, may be able to protect local guilds from the banking monopoly (144). 
Responsibility does not lie solely with bankers, however. The choices we make as 
individuals are the third and possibly most important way we can provide healthy limits 
to our economy. In The Outline of Sanity, Chesterton admits, “We cannot pretend to be 
offering merely comforts and conveniences. Whatever our ultimate view of labour-saving 
machinery, we cannot offer our ideal as a labour-saving machine… There is no way out 
of the danger except the dangerous way” (130-31). Chesterton therefore makes a “call for 
volunteers” (133). Similarly, Belloc says the process begins by changing “an attitude of 
                                                
37 Once again, the recent banking collapse comes to mind, where banks were insuring the 
bad loans they were issuing in order to make a profit when those loans defaulted. See 
Inside Job. 
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the mind” (62). Likewise, Fr. McNabb claims, “No people has ever left the town for the 
land, or remained on the land when it could have gone to the town, except under the 
motive of religion” (36). He therefore asks of his reader:  
If God allows you a plot of soil, and hands for toil, why should you be 
solicitous to have your revenues from Babylonian brickworks— your meat 
from Babylonian cold-storage— your drink from Babylonian 
waterworks— your clothes from Babylonian cloth-factories? Is there no 
clay in Sussex soil— are there no cattle in Sussex meadows— is there no 
water in Sussex wells— is there no wool in Sussex sheep? (38) 
 
Amazingly, McNabb wrote these words in 1925, long before such modern conveniences 
as overnight transnational shipping and bottled water. What the Distributists make clear 
from these statements is that at the root of the economic problem are the lifestyle choices 
made daily by individuals. The choices often seem to hinge on two things: what is 
convenient in the short-term for the individual and what is inconvenient but good for the 
long-term health of the community. As Chesterton admitted, these choices are not easy to 
make. Like Chesterton, Berry also readily admits the difficulties of choosing what is best 
for the community in our modern culture. For instance, even though Berry’s garden 
provides most of his vegetables and he has chosen to not own a tractor, TV, fax machine, 
computer, or answering machine, he does occasionally purchase some produce out of 
season and his diet also includes such non-local foods such as fruit, coffee, and tea 
(Minick 159-60). Berry states, “We’re not fanatics” (Minick 159). As he emphasizes 
elsewhere, “no community is or ever can be entirely self-sufficient” (Berger 176). So the 
principle of limiting seems to be one of degree, not all-or-nothing. However, both the 
Distributists and Berry agree that individuals must ask these questions of limit regarding 
their lifestyle choices, because a good economy is essential to a healthy community. 
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As we’ve seen, these authors have rejected the embrace of a post-industrial 
economy and called for a return to previous systems of economic living. For moderns, 
their conservative ideology is certainly radical, challenging deep-seated modes of 
thinking and operating. Certainly, their calls for a return will be unsettling to many. As 
we have seen, Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry called for three primary returns. First, they 
called for society to return to the land and communities built upon an agrarian 
foundation, rejecting the modern tendency to reject the country and migrate to the city.38 
Second, they called for a return to the proper use of “goods” and money, rejecting usury 
and the endless pursuit of money as the proper end or measure for an economy.39 Third, 
they called for a return to personal ethical choices as the starting place to recover a proper 
and healthy economy, rather than looking to a centralized government and/or super-
corporations to provide a top-down solution. A worldview founded on an economic 
philosophy like theirs leads to some important practical applications, which we will 
examine in their fiction in the next chapter.  
                                                
38 In an interview with Kate Turner, Berry says of Lewis: “The fundamental difference 
between [C. S. Lewis] and me…is probably not one of belief but one of life. He was a 
scholar, a man whose life was devoted almost exclusively to books. And I’m an agrarian 
and a farmer….Lewis in his time didn’t have to think of the things we’re having to think 
of now. The agrarian class, the agrarian tradition in England was more intact in Lewis’s 
time than it is now” (qtd. in Dickerson & O’Hara 267-68). However, I would disagree a 
bit with Berry, both because Lewis had to have known about the Distributists and their 
criticisms of modern agriculture through his love for Chesterton and also because of the 
respect Lewis shows for nature and farming, especially in the Narnia stories. 
39 More than usury in the narrow sense, I’m using Chesterton’s term to describe many 
features of late capitalism. Chesterton’s use of the term is similar to Berry’s: both are 
using the term polemically. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
As we have discussed earlier, the good life, per Taylor, was classically divided 
into two types, the ordinary life and the contemplative/political life. The ordinary life was 
the prerequisite for the contemplative/political life, and the contemplative/political life 
was a higher “good” than the ordinary life. When this privileging gets reversed through 
the Protestant Reformation, then Renaissance and Enlightenment,40 a dramatic shift in 
perspective occurs. When humans are engaged in contemplation and political action, they 
are outwardly focused, recognizing a greater community of which they are a part. In 
order to sustain a prolonged engagement in contemplation and political action, one must 
also be rooted. In contrast, when humans are concerned with the ordinary life, they are 
concerned with personal matters like wealth, comfort, and status. This privileging of 
one’s ordinary life helps contribute to the detached, individualistic nature of our society. 
Our modern version of the “good life” states that we are all individuals seeking our own 
versions of the ordinary life. For many, the ordinary life amounts to a “good life” of 
comfort and wealth, as for instance embodied in the American Dream. As a consequence, 
the humanities become devalued in favor of “practical,” utilitarian disciplines such as 
science and mathematics that have a more easily observable correlation to the industrial 
world of commerce and open the door to the comfort and wealth of ordinary life. 
Therefore, a return to the pursuit of shared corporate goods, through contemplation or 
political action, allows one to regain a rooted ethical perspective that should be an 
                                                
40 See Taylor, Sources, 211-16. 
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integral part of the humanities.41 Such an ethics allows humans to have respect for other 
individuals, communities, and the natural world. 
By respect, I mean not a classical (heroic) or even a modern understanding as 
Taylor defines it. In other words, not the respect warriors earn because of the “honour 
ethic” (Sources 20) or the framing of the “principle of respect… in terms of rights” by the 
“modern West” (11). Rather, it is recognition of a thing’s creational goodness, possession 
of a telos, and redemptive possibility. For Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry, this ethical 
framework is founded in the Judeo-Christian account in Genesis, which sees Creation as 
good but fallen and believes the intended telos of everything on Earth is a restoration of 
relationship with the Creator. In this traditional reading of the Judeo-Christian 
worldview, after creating the Earth and all that is in it including humans, God called his 
creation “very good” (The Holy Bible, English Standard Version, Gen. 1.31).42 However, 
in chapter three of Genesis humans disobeyed God’s one limitation placed upon them and 
as a consequence death (the consequence of sin) entered into the world. However, 
throughout the OT runs the message of eventual restoration. Perhaps the most famous 
instance of this OT promise is in Isaiah: 
“For behold, I create new heavens and a new earth, and the former things 
shall not be remembered or come into mind. | […] [N]o more shall be 
heard in it the sound of weeping and the cry of distress. | No more shall 
there be in it an infant who lives but a few days, or an old man who does 
not fill out his days… […] They shall build houses and inhabit them; they 
shall plant vineyards and eat their fruit. | They shall not plant and another 
eat; …my chosen shall long enjoy the works of their hands. | They shall 
not labor in vain or bear children for their calamity… […] The wolf and 
the lamb shall graze together; the lion shall eat straw like the ox, and dust 
                                                
41 For an extended discussion of the importance of contemplating the Good, see 
Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good. 
42 Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent biblical quotations are taken from The Holy 
Bible, English Standard Version. 
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shall be the serpent’s food. They shall not hurt or destroy in all my holy 
mountain,” says the LORD. (65.17-25) 
 
Here we see included in this promise the creation of new heavens and earth which 
restores things to the way they were before the Fall described in Genesis: no suffering, no 
early death, no wasted or unpleasant labor, and peace throughout all of creation. This 
promised restoration continues in the NT. We see this clearly when John writes in 
Revelation: 
Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first heaven and the first 
earth had passed away and the sea was no more. And then I saw the holy 
city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God… And I heard 
a loud voice from the throne saying, “Behold, the dwelling place of God is 
with man. […] He will wipe away every tear from their eyes, and death 
shall be no more, neither shall there be mourning, nor crying, nor pain 
anymore, for the former things have passed away.” 
 And he who was seated on the throne said, “Behold, I am making 
all things new.” (21.1-5) 
 
So we see quite clearly a teleological narrative in the Judeo-Christian tradition that ends 
in the restoration by God of a “very good” creation that had severed its relationship with 
him. 
Thus, the Judeo-Christian tradition places emphasis on the restoration of 
relationships to God, others, and the natural order as central for humans to achieve the 
“good life.” By “good life,” I mean when things act according to their telos and in 
recognition of the “respect” of themselves and others, especially in their standing towards 
God. Living the good life requires seeing oneself as not just an individual, but part of a 
larger created order. This definition goes back to a pre-modern Christian understanding.43 
                                                
43 For this and what follows, I differ a bit from how Taylor presents this historical shift. 
He shows how the Puritans returned to the Genesis account of creation as “good” and the 
role of humans to be “stewards,” in order to assert the ordinary life and its instrumental 
stance towards the world as the highest good (211-33). I’m arguing that Chesterton, 
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Individuals, communities, and the natural world are connected in a triangle of 
interdependence. This connection exists because the choices individuals make affect not 
only themselves, but also other human beings and the natural world. Choices 
communities make affect not only individuals but the natural world as well. Equally so, 
the natural world makes demands upon how humans live, both individually and 
communally. None of these three aspects of the created order functions in isolation, and 
to seek a good life purely in individualistic terms is not possible if it weakens the health 
of one’s community or natural environment, because they too are deemed “very good” 
and are in the process of being restored. This understanding of the good life mixes with 
Aristotle’s understanding in the attention given to people, places, and things. Recognizing 
their created nature makes them sacramental pointers back to God. So contemplation and 
political action (how to care for creation as stewards) is once again privileged above 
affirmation of the individualistic ordinary life as the highest good. 
Political action is therefore essential to the good life because questions must be 
asked about how to best affirm and/or bring about the restorative nature of created things. 
One key issue that must be addressed is how to move away from a utilitarian relationship 
to these created things, as this perspective ignores their sacredness, instead of seeing 
them exclusively as resources to be used up in service of some individualistic goal (such 
as maximizing shareholder profit, or preserving humanity for eternity).  As such, a rooted 
ethic rejects all forms of imperialism because it is utilitarian and does not respect the 
essential goodness of that from which it takes. Therefore, we would expect authors who 
                                                                                                                                            
Lewis, and Berry write out of a pre-Reformation Christianity that viewed these same 
texts sacramentally and thus privileged the contemplative over the ordinary life. 
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write out of a rooted ethical system would take a hard stance against imperialism as a 
means of achieving the “good life” for humans. 
Imperialism takes many forms, one of which familiar to us is the imposing of 
restrictions on the lower classes by upper class policy makers. The same was true at the 
turn of the twentieth century, when many politicians and social scientists developed 
numerous reforms that changed with each new scientific or philosophical discovery. The 
problem with these reforms is that they were instrumental; their implementation was 
meant to achieve some better way to improve the ordinary life on humanity’s path 
towards progress. As such, they neglected the sacred personhood of the individuals they 
were intended to help.  Chesterton staunchly defended the common Englishman from 
what he saw as a tyranny of the intellectual upper class to chase after these philosophical 
fads that led to laws preventing the poor from achieving a “good life.” For Chesterton, 
this good life included first of all the necessities of ordinary life such as home and 
property, access to food and ale, and stability. In What’s Wrong with the World, 
Chesterton writes of the Homelessness of Jones (his everyman): 
The ordinary Englishman has been duped out of his possessions, such as 
they were, and always in the name of progress. […] This man (Jones let us 
call him) has always desired the divinely ordered things; he has married 
for love, he has chosen or built a small house that fits like a coat; he is 
ready to be a great grandfather and a local god. And just as he is moving 
in, something goes wrong. Some tyranny, personal or political, suddenly 
debars him from the home…. (58) 
 
We see here that Chesterton is affirming the good life for English lower classes which he 
saw as being attacked by instrumental ways to “progress” embodied in the reforms 
passed by the upper “ruling” classes. 
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 Chesterton goes on to sum up the journey Jones must make from his home to a 
city slum to work in a factory, all at the bidding of philosophers in the name of progress. 
Chesterton’s gripe seems to be in the upper class’s utilitarian method of instituting 
sweeping changes in the name of progress for all at the expense of the poor who must 
relinquish what little they have. This defense of the individual44 is seen most clearly at 
the end of What’s Wrong with the World, this exaggerated and polemical collection of 
essays, when Chesterton laments a law instituted by the upper class requiring the heads of 
school girls to be shaved to prevent the spread of lice, rather than changing the cause of 
the lice: the awful conditions in which the poor are forced to live (192-94). He states: 
With the red hair of one she-urchin in the gutter I will set fire to all 
modern civilization. Because a girl should have long hair, she should have 
clean hair; because she should have clean hair, she should not have an 
unclean home…. That little urchin with the gold-red hair… she shall not 
be lopped and lamed and altered; her hair shall not be cut short like a 
convict’s…. She is the human and sacred image; all around her the social 
fabric shall sway and split and fall; the pillars of society shall be shaken, 
and the roofs of ages come rushing down; and not one hair of her head 
shall be harmed. (194) 
 
Any economic or societal change should thus be made with this respect for the good life 
or well being of the individual. This seems to speak strongly to Chesterton’s view of the 
individual: above all else, humans should be valued because they are humans.  
Chesterton’s defense of the creational goodness inherent in individuals continued 
in his defense of communities, as he was always in favor of the small rather than the 
large. This conviction can be seen quite clearly in Chesterton’s opposition to the Boer 
War. Standing against other powerful voices like H. G. Wells and G. B. Shaw, Chesterton 
argued against England’s invasion of South Africa and said that the Boers had a right to 
                                                
44 Here I am not talking about individualism, but things valued for themselves. 
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defend their homes.45 Chesterton fictionalized his philosophy regarding the defense of 
small nations in The Napoleon of Notting Hill (1904) and The Flying Inn (1914). He did 
not stop there, however, as he saw that the same philosophical impetus that led a nation’s 
leadership to invade and take from another could also cause the leadership to invade and 
take from its own citizens. Therefore, he also tackled the problem of the imperialism of 
England by England in both The Napoleon of Notting Hill and The Flying Inn. 
The Napoleon of Notting Hill is set in the future, 1984,46 though it is concerned 
much more with philosophical, ethical, and religious issues than with predicting 
technological advancements. Therefore, the London of 1984 looks remarkably similar to 
that of 1904. What Chesterton changes is the type of government in England, as it now 
chooses its king by a completely random election of a member of the populace. This is 
because the people of England replaced their faith in revolutions with a faith in evolution 
and let “natural” selection choose their leader. We are told: “Some one in the official 
class was made King. No one cared how: no one cared who. He was merely an universal 
secretary” (9). When Auberon Quin, a prankster who thinks everything is a joke, is 
elected as the new king, he reinstates the old custom of walling the districts of London 
and appointing provosts and heraldry over them as a joke. As it turns out, the provost of 
Notting Hill, Adam Wayne, entirely lacks a sense of humor and takes his position 
seriously. When the government and businessmen try to run a road through Pump Street 
                                                
45 As others have noted, Chesterton ironically remained silent and unquestioning 
regarding the Dutch’s right to be in South Africa. For example, Martin Gardner states, 
“He was against the war simply because he thought the Boers were right in defending 
their Orange Free State and their Transvaal Republic, with its rich gold mines and cheap 
labor. I wonder if it ever occurred to G. K. that the Dutch had as little right as the British 
to rule the native blacks?” (xvii). 
46 Though Orwell’s dystopia shares the same date and in fact Orwell (mostly) admired 
Chesterton as a writer, the similarity is probably a coincidence.  
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in Notting Hill, Wayne rallies its shopkeepers and citizens to fight in battle against the 
opposition. They win, and keep winning, until eventually Wayne becomes the “Napoleon 
of Notting Hill,” and a threat to everyone else. Another battle is fought in order to defeat 
Wayne and restore order to England. The novel ends with Quin and Wayne discovering 
that they are “two lobes of the same brain,” one a humorist and the other a fanatic (162). 
Chesterton’s larger point is that it takes both to keep sanity and order, and one without 
the other is dangerous. 
Within his novel, Chesterton emphasizes the importance of respecting the cultural 
uniqueness of communities. At the beginning, a few of the main characters, namely Quin, 
Barker, and Lambert, meet and have lunch with the disposed President of Nicaragua. In 
Chesterton’s future, all of the nations of the world have been swallowed up into empires 
and Nicaragua was the last of the small nations to go. During Quin and his friends’ 
conversation with the ex-President of Nicaragua, the topic of cosmopolitanism arises. 
Barker states, “We moderns believe in a great cosmopolitan civilisation, one which shall 
include all the talents of all the absorbed peoples—“ (18). The ex-President asks Barker 
how he catches wild horses, to which the latter replies that he does not. Then the ex-
President replies, “Precisely… and there ends your absorption of the talents. That is what 
I complain of your cosmopolitanism. When you say you want all peoples to unite, you 
really mean that you want all peoples to unite to learn the tricks of your people” (18).47 
Later, this seems to be a reason for the objection to a road built through Pump Street: it 
will disrupt the local culture of the shops there. This situation brings to mind the 
                                                
47 The two issues of imperialism and “cultural hegemony” are closely related because 
they are worked out in a third issue, colonialism. When an imperial power colonizes 
someplace, it usually takes the best that place has to offer and in return it peddles its own 
economic and cultural wares, making that place more homogeneous. 
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objection Berry and others have had to the interstate system in the U.S., because it too 
has displaced local culture as it allows mass-produced and monoculture goods to travel 
long distances quickly and serve as a replacement. Chesterton’s novel makes it clear that 
as long as a local culture is defending itself it is in the right, but when it enlarges its own 
boundaries at the expense of its neighbors, as Wayne does when he makes Notting Hill an 
empire, then it is in the wrong. 
Interestingly, The Flying Inn also begins with a disposed leader. Patrick Dalroy, 
one of the novel’s protagonists, is forced to relinquish the title “King of Ithaca” to three 
representatives of imperialistic world powers: Lord Ivywood, member of English 
Parliament; Dr. Gluck, the German Minister; and Oman Pasha, representing Turkey. 
Dalroy, a native Irishman, returns to his friend Mr. Pump, proprietor of the pub/inn “The 
Old Ship” in England. Unfortunately for them, Ivywood (under the influence of Pasha’s 
Muslim prohibition of spirits) passes a decree outlawing the sale of alcohol anywhere 
lacking a proper sign, a law that prevents the poor, not the rich, from access to spirits. 
Therefore, Dalroy and Pump flee with sign from “The Old Ship,” a keg of rum, and a 
wheel of cheese. They roam the English countryside, hiding from the authorities and 
planting the inn’s sign to meet the loophole in the law and periodically justify their 
distribution of alcohol to the English poor, thus becoming a thorn to Ivywood. 
Eventually, Dalroy leads the English peasantry in an uprising against Ivywood and Pasha 
and wins the love of Ivywood’s niece, Joan. 
One way in which the differing approaches towards respecting the natural world 
can be seen is the ways that Dalroy and Pump treat animals compared to Ivywood and his 
camp. One key example concerns Ivywood’s dog Quoodle, who has a whole chapter 
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devoted to him. True to character, Ivywood regards Quoodle in very instrumental and 
utilitarian ways: 
Lord Ivywood did not call him Quoodle. Lord Ivywood was almost 
physically incapable of articulating such sounds. Lord Ivywood did not 
care for dogs. He cared for the Cause of Dogs, of course; and he cared still 
more for his own intellectual self-respect and consistency. He would never 
have permitted a dog in his house to be physically ill-treated; nor, for that 
matter, a rat; nor, for that matter, even a man. But if Quoodle was not 
physically ill-treated, he was at least socially neglected: and Quoodle did 
not like it. For dogs care for companionship more than for kindness itself. 
(498) 
 
We are told that he “consulted experts” to try to sell Quoodle, but was told he was not 
worth much because of his mixed-breed (498). Ivywood was also interested in his dog’s 
ability as either a watchdog or swimming, more utilitarian reasons (498). Chesterton has 
fashioned Ivywood to be his symbol of the technocrat, much like Gradgrind was for 
Dickens.48 In many ways, Ivywood is a combination of MacIntyre’s Rich Aesthete and 
Manager characters (27-28). In contrast, Ivywood’s niece “did appreciate dogs” (Flying 
498). We are told “the difference remained” in Joan 
in spite of her sophistries and ambitions; that her elemental 
communications were not cut, and his [Ivywood’s] were. For her the 
sunrise was still the rising of a sun, and not the turning on of a light by a 
convenient cosmic servant.49 For her the Spring was really the Season in 
the country, and not merely the Season in town. For her cocks and hens 
                                                
48 In Orthodoxy, Chesterton states: “But the man we see every day—the worker in Mr. 
Gradgrind’s factory, the little clerk in Mr. Gradgrind’s office—he is too mentally worried 
to believe in freedom. He is kept quiet with revolutionary literature. He is calmed and 
kept in his place by a constant succession of wild philosophies. He is a Marxian one day, 
a Nietzscheite the next day, a Super-man (probably) the next day; and a slave every 
day…. The only man who gains by all the philosophies is Gradgrind” (159-60).  
49 Cf. the opening pages of Steiner’s Real Presences, where Steiner argues against 
Nietzsche’s philosophy that “[w]e still speak of ‘sunrise’ and ‘sunset’. We do so as if the 
Copernican model of the solar system had not replaced, ineradicably, the Ptolemaic” (3). 
He “wager[s]” instead that “every poet, artist, [and] composer of whom we have explicit 
record – predicates the presence of a realness, of a ‘substantiation’…within language and 
form” (4). This seems to be Joan’s (and Chesterton’s) wager as well. 
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were natural appendages to an English house; and not (as Lord Ivywood 
had proved to her from an encyclopædia) animals of Indian origin, 
recently imported by Alexander the Great. And so for her a dog was a 
dog, and not one of the higher animals, nor one of the lower animals, nor 
something that had the sacredness of life, nor something that ought to be 
muzzled, nor something that ought not to be vivisected. She knew that in 
every practical sense proper provision would be made for the dog; as, 
indeed, provision was made for the yellow dogs in Constantinople by 
Abdul Hamid; whose life Lord Ivywood was writing for the Progressive 
Potentates series. Nor was she in the least sentimental about the dog or 
anxious to turn him into a pet. It simply came natural to her in passing to 
rub all his hair the wrong way and call him something which she instantly 
forgot. (499) 
 
In Joan and Ivywood we see contrasting perspectives on Quoodle, who acts as a 
representative of the natural world. Whereas Ivywood and other like-minded upper class 
technocrats see Quoodle and others as ideas, Joan sees Quoodle as an individual whose 
needs need to be taken into consideration. This appreciation that Joan has for Quoodle is 
similar to the appreciation of particularity we discussed in chapter two. This appreciation 
for particularity that Joan demonstrates can lead to a broader sentiment of appreciation 
for dogs in general. Lewis touched on this issue in a 1930 letter to his friend Arthur 
Greeves: 
As to the business of being ‘rooted’ or ‘at home everywhere,’ I wonder are 
they really the opposite, or are they the same thing. I mean, don’t you 
enjoy the Alps more precisely because you began by first learning to love 
in an intimate and homely way our own hills and woods? While the mere 
globe-trotter, starting not from a home feeling but from guide books & 
aesthetic chatter, feels equally at home everywhere only in the sense that 
he is really at home nowhere? It is just like the difference between vague 
general philanthropy…and learning first to love your own friends and 
neighbours wh. makes you more, not less, able to love the next stranger 
who comes along. If a man loveth not his brother whom he hath seen – 
etc. In other words, doesn’t one get to the universal (either in people or in 
inanimate nature) thro’ the individual – not by going off into a more 
generalized mash. (Collected 912) 
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Both Chesterton and Lewis seem to be in agreement on this principle: that our ethics and 
understanding of the Good, comes out of our attachment and attention to the particular 
goods around us. For Ivywood to have a true appreciation for canines, he first has to have 
an appreciation, like Joan, for Quoodle. 
 In this sympathetic consideration of Quoodle, a dog, is Chesterton playing the role 
of the ecologist? To be sure, Chesterton is not a spokesperson for ecology as we 
understand it by any means, but there are glimpses in his rooted ethics. This treatment of 
ecology is not to be expected of him at this period in history, as the term ecology and its 
public acknowledgement had not yet become a hypergood for society and therefore 
available for a complete treatment by Chesterton. Instead, Chesterton treated the 
environment as a part of his larger ethical framework, and thus we can see glimpses of a 
creational view of nature in his writings. What is missing is an explicit working out of the 
interaction between humans and the natural environment that shows the two coexisting 
without the human impulse to dominate. This public narrative had yet to emerge to the 
forefront, as ecology had yet to become a hypergood. When we get to Lewis, we see 
these human/environmental concerns starting to take shape in the public sphere, but even 
at that time they have yet to dominate modern ethics, as they do today for us and for 
Berry. With this qualification in mind, let us turn to Lewis’s fiction.  
 Like Chesterton, Lewis saw the danger posed by the ruling class’s detached 
instrumentalism towards individuals, communities, and the natural world as it pursued a 
vague concept of “progress” for humanity. MacIntyre argues:  
The problems of modern moral theory emerge clearly as the product of the 
failure of the Enlightenment project. On the one hand the individual free 
agent, freed from hierarchy and teleology, conceives of himself and is 
conceived of by moral philosophers as sovereign in his moral authority. 
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On the other hand the inherited, if partially transformed rules of morality 
have to be found some new status, deprived as they have been of their 
older teleological character and their even more ancient categorical 
character as expressions of an ultimately divine law. If such rules cannot 
be found a new status which will make appeal to them rational, appeal to 
them will indeed appear as a mere instrument of individual desire and will. 
Hence there is a pressure to vindicate them either by devising some new 
teleology or by finding some new categorical status for them. The first 
project is what lends its importance to utilitarianism… (62)  
 
This utilitarian outlook has its effects even in literature. Taylor acknowledges this 
modern phenomenon. Using “Hulme’s early theory [of] poetry,” he states:50  
In a mechanistic, utilitarian world we come to deal with things in a 
mechanical, conventionalized way. Our attention is turned away from 
things to what we are getting done through them. Ordinary prose reflects 
this. It deals in dead counters, which allow us to refer to things without 
really seeing them…. Poetry is meant to break through this abstraction…. 
The poetic image breaks away from a language of counters and gives us a 
fresh intuitive language which restores our vision of things. (Sources 460) 
 
I would qualify Taylor’s view by saying that prose can also be “poetic” in offering its 
readers a restored vision. After all, as we have seen, both Chesterton and Lewis had their 
imaginations baptized by George MacDonald’s fiction. 
 As an alternative to the utilitarian vision of things, Lewis models the importance 
of rooted ethics in his three interplanetary novels that form a trilogy referred to today as 
the Space Trilogy. The novels were published before and during World War II in 1938, 
1943, and 1945. All three novels concern a Christian philologist named Ransom. In Out 
of the Silent Planet, Ransom is kidnapped by two scientists, Devine and Weston, and 
taken to Malacandra (Mars) to be offered as a sacrifice to the alien beings there. In the 
next novel, Ransom is sent to the planet Perelandra (Venus) to prevent a Satan-possessed 
                                                
50 Thomas Ernest Hulme (1883-1917) was an English poet, philosopher, and critic. He 
associated with such poets as Ezra Pound and F. S. Flint and his ideas were influential to 
many modernists, notably T. S. Eliot. 
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Weston from tricking that planet’s Eve into disobeying God and turning Perelandra into a 
fallen planet (re-imagining the Garden of Eden story on Earth). The last novel, That 
Hideous Strength, takes place on Thulcandra (Earth) and concerns a scientific 
organization’s plot to replace all life, except for the minds of humans, with machines and 
its eventual foiling by a small band of community members opposed to these goals, with 
Ransom as their leader. While fantastic in scope, Lewis uses these novels to pit the 
Christian teleology he held with the modern scientific philosophies of his time. 
 In Out of the Silent Planet, Lewis shows the modern scientific belief in progress 
and its instrumentalism of humanity and Nature to be egotistical, destructive, and in a 
word, “evil.” In contrast, he presents his readers with an imaginary world in which places 
and their inhabitants are respected. When Weston and Devine kidnap the protagonist 
Ransom, their justification runs as follows: “We have learned to jump off the speck of 
matter on which our species began; infinity, and therefore perhaps eternity, is being put 
into the hands of the human race. You cannot be so small-minded as to think that the 
rights or the life of an individual or of a million individuals are of the slightest 
importance in comparison with this” (29).51 Of course Ransom disagrees, stating, “I 
consider your philosophy of life raving lunacy. I suppose all that stuff about infinity and 
eternity means that you think you are justified in doing anything…on the off chance that 
some creatures or other descendants from man as we know him may crawl about a few 
centuries longer in some part of the universe” (29-30). Weston replies, “Yes—anything 
whatever…and all educated opinion—for I do not call classics and history and such trash 
education—is entirely on my side” (30). Here Lewis raises a crucial argument for the 
                                                
51 Two decades later, Lewis’s fiction becomes a reality. See fn. 3. 
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importance of the humanities in education, which is a significant part of my own 
argument. The humanities—and art including literature in particular—are an essential 
part of human culture that help us stay ethically fixed within a larger tradition. These 
limits prevent us from transgressing the boundaries of our place and therefore 
disrespecting the individuals, communities, and natural world around us.52 
 Lewis shows how these ethical boundaries help communities coexist through 
mutual respect in his depiction of the inhabitants of Malacandra, who consist of three 
species akin to humans in essence, though not in form. The community life of these three 
species, who have learned to live successfully (through culture and tradition) in their 
place and in harmony with each other and their environments, acts as a foil for the 
imperialistic, Wellsian motives of Weston and Devine, as well as for the non-harmonious 
ways in which humans live on Thulcandra. After all, in 1938 the nation states in Europe 
were about to confront the very real consequences of overstepped boundaries that led to 
World War II. On Malacandra the three species (or metaphorical nation states) were the 
sorns, hrossa, and pfifltriggi. Though not intermixing, these three species respected each 
other and realized the unique and important roles they served to the whole planet 
(ecosystem).53 This can be clearly seen in a discovery Ransom makes while staying with 
                                                
52 A recent book (2011) that purportedly asserts the ethical importance of the humanities, 
while also rejecting the belief in a shared ethical standard, is All Things Shining by 
Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly. For a brief overview of their argument, see this 
New York Times Sunday Book Review: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/books/ 
review/Neiman-t.html. See also this lively exchange between the authors and Gary Wills: 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/may/26/all-things-shining-exchange/ 
53 So, is Lewis suggesting segregation, or separation of species, as the way to insure 
harmony? From Lewis’s strong comments about the dangers of modern “ethics” in the 
Abolition of Man, quoted below, I believe he would have opposed forced segregation. His 
point in Out of the Silent Planet is that culturally different communities could respect 
each other’s differences and live in harmony, as long as they derived their ethical 
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the sorn, who are the most philosophical of the species. He stumbles upon a “monolithic 
avenue” of stones containing carved depictions of the history of Malacandra (110-11). 
The history contains not only depictions of activities performed by each of the three 
human-like species, but also depictions of other animal life and of the history of the solar 
system as well. Lewis is showing the importance of the humanities—specifically history 
and philosophy—in preserving a story that assigns the various parts of creation places in 
an order, thus providing them with limits to respect. Like the sorn, the hrossa also 
preserve history and tradition, but their chosen medium is poetry. These cultural artifacts 
have allowed Malacandra, an old planet, to exist in an “unfallen” state compared to 
Thulcandra (Earth).  
 To underscore the importance given even to non-human life on Malacandra, 
Lewis provides an interesting exchange between Ransom and Hyoi, a hross. On 
Malacandra there exists a shark-like animal called a hnakra that is carnivorous and 
antagonistic towards the hrossa and therefore the hrossa must occasionally hunt and kill. 
In trying to understand the nature of “bentness” (sin) on Malacandra, Ransom questions 
Hyoi about the hnakra. Hyoi replies: 
Oh, but that is so different. I long to kill this hnakra as he also longs to kill 
me. I hope that my ship will be the first and I first in my ship with my 
straight spear when the black jaws snap. And if he kills me, my people 
will mourn and my brothers will desire still more to kill him. But they will 
not wish that there were no hnéraki; nor do I. How can I make you 
understand, when you do not understand the poets? The hnakra is our 
enemy, but he is also our beloved. (76) 
 
Here, Lewis’s views seem similar to a Native American perspective towards nature, that 
it is to be loved and respected for what it is, even if that means it is antagonistic towards 
                                                                                                                                            
philosophy from the same external source, which he called the Tao in the Abolition of 
Man. 
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us. This way of looking at the world is a very difficult and foreign concept, especially to 
a culture that is obsessed with things like bug spray and sanitary wipes, scientific 
products designed to exterminate unwanted parts of nature. Of course, this does not 
entirely work as planned and resistant bugs, bacteria, and virus strains develop, but that 
does not change our instrumentalist perspective towards the environment. Lewis depicts a 
nightmarish form of this mentality in That Hideous Strength, when he makes removing 
all non-desirable vegetation from the Earth one of the goals of the scientific technocrat 
agency N.I.C.E. After Mr. Winter admits his “fond[ness] of trees,” Filostrato replies: 
 Oh, yes…. The pretty trees, the garden trees. But not the savages. I 
put the rose in my garden, but not the brier. The forest tree is a weed. But I 
tell you I have seen the civilized tree in Persia. It was a French attaché 
who had it because he was in a place where trees did not grow. It was 
made of metal. A poor, crude thing. But how if it were perfected? Light, 
made of aluminium. So natural, it would even deceive.” 
 “It would hardly be the same as a real tree,” said Winter. 
 “But consider the advantages!…. At present, I allow, we must have 
forests, for the atmosphere. Presently we find a chemical substitute. And 
then, why any natural trees? I foresee nothing but the art tree all over the 
earth. In fact, we clean the planet.” (169) 
 
Eventually, Filostrato’s train of thought leads him to reject birds, all organic life, even 
dirt and the bodies of humans. What Lewis argues here, as he did in The Abolition of 
Man, is the danger of an unrooted morality that has no way to check the type of scientific 
progress that would damn the physical in pursuit of the eternal spiritual. This is similar to 
the pursuit of heaven by many modern Christians at the expense of the environment, as 
lamented by Berry and others. 
 In fact, Jason Peters has recently discussed Berry’s orthodox rejection of this 
heresy in his essay “Education, Heresy, and the ‘Deadly Disease of the World’.” 
Examining Berry’s companion essays “Why I Am Not Going to Buy a Computer” and 
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“Feminism, the Body, and the Machine,” Peters argues that the dualism between body 
and spirit that Berry rejects is the heresy of Gnosticism that permeates our culture. 
Quoting Berry, Peters comments: 
“The danger most immediately to be feared in ‘technological progress,’” 
Berry says, “is the degradation and obsolescence of the body”—that’s 
Gnosticism. “Implicit in the technological revolution from the beginning 
has been a new version of an old dualism”—that’s Gnosticism in its 
specifically Manichaean iteration—“one always destructive, and now 
more destructive than ever.” The education of which Berry long ago 
declared himself skeptical perpetuates both heresies, and the result is 
absurdity and perversion—a perversion that has now become the deadly 
disease of the world. (274) 
 
How did Berry acquire this orthodoxy? Peters states, “Berry came to this orthodoxy not 
by studying but by meditating poetry and place, by attending to soil and practicing the 
disciplines by which it is maintained…. A great many of us, by contrast, abstracted from 
the soil and disinclined toward the domestic arts, languish under a resuscitated gnosticism 
that our education perpetuates” (273). Peters argues that Berry rejects the “bestialism and 
angelism that follow upon our flight from the flesh” (274).54 For Chesterton, Lewis, and 
Berry an ethics rooted in a particular place allows one to resist and reject the Gnostic 
heresy. Likewise, when the humanities encourage active involvement with physical 
people, places, and things it bridges this schism between the life of the mind and the 
body.  
                                                
54 Perhaps one of the strongest Gnostic voices in our time is that of Harold Bloom. In a 
recent article critical of this aspect of Bloom, R. V. Young states: “While he [Bloom] 
gazes unblinkingly at the devastation wrought upon the tradition by the postmodern 
assault, he is blind to the intimate and indispensable bond between the secular ‘canon’ 
and the Faith informing its necessary model, the scriptural canon. Western civilization is 
the cultural embodiment of Christendom; when its cultural heart stops beating, all that is 
left is a corpse” (19-20). Young’s commentary runs parallel to Taylor’s, as both 
recognize the inseparable bond between the Judeo-Christian tradition and the Western 
culture of which we are heirs. 
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In addition to the Space Trilogy, Lewis emphasizes rooted ethics in his Narnia 
series. Perhaps one of the clearest examples of the difference between those with and 
without rooted ethics occurs in book six of the Chronicles of Narnia series.55 In The 
Magician’s Nephew, Lewis provides a stark contrast between two types: a 
magician/scientist type and an agrarian/steward/king type. The novel concerns the 
creation of Narnia by Aslan the Lion, who represents Christ in Lewis’s imaginative 
world. Through trickery, Uncle Andrew, a magician/scientist sends his nephew Digory 
and Digory’s friend Polly to a “World between the Worlds” consisting of several pools of 
water. Each pool of water leads to its own separate world. Digory and Polly end up in a 
dead world and awaken a witch who has been under a spell. This witch, Jadis, forces the 
children to take her back to London so she can rule our world. The children lead Jadis, 
Uncle Andrew, a cabby and his horse back to the World Between the Woods and 
eventually to Narnia, where they witness its creation. Aslan appoints the cabby and his 
wife to be king and queen of Narnia, banishes the Witch, and sends the children and 
Uncle Andrew back home. 
 Lewis characterizes the magician/scientist type in two primary ways. First, they 
are utilitarian, which leads them to be cruel to people, animals, and the environment. For 
example, Lewis makes a point to stress Uncle Andrew’s cruelty towards guinea-pigs in 
his experiments.56 He states, “My earlier experiments were all failures. I tried them on 
                                                
55 Though the action of the novel precedes the others and is thus labeled as book one in 
contemporary reprints, Lewis chronologically wrote the book sixth, in 1955. 
56 Unlike PETA’s exaggerated position that sees humans as a sub-species of animals and 
often gives more rights to other animals than humans, Lewis is consistent in his position 
that humans are distinct from animals and are privileged in the Creational Order. 
However, he clearly has problems with an abuse of that privilege in the treatment of 
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guinea-pigs. Some of them only died. Some exploded like little bombs——” (21). 
Digory, who we are told “once had a guinea-pig of his own,” calls these actions “a jolly 
cruel thing to do,” and receives this reply from his Uncle: “That’s what the creatures were 
there for. I’d bought them myself” (21). Later, when Digory asks his uncle why he sends 
guinea-pigs, Polly, and Digory into the other world as a part of his experiment instead of 
going himself, Uncle Andrew exclaims:  
Me? Me?…. The boy must be mad! A man at my time of life, and in my 
state of health, to risk the shock and the dangers of being flung suddenly 
into a different universe?…. 
 You don’t understand. I am the great scholar, the magician, the 
adept who is doing the experiment. Of course I need subjects to do the 
experiment on. Bless my soul, you’ll be telling me next that I ought to 
have asked the guinea-pigs permission before I used them! (22-23)  
 
In The Magician’s Nephew we see these contrasting views towards guinea-pigs as 
creatures. For Uncle Andrew, buying them constitutes owning them and therefore gives 
him the right to treat them any way he pleases in service of some “higher good,” which 
we really see in the novel amounts to glory-seeking. For Digory, the animals were to be 
treated fairly and cared for. Of course, Lewis here seems to condone pet ownership and 
thus asserts that humans can exercise some will over animals, as long as the animals are 
cared for. Lewis strongly opposed vivisection. In his essay, “Vivisection,” he claims that 
the only true argument in favor of it comes from a Christian perspective that believes 
humans and animals are distinct creatures, though he believes this should compel us to 
“prove ourselves better than the beasts precisely by the fact of acknowledging duties to 
them which they do not acknowledge to us” (452). The real danger, however, lies 
elsewhere for Lewis. He states: 
                                                                                                                                            
animals, devoting a chapter in The Problem of Pain to “Animal Pain,” as well as the 
essays “Vivisection” and “The Pains of Animals: A Problem in Theology” to the subject. 
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But of course the vast majority of vivisectors have no such theological 
background. They are most of them naturalistic and Darwinian…. The 
very same people who will most contemptuously brush aside any 
consideration of animal suffering if it stands in the way of ‘research’ will 
also, on the another context, most vehemently deny that there is any 
radical difference between man and the other animals…. If loyalty to our 
own species, preference for man simply because we are men, is not a 
sentiment, then what is?…. 
 But the most sinister thing about modern vivisection is this. If a 
mere sentiment justifies cruelty, why stop at a sentiment for the whole 
human race? There is also a sentiment for the white man against the black, 
for a Herrenvolk against the non-Aryans, for ‘civilized’ or ‘progressive’ 
peoples against ‘savage’ or ‘backward’ peoples…. Once the old Christian 
idea of a total difference in kind between man and beast has been 
abandoned, then no argument for experiments on animals can be found 
which is not also an argument for experiments on inferior men. (452-53) 
 
Certainly we see this slippery sentiment exhibited in Uncle Andrew. He tells Digory, 
“Men like me who possess hidden wisdom, are freed from common rules just as we are 
cut off from common pleasures. Ours, my boy, is a high and lonely destiny” (Magician’s 
18). Here we see Uncle Andrew claiming for himself special status above other humans, 
therefore justifying his abuses of them, but his reasoning is based upon his own 
sentiment. Later, Queen Jadis tells the children something similar, except she represents 
what Uncle Andrew will become if he continues down his slippery slope of sentiment. 
After telling the children about a war with her sister that destroyed both their kingdoms, 
Polly questions her about “[a]ll the ordinary people…who’d never done you any harm…. 
[including] the women, and the children, and the animals” (61). Jadis replies, “I was the 
Queen. They were all my people. What else were they there for but to do my will” (61). 
She continues, “You must learn, child, that what would be wrong for you or for any of 
the common people is not wrong in a great Queen such as I. The weight of the world is 
on our shoulders. We must be freed from all rules. Ours is a high and lonely destiny” 
(62). Digory (and Lewis’s readers) immediately recognize the parallel in Andrew and 
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Jadis’s words, confirming that they represent the same dangerous mentality that views 
individuals and the natural world instrumentally.57  
 Second, magician/scientists are imperial and colonial; they dominate and use up 
people and resources in one place and then move on to the next to do the same. Certainly, 
this is clear in Queen Jadis’s actions. Having used up her own world warring with her 
sister, she sees the children’s breaking of her spell as an opportunity for her to dominate 
another world and use it up. She only views others as being instrumentally in service to 
her; for her, their purpose is not to seek goods on their own but to serve her and her 
ideology. Likewise, when Uncle Andrew sees the creation of Narnia, he only sees in it 
the instrumental potential to serve him. Upon seeing all of the newly created animals, he 
thinks, “If I were a younger man, now——perhaps I could get some lively young fellow 
to come here first. One of those big game hunters. Something might be made of this 
country” (109). Later he thinks, “I have discovered a world where everything is bursting 
with life and growth…. The commercial possibilities of this country are unbounded” 
(111). The final stage in this instrumental perspective involves the desire to extend life as 
long as possible: “And then as regards oneself…. There’s no knowing how long I might 
live if I settled here” (112). Jadis and Andrew both see Narnia as a resource to be used up 
in service of themselves, not as a good Creation to be respected. 
 In contrast, Lewis provides the model of the agrarian/steward/king type. Unlike 
the magician/scientist, this type submits to authority—sees the hierarchy of which it is a 
part—and respects limits. This leads to the other primary characteristic of this type: 
                                                
57 Today’s politicians imply such views, for example, when the label “terrorist” makes 
humans fair game for “above the law” practices such as Predator drone strikes, perpetual 
detainment without trial, or interrogation methods that include torture.  
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respect for other people, communities, and the natural world. One way this respect is 
exhibited is in a willingness to be attentive to the world around, to listen, rather than act 
upon. Unlike Uncle Andrew and Jadis, who refuse to stop acting as they move (and seek 
to conquer) from place to place, the Cabby “struck up at once a harvest thanksgiving 
hymn, all about crops being ‘safely gathered in’” when he witnesses Narnia’s creation. 
When the others start to argue with each other, he states, “‘Old your noise, everyone…. I 
want to listen to the moosic” (103). Later he asserts, “Watchin’ and listenin’ ’s the thing 
at present; not talking” (106).  Lewis is demonstrating the Cabby’s participation in the 
good life as he is attentive to the external Good that he sees. This type of activity is one 
that Uncle Andrew and Jadis cannot comprehend—they see the creation of Narnia either 
as a threat to their safety or as resource to be exploited. 
To be fair, Lewis was not an ecologist, like Berry. He, like Chesterton, was 
writing before the term “ecology” had even been coined. Nevertheless, Matthew 
Dickerson and David O’Hara see in Lewis an “integrated worldview,” claiming “his 
Christian story is one that calls the world good and hospitable and that calls for 
reverential and humble response on the part of humans. His is a voice that gives the lie to 
the ‘Abrahamic’ narrative of domination” (258).  Of course, his views will not seem 
developed or consistent enough to some modern ecologists. For example, Margarita 
Carretero-González praises his acknowledgement of the importance of non-human life, 
but also points out how he still operates out of an anthropocentric worldview, making 
him problematic for many environmentalists today. She believes “the issue at stake here” 
is that “Lewis had complete faith in the dogma that humans had been appointed by God 
to be the center of the universe and this assertion can hardly be reconciled with deep 
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ecological ethics” (96). Nevertheless, Carretero-González states, “In focusing too much 
on the negative aspects of the Narnian world, we may lose the benefit of seeing the 
environmental perspective Lewis does entertain, and there is certainly much in this 
regard… to celebrate and enjoy” (109). 
In Berry, we of course find the most fleshed-out Judeo-Christian ecological 
philosophy, rooted in an attentive respect for the natural world, rather than an 
instrumental condescension. Like Chesterton, Berry is concerned for the way autocrats 
like Ivywood take an instrumentalist stance towards individuals in other communities, 
even if it is for their own “good.” Writing of the “tyranny of charity,”58 Berry states: “An 
agency or bureau or institution cannot exercise taste and judgment, cannot be motivated 
by love or compassion, cannot value a man for his industry or his art or his pride; they are 
abstractions themselves and must deal with people as abstractions” (Long 9). He 
continues, “To give a man bread when he needs a tool is as inept and unfeeling as to give 
him a stone when he needs bread, and this painful clumsiness is inherent in the 
generalizations of the social planners and the organized charities. Their most ‘humane’ 
endeavors almost necessarily involve an attitude toward humanity that debases it” (9-10).  
One way Berry sees individuals as sacred can be seen in his use of the terms 
“respect” and “affection.” As we have already seen, Berry’s philosophical vision is often 
filtered through an economic lens. He thus contrasts how an authentic economy should 
treat individuals with how our industrial economy currently treats them. He says, “The 
                                                
58 For some, Berry may sound here like a libertarian. However, I believe Berry makes it 
clear in his essays that there is a role government should play in creating and enforcing 
laws that foster greater local community well-being. What he is critical of are policies 
that are impersonal; charity should be motivated out of a personal relationship between 
neighbors, because of the respect involved. Love, the greatest expression of respect, can 
only truly exist if people are known personally, not as statistics. 
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right economy is right insofar as it respects the source, respects the power of the source to 
resurge, and does not ask too much” (“A Nation” 72). He gives topsoil as an example of 
how individual things have value beyond what the industrial economy places on them: 
“[Topsoil’s] value is inestimable; we must value it, beyond whatever price we put on it, 
by respecting it” (73). In contrast, “The industrial economy…reduces the value of a thing 
to its market price, and it sets the market price in accordance with the capacity of a thing 
to be made into another kind of thing” (73). Elsewhere, Berry asserts that “people, places, 
and things cannot be well used without affection. To be well used, creatures and places 
must be used sympathetically, just as they must be known sympathetically to be well 
known” (“An Argument” 82). For examples, he states: 
The economist to whom it is of no concern whether or not a family loves 
its farm will almost inevitably aid and abet the destruction of family 
farming. The “animal scientist” to whom it is of no concern whether 
animals will suffer will almost inevitably aid and abet the destruction of 
the decent old ideal of animal husbandry and, as a consequence, increase 
the suffering of animals. I hope that my country may be delivered from the 
remote, cold abstractions of university science. (82) 
 
Lest we think Berry only has qualms with university science, he has this to say about the 
humanities: “The humanities have been destructive not because they have been 
misapplied, but because they have been so frequently understood by their academic 
stewards as not applicable” (82). For example, he states, “A poem…is a relic as soon as it 
is composed; it can be taught, but it cannot teach…. I hope that my country may be 
delivered from the objectivity of the humanities” (83). As we saw in chapter two in our 
discussion of Lewis’s Space Trilogy, the humanities should be doing the crucial task of 
placing students within a larger tradition, and this task cannot be accomplished if poems, 
novels, and plays are taught as artifacts divorced from their frameworks. 
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A good example of how Berry values humans as individuals whose pursuit of the 
good life must be respected can be seen in his criticism of our modern culture’s “attitude 
toward work” (“What” 107).59 He is sharply critical of how modern culture has shied 
away from “the manual work necessary to the long-term preservation of the land,” 
instead opting for a “rush toward mechanization, automation, and computerization” 
(107). As a consequence, agribusiness has eliminated the need for humans to do what 
Berry sees as good work in the country, and thus our cities have become overcrowded 
with the “permanently unemployable” (106). He asks, “One wonders what the authors of 
our Constitution would have thought of that category, ‘permanently unemployable’” 
(106). This leads Berry to ask further questions about the telos of humans: “The great 
question that hovers over this issue, one that we have dealt with mainly by indifference, 
is the question of what people are for. Is their greatest dignity in unemployment? Is the 
obsolescence of human beings now our social goal?” (107). Berry believes that work is 
essential for the well being of humans. This mandate for work can be traced back to 
Genesis, when God has Adam name the animals and gives him and his descendents the 
task of “subdue[ing]” the earth (1.28).60 In the second version of the Creation story, we 
are given a less controversial description: “The LORD God took the man and put him in 
the garden of Eden to work it and keep it” (Gen. 2.15). In her poem “Tragic Error,” 
Denise Levertov looks at our misreading of the mandate to “subdue” in Genesis, 
                                                
59 See Taylor’s chapter “God Loveth Adverbs” in Sources of the Self for a discussion of 
the Protestant work ethic inherited by moderns (211-33). 
60 This term, of course, has been the subject of much debate and derision. Starting with 
Lynn White, Jr.’s “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” in 1967, many have 
blamed the Judeo-Christian tradition’s misreading of Genesis 1 as a mandate for humans 
to use up the Earth. Of course, many others have rebutted this contention and have sought 
to return to a pre-Enlightenment understanding of Genesis. See Steven Bouma-Prediger, 
For the Beauty of the Earth: A Christian Vision for Creation. 
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expressing well this original understanding of work: “Surely we were to have been | 
earth’s mind, mirror, reflective source. | Surely our task | was to have been | to love the 
earth, | to dress and keep it like Eden’s garden” (lines 10-15). So from the very beginning, 
pre-Fall, work (at least agricultural or cultivating work) was an essential part of what 
constituted humanness and was deemed “good.” Therefore, Berry rightfully takes issue 
with industrialism’s purpose (or at least, byproduct) of taking away work from humans. 
Taking away work leads to an abstraction of humans into a category, the “permanently 
unemployable,” and this opens the door to greater abstractions, like an absentee 
economy. 
Berry has a lot to say about the lack of respect an absentee economy shows in its 
abstraction of people, communities, and the natural world. He states:  
Living as we now do in almost complete dependence on a global 
economy, we are put inevitably into a position of ignorance and 
irresponsibility…. We can connect ourselves to the globe as a whole only 
by means of a global economy that, without knowing the earth, plunders it 
for us…. To build houses here, we clear-cut the forests there. To have air-
conditioning here, we strip-mine mountains there. To drive our cars here, 
we sink our oil wells there. It is an absentee economy. Most people aren’t 
using or destroying what they can see. (“Conservation” 37) 
 
Of this type of economy Patrick Deneen states, “Modern economic systems tend toward 
abstraction, replacing exchange that closely demonstrates the connections between work 
and its products with complex financial and monetary interactions that obscure those 
relations” (308). This type of economy exists because technocrats make decisions based 
upon ideas and not real people and communities. Berry states, “The present practice of 
handing down from on high policies and technologies developed without consideration of 
the nature and needs of the land and the people has not worked, and it cannot work” (“An 
Argument” 81).  
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Berry calls this type of economic practice “colonization.” He states, “The 
economic principle is everywhere the same: a domestic colonialism that extracts an 
immense wealth from our rural landscapes, returning as near nothing as possible or 
nothing or worse than nothing to the land and the people” (“Simple” 59). Elsewhere he 
says, “[T]hinking to transcend our definition as fallen creatures, we have only colonized 
more and more territory eastward of Eden” (“Two Economies” 128). Furthermore, says 
Berry, “The global ‘free market’ is free to the corporations precisely because it dissolves 
the boundaries of the old national colonialisms, and replaces them with a new colonialism 
without restraints or boundaries” (“The Total Economy” 182).61 Berry terms this abstract 
economic practice “the colonization of the future,” saying, “What has drawn the Modern 
World into being is a strange, almost occult yearning for the future” (Unsettling 56).  Not 
surprisingly, he begins this chapter in The Unsettling of America (from which the 
previous quote was derived) with a quote from That Hideous Strength, which runs thus: 
“Dreams of the far future destiny of man were dragging up from its shallow and unquiet 
grave the old dream of Man as God. The very experience of the dissecting room and the 
pathological laboratory were breeding a conviction that the stifling of all deep-set 
repugnances was the first essential for progress” (Unsettling 50). Once again, the 
yearning for the future demonstrated in this passage exemplifies what Arendt sees in 
                                                
61 Thomas Friedman’s recent New York Times essay succinctly discusses this issue. 
Friedman states, “There is a big gap in how C.E.O.’s and political leaders look at the 
world.” He argues that while politicians have an obligation to the citizens of their nations, 
multi-national corporations are constrained by no such boundaries; they make their goods 
overseas to minimize costs and sell to a global, not national, market. Friedman states, 
“Therein lies the tension. So many of ‘our’ companies actually see themselves now as 
citizens of the world. But Obama is president of the United States.” Berry would 
probably add that many, if not most, of these companies are not behaving as ideal 
“citizens,” interested in the public good. 
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humanity’s flight from earth. Philosophically and theologically, then, Berry and Lewis 
see at the back of the worldview of abstracting others to instrumentally achieve 
“progress” the old desire to escape our human condition and become like God. What is 
really at issue here, therefore, is our rootlessness within the larger creational order that 
dictates how we are to live towards the other things within that order.  
In contrast to the absentee economy, Berry espouses what we have already seen 
he calls the Great Economy.62 According to Berry, the Great Economy “seek[s] the 
Kingdom of God first; that is, it gives an obviously necessary priority to the Great 
Economy over any little economy made within it. The passage [Matt. 6] also clearly 
includes nature within the Great Economy, and it affirms the goodness, indeed the 
sanctity, of natural creatures” (“Two Economies” 119). Berry asserts that humans must 
make their own little economies in order to live in this world, but they should be 
subservient to the Great Economy. The problem he sees with the industrial economy is 
that it “does not see itself as a little economy; it sees itself as the only economy…. The 
industrial economy is based on invasion and pillage of the Great Economy” (126). He 
states, “Sometime between, say, Pope’s verses on the Chain of Being in An Essay on Man 
and Blake’s “London,” the dominant minds had begun to see the human race, not as a 
part or a member of Creation, but outside and opposed to it” (131). However, he asserts, 
“There is no ‘outside’ to the Great Economy, no escape into either specialization or 
generality, no ‘time off….” Our modern perspective of viewing ourselves as separate 
from Creation is one of the frameworks that Taylor calls “unquestioned fact” (Sources 
17). It is also one of the most pervasive (and destructive). We can presume that we are 
                                                
62 In a move similar to Lewis’s using the Tao as his “neutral” term for shared ethics, 
Berry uses the Great Economy as his “neutral” term for the Kingdom of God. 
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outside the membership that includes us, but that presumption only damages the 
membership—and ourselves, of course, along with it” (“Two Economies” 136). Our 
choices as earth dwellers will therefore have an impact on our environment and thus must 
be considered (farming practices, for example). Berry does not deny this reality, nor does 
he expect little economies/communities to be completely self-sufficient: 
Of course, everything needed locally cannot be produced locally. But a 
viable neighborhood is a community, and a viable community is made up 
of neighbors who cherish and protect what they have in common. This is 
the principle of subsistence. A viable community, like a viable farm, 
protects its own production capacities. It does not import products that it 
can produce for itself. And it does not export local products until local 
needs have been met. (“The Total Economy” 192). 
 
We saw earlier in chapter two models for both types of little economies. The type of little 
economy that tries to live outside of the Great Economy, exemplified by Troy’s farm and 
Meickelberger’s agribusiness, buys out its neighbors and seeks to increase its production 
by importing borrowed wealth and ignoring limits of every kind. This type of economy 
led to the reduction in health of its adherents (seen in Meikelberger’s ulcer) and in the 
surrounding community (loss of neighbors). In contrast, the Amish farmer Troyer ran his 
little economy with respect for the Great Economy and by accepting the limits that 
economy imposed on him had both a flourishing farm and community. 
 In fact, it is at the end of the novel Remembering that Berry emphasizes the telos 
of restoration in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Andy, we may recall, has returned home 
from San Francisco, where he had contemplated abandoning his family and past. When 
he arrives home he  is exhausted and he falls asleep under an oak tree on his farm. He has 
a vision of a “dark man” leading him further and further into the future and up a hill on 
his property, where he eventually gets a glimpse of Port William. This is what he sees: 
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The dark man points ahead of them; Andy looks and sees the town and the 
fields around it, Port William and its countryside as he never saw or 
dreamed them, the signs everywhere upon them of the care of a longer 
love than any who have lived there have ever imagined. The houses are 
clean and white, and great trees stand among them and spread over them. 
The fields lie around the town, divided by rows of such trees as stand in 
the town and in the woods, each field more beautiful than all the rest. Over 
town and fields the one great song sings, and is answered everywhere; 
every leaf and flower and grass blade sings. And in the fields and the 
town, walking, standing, or sitting under the trees, resting and talking 
together in the peace of a sabbath profound and bright, are people of such 
beauty that he weeps to see them. He sees that these are the membership 
of one another and of the place and of the song or light in which they live 
and move. (221) 
 
The people “appear as children corrected and clarified” (221). They, like their 
communities and the natural world, have been restored. Berry’s message is clear: people, 
communities, and the natural world are not resources to be used up or collateral damage 
to changing philosophical fads, but they are eternal, good, and will someday be restored.  
 This awareness should translate into a rooted ethical perspective that respects the 
Judeo-Christian “present, not yet” nature of individuals, communities, and nature.63 
Respecting all things means acknowledging their place in a larger hierarchical framework 
and accepting the limits that are implicit to this framework. Accepting these limits will 
prevent the destruction caused by imperialism and colonialism, because those institutions 
are built upon a rejection of limits, easily seen in the obvious greed that accompanies 
them. This rooted ethical perspective may sound idealistic, but for Chesterton, Lewis, 
Berry, and many others, it is the starting place to fix the problems we face in our 
confused, modern society. 
                                                
63 For Jews, while God has a very real influence on earth during the Diaspora, the 
Messiah has not yet come to restore order. For Christians, Christ started that restoration 
while on earth, but it will not be complete until the Second Coming. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 Thus far we have examined many similarities in the writings of Chesterton, 
Lewis, and Berry. We have explored their decisions to return to and set down roots in a 
tradition, rather than listen to the exploratory narratives of many of their modern 
contemporaries. Besides this mutual return, we have seen how their ethical and economic 
philosophies have grown up from these roots. In this chapter, we will take up in a new 
and fuller way, based upon what we have learned, the question posed in the introduction 
and analyze what these authors have to say to the question, “What does it mean to be 
human?” We will also see how these authors and their work give new meaning and 
significance, especially regarding the importance of wholeness, to the place of the 
humanities in a liberal arts education. 
To begin, let us borrow and appropriate a definition from J. Scott Bryson to help 
us define the aspects of modern culture that are among the most problematic for our 
authors. In his recent book The West Side of Any Mountain, Bryson identifies three 
characteristics that are needed to confront the “distinctly contemporary problems and 
issues” of modern culture:  
[A]n ecological and biocentric perspective recognizing the interdependent 
nature of the world; a deep humility with regard to our relationships with 
human and nonhuman nature; and an intense skepticism that usually leads 
to condemnation of an overtechnologized modern world and a warning 
concerning the very real potential for ecological catastrophe. (2) 
 
The problematic aspects of modernity Bryson implies are as follows: a non-ecological 
and egocentric perspective that, to borrow Taylor’s term, disengages humans from nature 
and other humans (Sources 160); a deep arrogance with regard to our relationships with 
human and nonhuman nature; and an exclusive reliance on disengagement and its 
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correlative “objectification” (Sources 160), a reliance that usually fosters an unquestioned 
overuse of technology, regardless of the consequences of its use. These three 
characteristics underscore a larger issue: a loss of communal identity that is a mark of 
modern culture and has been a point of contention among philosophers, theologians, 
historians, and sociologists for over a century.  
As we have seen, thinkers such as Arendt, MacIntyre, and Taylor have traced the 
historical origins of our modern crisis of human identity. Their work is crucial in showing 
how our modern ideas about humanness and our planetary place have deemphasized 
Aristotle’s important link between place and ethics, and also in showing how many of our 
modern beliefs have their roots in a secularizing of the Judeo-Christian tradition. This 
deemphasis has helped create much of the identity turmoil felt today. In After Virtue, 
MacIntyre claims “it is worth remembering Aristotle’s insistence that the virtues find 
their place not just in the life of the individual, but in the life of the city”—or today, a 
community whose members share a similar faith and tradition—“and that the individual 
is indeed intelligible only as a politikon zôon” (150). In Sources of the Self, Taylor shows 
how the Aristotelian and Catholic dichotomy that elevated contemplation of the good 
over the labor of everyday life was rejected and overturned by the Reformation (211-12). 
When the reformers rejected the institutionalized Church, they placed the saving 
relationship between God and his Church in individuals (216-17). This change 
emphasized an individual’s place in the world, rather than emphasizing the importance of 
a community of shared values. 
While it is true that many Christians over the centuries have sought to create a 
world culture, the same can be said for many other institutions—religious, political, 
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economical, and cultural. The problem is not with the orthodox root of Christianity, 
which is a relational state of being concerning human beings’ relationship with God and 
with Creation, including other humans. In fact, in Acts 2 we find that the first Christians 
did live together in small communities—it was not until later that, first, the Church 
became more and more institutionalized and, second, the Reformation led to an emphasis 
on the individual. Thus, the concept of a world community made up of individuals can be 
seen as an issue for Christianity as it became increasingly assimilated with the changing 
culture around it. Not all authors, particularly Christians, have succumbed to one or the 
other of these issues and so what is needed is an examination of those Christian authors 
centered on the question, “How can the literature of Christian authors show us how to 
return to a relational emphasis on place, local communities, and ethics?” One possible 
answer, of course, is that this literature is grounded in hypergoods that promote just such 
a relational emphasis. 
When we consider these hypergoods that emphasize relationships, Berry is of 
course the most overt, due to a more narrow focus on this issue in his essays, and his 
having located his fiction almost exclusively in the same community of Port William.  
But we get to Berry through Chesterton and Lewis. As we have seen, all three authors 
explore humanity’s relation to places, ethics, and things. By things, I include nature, 
humans, and man-made objects. However, each author in a foundational work offers his 
own unique perspective on the three categories. As Chesterton shows in Orthodoxy, it is 
orthodoxy that gives humans the appropriate relationships to places, ethics, and things. 
Lewis, in The Abolition of Man, insisted that only an acceptance of the Tao, or absolute 
Truth (a set of common objective values held across cultures and eras), could properly 
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cultivate right relationships to these categories. For Berry, health (defined as wholeness) 
is the primary measure for humans and places. Though he discusses this perspective 
throughout much of his work, perhaps an early and key instance can be seen in his book 
The Unsettling of America, particularly in the chapter titled “The Body and the Earth.” 
Let’s briefly examine a few passages in each of these three works, beginning with 
Chesterton, to construct a framework for the values/virtues infused throughout their 
literature.  
In Orthodoxy, Chesterton argues from his own personal experiences. He shows 
how his discovery of orthodox Judeo-Christian values helped him make sense of his life 
and its relationship to the universe. As he says, “The spike of dogma fitted exactly into 
the hole in the world—it had evidently been meant to go there—and then the strange 
thing began to happen. When once these two parts of the two machines had come 
together, one after another, all the other parts fitted and fell in with an eerie exactitude” 
(114). Therefore, orthodoxy allows Chesterton to make sense of the relationships 
between places, ethics, and things. For example, because Nature was created as good, it is 
to be respected, but not objectified as a commodity. Likewise, humans are also created as 
good and to be respected, but not made exclusive ends. These principles of orthodoxy put 
in proper relation ethics between humans and places. 
Lewis, in The Abolition of Man, argues from a more philosophical approach.64 In 
part three, he describes the consequences of rejecting a common ethic, or Tao, for 
humanity and Nature. He states, “In the older systems both the kind of man the teachers 
wished to produce and their motives for producing him were prescribed by the Tao—a 
                                                
64 Though written in a WWII context, Lewis’s basic argument applies to other systems 
and across historical eras. 
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norm to which the teachers themselves were subject and from which they claimed no 
liberty to depart” (60). In other words, there was a transcendent order of common values 
that guided all members of the community, from the top of the power structure to the 
bottom. He then argues that by rejecting this common system of values, humans lose 
what separates them from Nature, and thus are left to be guided by the same impulses that 
guide Nature. As he states, “Man’s final conquest has proved to be the abolition of Man” 
(64). Rejecting these common values, therefore, has dramatic consequences for places, 
ethics, and things. The only guiding “ethic” left is that of Nature, whose first instinct is 
self-preservation and self-assertion. Of course, there are many instances when self-
preservation or self-assertion can be proper goals, such as our natural inclinations to 
nourish ourselves or to escape danger. However, if our only guiding ethic was this 
instinct, we would be in conflict with regards to such ethics as bravery, because we must 
be willing to accept, rather than flee from danger, in order to achieve some other purpose, 
whether to save another’s life or to save our own. Regarding this instinct of self-
preservation and self-assertion, Lewis states, “When all that says ‘it is good’ has been 
debunked, what says ‘I want’ remains” (65). Similarly, he states, “If you will not obey 
the Tao, or else commit suicide, obedience to impulse (and therefore, in the long run, to 
mere ‘nature’) is the only course left open” (67).65 What is wrong with obeying our 
impulses/instincts? The problem, Lewis insists, is that “[o]ur instincts are at war….Each 
                                                
65 Lewis here anticipates the arguments of scientific naturalists such as E. O. Wilson. 
Regarding Wilson’s philosophy, Taylor states, “In his On Human Nature, the scientism 
has quite swallowed up the morality; indeed, we are offered a crassly reductive account 
of this latter. Natural selection wires in certain propensities to react, certain ‘gut feelings’, 
which are ‘largely unconscious and irrational’” (Sources 406). Taylor continues, “A 
reductive position of this sort is, of course, in a very deep sense untenable; that is, no one 
could actually live by it, and hence the best available account of what we actually live by 
cannot but be different” (406). 
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instinct, if you listen to it, will claim to be gratified at the expense of the rest” (36). This 
need to satisfy our desires then proves destructive to us, Nature, and other humans. If left 
only up to our impulses/instincts, the weak are left to the mercy of the strong.  
In “The Body and the Earth,” Berry argues that we need to stop thinking of health 
as only the “absence of disease,” and see instead that “the concept of health is rooted in 
the concept of wholeness” (Unsettling 103). In the same way, the purpose of a liberal arts 
education should be more than to secure a job and the “absence of poverty.” Instead, a 
liberal arts education should strive for the health of wholeness, as we will discuss at the 
end of this chapter. Berry continues, “The word health belongs to a family of words, a 
listing of which will suggest how far the consideration of health must carry us: heal, 
whole, wholesome, hale, hallow, holy…a definition to health that is positive and far more 
elaborate than that given by most medical doctors and the officers of public health” 
(103). Later he states, “Perhaps the fundamental damage of the specialist system—the 
damage from which all other damages issue—has been the isolation of the body” (104). 
The solution to this damage, for Berry, is healing via the restoration of connections. He 
explains: 
Healing…open[s] and restor[es] connections among the various parts—in 
this way restoring the ultimate simplicity of their union. When all the parts 
of the body are working together, are under each other’s influence, we say 
that it is whole; it is healthy. The same is true of the world, of which our 
bodies are parts. The parts are healthy insofar as they are joined 
harmoniously to the whole. (110) 
 
In the same way, literature that emphasizes these kinds of connections for health would 
benefit our students. The literature we teach our students could help them see and restore 
such connections in their own lives, thus fostering healthy citizens within healthy 
communities. Berry sums up his argument by saying, “Only by restoring the broken 
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connections can we be healed. Connection is health” (138). Here he makes a distinction 
between two types of work. He states, “There is work that is isolating, harsh, destructive, 
specialized or trivialized into meaninglessness. And there is work that is restorative, 
convivial, dignified and dignifying, and pleasing” (138). He calls this good work a 
“sacrament,” because through it “we enact and understand our oneness with the Creation” 
(138). “Such work is unifying, healing,” he says (140). Likewise, the study of literature 
should be the type of work that is good in all of the ways that Berry lists. What such 
goods found in literature would help us towards this goal? 
Earlier, we began with Bryson’s three characteristics needed to confront issues in 
our modern culture: interdependence, humility, and skepticism. These ethical positions 
have their roots in what Taylor would call Judeo-Christian derived hypergoods. 
Remember, hypergoods are goods that give us a perspective to make sense of other goods 
and so they take priority in our hierarchy of values (Taylor Sources 63). Three such 
hypergoods supplanted in modernism that Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry promote in their 
works are respectful engagement with tradition and family,66 fidelity, and a belief in 
transcendence. It is through respectful engagement with tradition and family that we see 
the importance of interdependence and a skepticism towards technology that would 
undermine these foundational communities (of tradition and family). Likewise, belief in a 
transcendent order, a common group of values, fosters humility. Such belief includes 
acknowledgement of mystery and perhaps even miracles.67 Also implied in humility is an 
acceptance of legitimate limits.  
                                                
66 This includes re-cognizing hierarchy in a more positive way. 
67 Of course, there has been a long tradition of the discussion of miracles, but this topic is 
outside the scope of my argument. 
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We will look first at how these authors emphasize respectful engagement with 
tradition and family in their writings. Chesterton considered the nuclear family to be the 
primary building block of society. For example, in The Everlasting Man he claims one of 
the first facts, “the thing that is before all thrones and even all commonwealths,” is that of 
“the family” (53). He continues, “We can say that the family is the unit of the state; that it 
is the cell that makes up the formation. Round the family do indeed gather the sanctities 
that separate men from ants and bees. Decency is the curtain of that tent; liberty is the 
wall of that city; property is but the family farm; honour is but the family flag” (54). 
Here, Chesterton seems to say that many of our virtues in life do not come first and 
dictate how we are to treat families; rather, the respectful engagement with family comes 
first and our other virtues are the effect of this engagement. For Chesterton, the family 
unit consists of father, mother, and child and its three parts is no accident.68 He therefore 
opposed any legislation from technocrats that encroached upon the basic rights of 
families. Like Chesterton, MacIntyre argues that our membership in our families and 
other communities precedes our pursuit of the good life and the virtues that enable us to 
do so. He states:  
For I am never able to seek for the good or exercise the virtues only qua 
individual….I am someone’s son or daughter, someone else’s cousin or 
uncle….As such, I inherit from the past of my family, my city, my tribe, 
my nation, a variety of debts, inheritances, rightful expectations and 
obligations. These constitute the given of my life, my moral starting point. 
(220) 
 
The modern tendency, therefore, to impose universal legislation that upsets local family 
virtues and traditions is a false one, because the ethics held by legislators are not 
                                                
68 Steeped in his Catholicism, he states: “The old Trinity was of father and mother and 
child and is called the human family. The new is of child and mother and father and has 
the name of the Holy Family” (Everlasting 55). 
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universal, formed in a vacuum, but are also derived from local family virtues and 
traditions.  
In The Flying Inn, we can also see Chesterton emphasizing respectful engagement 
with tradition. The novel is permeated with instances of Mr. Pump and Patrick Dalroy 
reminiscing about people, places, and events that have happened throughout their 
traversing the English countryside. They often memorialize these local memories in song. 
In fact, the novel’s numerous songs were collected separately in a later volume.69 I 
believe Chesterton makes this reminiscing and memorializing such a prominent part of 
his novel because he values these traditions that bind the English people together 
regardless of time and class. He sets up the actions of Pump and Dalroy as a sharp 
contrast to the modern politician Ivywood who would turn his back on these traditions 
and customs for the sake of the latest fad. This transgression of Ivywood is exemplified 
most in the main plotline of the novel—his desire to abolish the sale of alcohol in inns 
and pubs in order to sober up the lower classes. For Chesterton, alcohol (used 
moderately, of course) is not just something that stands alone to be added to one’s life or 
taken away at whim; rather, it is steeped in rituals and memories and traditions and to 
take it away would be to take away a part of the English peasants.  
Like Chesterton, Lewis also emphasizes respectful engagement with family and 
tradition. In his appendix to The Abolition of Man, Lewis provides examples of eight 
virtues that have been shared by humans across time and cultures. His list includes Duties 
to Parents, Elders, and Ancestors and Duties to Children and Posterity. Using examples 
ranging from Greek, to Roman, to Egyptian, to Hindu, to Jewish, to Christian, he 
                                                
69 Wine, Water, and Song. London: Methuen & Co., 1915.  
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provides illustrations to support each virtue. For example, to illustrate Duties to Parents, 
Elders, and Ancestors, he cites the Hindu Janet as saying, “Your father is an image of the 
Lord of Creation, your mother an image of the Earth. For him who fails to honour them, 
every work of piety is in vain. This is the first duty,” and the Analects of Ancient Chinese 
as saying, “When proper respect towards the dead is shown at the end and continued after 
they are far away, the moral force (tê) of a people has reached its highest point” (90-91). 
He provides these examples to support his idea of a Tao, or Truth, shared by the 
collective human race. We could consider these virtues/admonitions regarding family and 
tradition as a hypergood shared by humans across cultures and eras. 
As for Chesterton, nuclear families (two parents and their children) do not feature 
prominently in Lewis’s fiction. However, one place we can find Lewis emphasizing 
respectful engagement with family is in That Hideous Strength. The novel begins and 
ends by emphasizing the marriage of its protagonists, Jane and Mark Studdock. At the 
beginning of the novel, the newlyweds’ marriage was cold and incomplete, because the 
two pursued their own interests as individuals (and academic intellectuals). However, 
they both learn by the end of the novel the importance of community, and they are 
reunited with their passion and humility for each other reignited. Besides this example, 
Lewis of course wrote the Narnia stories, which feature and concern themselves with 
children, though the children are almost never with parents or parental figures. However, 
their close “familial” relation is clear. For example, in The Lion, the Witch, and the 
Wardrobe, Edmund accuses Susan of “Trying to talk like Mother” (2) and Peter, acting 
like a father, scolds and bosses Edmund to the point that Edmund runs off to betray his 
siblings to the White Witch. So we see, in the absence of their actual parents, the siblings 
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working out their familial roles. Their closeness is especially made clear later when Peter 
defends his decision to rescue Edmund, saying “in a rather choking sort of voice”: “All 
the same…we’d still have to go and look for him. He is our brother, after all, even if he is 
rather a little beast, and he’s only a kid” (81). By the end of the novel, of course, the 
siblings find forgiveness and restoration (facilitated, of course, by Aslan) and their 
community is restored.  
Berry’s emphasis on tradition and family is prolific. One example we saw earlier: 
Jayber’s acceptance of bachelorhood in Port William. When he accepted the job as barber 
in this community, he also accepted the tradition that went with it: barbers were bachelors 
and their shops were places for men to fraternize. Jayber could have gotten married, of 
course, but then he would have had to relinquish his traditional role, or membership, in 
the community as the facilitator of a particular arena of male society. Similarly, the Camp 
House in Port William was a zone of bachelorhood, owned first by Ernest Finley, then 
Burley Coulter, then Jayber Crow (after he retired). Another example of Berry’s 
emphasis on respectful engagement with family can be seen in the life of Hannah 
Coulter. Though she is only married to her first husband, Virgil Feltner, for four years (he 
is killed in World War Two), she remains as a member of the Feltners, living in her in-
law’s house, until she remarries. As Hannah says, “I became one of the Feltners, and not 
in name only” (Hannah 41). Here Berry is emphasizing a metaphysical change in 
Hannah’s relationship, born out of a hypergood that respects the health of familial 
communities and will not divide what has been joined. 
Second, all three authors treat fidelity as a hypergood. Berry states: “The idea of 
fidelity is perverted beyond redemption by understanding it as a grim, literal duty 
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enforced only by willpower. This is the ‘religious’ insanity of making a victim of the 
body as a victory of the soul….It is reasonable to suppose, if fidelity is a virtue, that it is a 
virtue with a purpose. A purposeless virtue is a contradiction in terms” (Unsettling 120-
21). He continues:  
Fidelity to human order, then, if it is fully responsible, implies fidelity also 
to natural order. Fidelity to human order makes devotion possible. Fidelity 
to natural order preserves the possibility of choice, the possibility of the 
renewal of devotion. Where there is no possibility of choice, there is no 
possibility of faith. One who returns home—to one’s marriage and 
household and place in the world—desiring anew what was previously 
chosen, is neither the world’s stranger nor its prisoner, but is at once in 
place and free. (130-31) 
 
Fidelity seen as a hypergood, then, should emphasize the freedom gained by continually 
deciding to uphold a choice that does not exist in a vacuum. It should not be experienced 
as dutiful drudgery, as this way of looking at fidelity is individualistic and not communal 
(and therefore whole, or healthy). 
This definition of fidelity that Berry offers here we of course saw earlier in our 
discussion of Manalive. Innocent Smith performed in his marriage what Berry calls 
“desiring anew what was previously chosen” in the unconventional but entirely faithful 
way he repeatedly wooed and “remarried” his wife. The significance of the hypergood 
Chesterton is emphasizing here is paramount. Unlike so many modern marriages that 
split up when the honeymoon period is over and the newness fades, the marriage that 
Smith acts out with his wife places fidelity first. It therefore dictates a return, rather than 
a departing, to the marriage vows. Chesterton’s example in Manalive is not meant to 
naively imply that every marriage will be as romantically idealistic. Elsewhere 
Chesterton states, “Love is not blind; that is the last thing it is. Love is bound; and the 
more it is bound the less it is blind” (Orthodoxy 101). But whether or not the marriage is 
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ideal is not the point; rather, if possible, the commitment to remaining in the place of 
one’s marriage should supersede modern culture’s messages to achieve one’s individual 
highest potential. Like Berry, Chesterton’s depiction of marriage privileges the wholeness 
of community, not utilitarian individualism.  
For Lewis, his fiction does not prominently deal with marriages (except for That 
Hideous Strength, discussed above). However, we can see in his works and characters an 
emphasis on fidelity—choosing to stand by them no matter what. Perhaps one of the 
clearest examples can be seen in Perelandra. In this novel Ransom is sent on a mission 
from God to Venus in order to prevent that planet’s “Eve” from being tempted by its 
“snake,” the Un-Man. At one point in the novel Ransom realizes the only way to stop the 
Un-Man is to engage in physical combat with him and this (rightfully) terrifies him. He is 
tempted to abandon his mission: “Terrible follies came into his mind. He would fail to 
obey the Voice, but it would be all right because he would repent later on, when he was 
back on Earth. He would lose his nerve as St. Peter had done, and be, like St. Peter, 
forgiven” (125). Here Ransom is not only rationalizing excuses for abandoning his 
mission, but he is misusing Scripture to do so. Of course, Ransom resists these 
temptations and remains faithful to his mission, because he places fidelity to a higher-
order good above his own personal comfort—an act that is the embodiment of Taylor’s 
definition of a hypergood.   
As we would imagine, Berry’s fiction is full of examples of fidelity as a 
hypergood. We have already examined several instances. Earlier we saw how for Berry 
his return and commitment to the Camp paralleled his commitment in marriage to his 
wife. As he says in The Long-Legged House, his marriage is the center of his life and the 
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Camp is the center of his marriage. Also, earlier we examined Jayber Crow’s personal 
pledge of fidelity to Mattie, unique in that she could not reciprocate the pledge, but this 
does not keep Jayber from honoring it. Then, we saw in Remembering Andy’s return 
home and his upholding fidelity to his wife, family, and physical/ancestral place. Here we 
will explore two new examples from Berry’s fiction. The first demonstrates what can 
happen when a commitment to fidelity is forsaken, while the second provides an 
interesting twist on our understanding of fidelity. 
For the first example, we turn to the novel The Memory of Old Jack. Written in 
1974 (revised 1999), the novel depicts the last day of Jack Beechum’s life. Set in 1952, 
Old Jack reflects on his life as he lounges about Port William on a hot September day. 
Before we see Jack’s reflections on his past, we are given some perspective about a 
couple that lives on Mat Feltner’s farm (a work in exchange for housing arraignment) that 
foreshadows the lack of fidelity explored later. The couple chooses not to invest their 
spare time in tending a garden or fattening a hog for the winter, but rather to spend each 
week fixing up their old car so it can take them into Hargrave (the nearest town). In other 
words, the couple chooses not to invest in their place any more than they have to, 
cheating on it in a sense as soon as they earn enough money. We are told of this couple: 
“Though the two of them live and work on the place [Mat’s farm], they have no 
connection with it, no interest in it, no hope from it. They live, and appear content to live, 
from hand to mouth in the world of merchandise, connected to it by daily money poorly 
earned” (13).  
Likewise, Jack’s wife Ruth, we learn through his memories, grew up in the city 
and planned to bring him out of the country and into her city life. When it became clear 
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to her that her vision was not his vision and that he was committed to his farm and place, 
she withheld herself from him, not only emotionally, but as much as possible, sexually. 
After Ruth gives birth to a stillborn son, “His presence was an invasion, a violation of the 
house. And except to eat and sleep, he began to stay away” (49). After this, Jack commits 
two infidelities. The first is in his desire for more land—the Ferrier place, which adjoined 
his farm. We are told:  
What he had in his mind now as he sat and thought, or walked the lengths 
of afternoons and thought, or worked and thought, was more land. He 
wanted more land. A man falling in his own esteem needs more ground 
under his feet; to stand again he may need the whole world for a foothold. 
His thoughts now ranged over the resources within his boundaries, and 
over the possibilities that lay outside them, seeking the terms of some new 
balance. His mind played over and over again the airy drama of ambition: 
how to use what he had to get what he wanted—a strange and difficult 
undertaking for him, who until then had wanted only what he had. Once 
he had hungered for the life his place could be made to yield. Now he 
would ask it to yield another place, at what expense to itself and to him he 
could not then have guessed. (50) 
 
He therefore takes walks around the property. During one such walk we are told: “His 
trip over there that day had formalized a sort of betrothal; it had joined his vision to his 
will. Now his desire was no longer a dream; it was an intention…. And now, having 
allowed desire to reach out beyond his own boundaries, he felt its exposure; he must 
rescue and preserve it and secure its triumph” (55). In his efforts to buy the property, “He 
was as ardent now in his cunning as he had ever been in love” (56). Also, “It was the first 
time in his life—and it was to be the last—that he ever resorted to stealth and deception, 
but he was pleased, for a while he was pleased, to discover he was good at it” (56). 
Eventually, he does buy the extra land, but it is too much for him to farm himself, and 
after three years he has to sell the farm to his rival at a heavy loss. Jack is back where he 
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started, except with heavy debt: “The boundaries of the old farm, which he so confidently 
thought to surpass, now contain him like walls” (69).  
 Eventually, he commits a second infidelity—he begins an affair with a widow 
named Rose. With Rose, Jack finds a match for his passion, but eventually realizes he 
cannot give her what she needs—the stability of marriage and a family—because he is 
already married. We are told, “It was as though he bore for these two women the two 
halves of an irreparably divided love. With Ruth, his work had led to no good love. With 
Rose, his love led to no work” (103). Eventually, Rose is burned to death in a house fire. 
So, as with the Ferrier place, Jack’s infidelities come at great cost to him. What Berry 
seems to be saying is that Jack’s fidelity to his marriage and his place should have 
superseded his own personal desires. This message is not an easy one for modern ears. Of 
course, the best scenario would be if Jack had married Rose instead of Ruth. However, 
the possibility of divorce never enters into the story, possibly because of its taboo at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. Divorce, we might suppose, would also be a breach of 
fidelity and bring about its own consequences.  
 A second example of fidelity as a hypergood in Berry’s fiction can be seen in the 
short story “Fidelity.” Though from the title readers might suppose the story is about 
fidelity in marriage, the main plot of the story provides a much broader definition. 
Briefly, Nathan and Hannah Coulter and Danny and Lyda Branch, concerned about their 
Uncle Burley’s health, take him to a hospital in Louisville. Shortly thereafter they regret 
their decision, as they realize the hospital will not release Burley until he improves or 
dies and, hooked up to machines, it is clear to them that he will not improve. Therefore, 
Danny sneaks into the hospital in the middle of the night and “kidnaps” Burley. He 
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commits this “crime” in order to let Burley die in peace in the woods where he lived all 
his life near Port William. Danny digs a secret grave in the woods and buries Burley after 
he dies. Meanwhile, state patrol officer Detective Kyle Bode investigates Burley’s 
kidnapping, but can find no evidence. The story ends with all of Burley’s friends and 
family gathered in the Wheeler Catlett & Son law office (father and son who were also 
relatives of Burley’s), showing Bode a true picture of fidelity. 
 The story presents a stark contrast between two ways of living—Bode’s and 
Burley’s family. Bode’s family originated in Nowhere, KY (fictionally placed just 
outside of Louisville) and his father insisted that he and his brother “get out of here and 
make something out of yourself” (398). After leaving home for the city “he married his 
high school sweetheart” and “became sexually liberated” (398). Humorously, we are told, 
“He suspected that his wife had experienced this liberation as well, but he did not catch 
her, and perhaps this was an ill omen for his police career” (398). Instead, she catches 
him with another woman but does not divorce him. However, “feel[ing] that she was 
limiting his development…he divorced her to be free to be himself” (398-99). He then 
remarries, but his second wife divorces him. It is here that Berry provides us with 
poignant insight to the modern epidemic of divorce that Bode represents:  
He knew that she had not left him because she was dissatisfied with him 
but because she was not able to be satisfied for very long with anything. 
He disliked and feared this in her at the same time that he recognized it in 
himself. He, too, was dissatisfied; he could not see what he had because he 
was always looking around for something else that he thought he wanted. 
And so perhaps it was out of mutual dissatisfaction that their divorce had 
come…. They were all free, he supposed. But finally he had to ask if they 
were, any of them, better off…. For they were not satisfied. (399)  
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This passage beautifully summarizes the problematic “freedom” found in modernity.70 As 
we saw earlier in our discussion of Lewis, if moderns define freedom as permission to 
fulfill all of their desires, they will be dissatisfied because those desires often are 
contradictory. In contrast, Berry presents his readers with a picture of orthodox fidelity, 
seen in the interconnected family tree of Burley’s family. Bode cannot understand why 
anyone would choose to live in such an old-fashioned backwoods place, but we see that 
in his pursuit of happiness, defined as the freedom to make no permanent vows to any 
person or place, he has left himself alone, disconnected from the health of community.  
A third hypergood emphasized by Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry is a belief in 
transcendence. There are two types of transcendence that must be distinguished: 
Transcendence (the mysterious separation between God and physical matter) and 
transcendence (the mysterious separation between physical matter). “transcendence,” is a 
shadow of the Transcendent. One way they express this belief is through the action of 
“choosing.” By choosing, I mean their characters are called to a task of some kind by a 
transcendent authority outside of themselves. Whether or not these characters want to 
perform these roles or tasks (and often they do not, or are at first reluctant), they do so 
anyway, acknowledging their places as parts of a greater transcendent whole. For 
Chesterton, Transcendence was a crucial component missing from paganism that 
Christianity provided, because “it divided God from the Cosmos” (Orthodoxy 112). It is 
no coincidence that the origins of the universe are described by orthodoxy as creation, 
because, says Chesterton, “All creation is separation. Birth is as solemn a parting as 
                                                
70 See fn. 6 for Taylor’s critique of Derrida and postmodernism on the issue of 
“untrammeled freedom,” which Taylor labels the “least impressive side of modernism” 
(Sources 489). 
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death” (113). He explains, “According to most philosophers, God in making the world 
enslaved it. According to Christianity, in making it, He set it free. God had written, not so 
much a poem, but rather a play; a play he had planned as perfect, but which had 
necessarily been left to human actors and stage-managers, who had since made a great 
mess of it” (113). Later Chesterton insists, “By insisting specially on the transcendence of 
God we get wonder, curiosity, moral and political adventure, righteous indignation—
Christendom. Insisting that God is inside man, man is always inside himself. By insisting 
that God transcends man, man has transcended himself” (204). This paradox is the 
mysterious nature of the Incarnation. 
Chesterton’s emphasis on the importance of both Transcendence and 
transcendence is certainly evident in the novel The Man Who Was Thursday, which he 
published around the same time as Orthodoxy.71 The novel’s protagonist, Gabriel Syme, 
is recruited—chosen—along with six others to be policemen for “The Last Crusade” by a 
mysterious man in a pitch black room. When Syme protests his lack of qualifications, 
saying, “I don’t know of any profession of which mere willingness is the final test,” the 
mysterious man replies: “I do…martyrs. I am condemning you to death. Good day.” (48-
49). All seven policemen, unbeknownst to each other, become members of a secret 
anarchists council led by a huge, ominous man called Sunday. The six policemen also 
assume the titles of days of the week, of which Syme becomes Thursday. One by one 
                                                
71 We must keep in mind that this novel is subtitled A Nightmare, and it is certainly 
fantastical, as Chesterton himself even had to remind his readers as late as 1936: “The 
book was called The Man Who Was Thursday: A Nightmare. It was not intended to 
describe the real world as it was, or as I thought it was, even when my thoughts were 
considerably less settled than they are now. It was intended to describe the world of wild 
doubt and despair which the pessimists were generally describing at that date; with just a 
gleam of hope in some double meaning of doubt, which even the pessimists felt in some 
fitful passion” (Man 186).  
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throughout the novel they discover each other to be policemen and eventually unite to 
take on Sunday. However, when confronted, Sunday stuns them with this: “There’s one 
thing I’ll tell you, though, about who I am. I am the man in the dark room, who made you 
all policemen” (155). So, very confusingly for both the policemen and readers, the same 
person recruited for the purposes of both good and evil. Syme eventually understands 
why, exclaiming: “Listen to me….Shall I tell you the secret of the whole world? It is that 
we have only known the back of the world. We see everything from behind, and it looks 
brutal….Cannot you see that everything is stooping and hiding a face? If we could only 
get round in front—“ (170). Here it seems to me that Chesterton is describing the 
confusion humans experience when we consider ourselves in relation to nature. We all 
experience birth, which is the separation of ourselves from what is around us. So we see 
things from the back. Chesterton is challenging us to see what lies behind Nature—the 
Transcendent creator God, or the key that unlocks the mystery faced by the pagans and 
philosophers described in Orthodoxy. This reading helps to explain why, after awaking 
from his vision or dream, “Syme’s state of mind is clearly identifiable as that peculiar to 
religious conversion” (Oddie 332). Syme has come to understand the importance of 
transcendence to the human condition and this helps him metaphorically see things from 
“round in front” or, in other words, to see the Transcendent behind Nature. 
Likewise, Lewis’s characters experience callings from the Transcendent 
numerous times in his fiction. In Out of the Silent Planet, I do not think readers are 
supposed to see Ransom’s journey to Malacandra as chance. Instead of taking a mentally 
challenged boy to offer as a sacrifice to the “aliens” they encountered on Malacandra, 
Weston and Devine instead take Ransom, a philologist who can quickly learn the 
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languages of the three species on that strange planet. The Oyarsa [archangel] of 
Malacandra affirms this near the end, saying to Ransom, “[I]t is not without the wisdom 
of Maleldil [Christ] that we have met now and I have learned so much of your world” 
(142). In Perelandra this transcendent purpose for Ransom is made even clearer, as 
Ransom realizes: “One of the purposes for which He had done all this was to save 
Perelandra not through Himself but through Himself in Ransom” (123). Soon after he 
reasons: 
The pattern is so large that within the little frame of earthly experience 
there appear pieces of it between which we can see no connection, and 
other pieces between which we can…. Before his Mother had born him, 
before his ancestors had been called Ransoms, before ransom had been the 
name for a payment that delivers, before the world was made, all these 
things had so stood together in eternity that the very significance of the 
pattern at this point lay in their coming together in just this fashion. And 
he bowed his head and groaned and repined against his fate—to be still a 
man and yet to be forced up into the metaphysical world, to enact what 
philosophy only thinks. (125) 
 
Lewis then reaffirms the importance of the transcendent at the end of the novel, when 
Ransom has a vision of the Great Dance. We see that Ransom is not the center of the 
universe, but rather part of an intricate web of connections, set in place by the 
Transcendent. By accepting his place in this larger community, he finds peace and health. 
A belief in transcendence is also demonstrated time and again throughout the 
Chronicles of Narnia. One of the clearest examples comes at the end of The Horse and 
His Boy. King Lune has two sons, Corin and Cor. Cor, the eldest, is to be Lune’s rightful 
heir, but he does not want the responsibility. So the two have this brief exchange: 
“But I don’t want it,” said Cor. “I’d far rather—“ 
 “’Tis no question what thou wantest, Cor, nor I either. ’Tis in 
course of law.” […] 
 “But, Father, couldn’t you make whichever you like to be the next 
King?” 
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 “No. The King’s under the law, for it’s the law makes him a king. 
Hast no more power to start away from thy crown than any sentry from his 
post.” (214-15) 
 
Here Lewis is clearly demonstrating that even for kings, who we would expect to be at 
the top of any hierarchy, there are external, transcendent goods higher than them to which 
they must hold. The law precedes the law-enforcer.72 This principle reminds us of what 
Lewis said earlier in this chapter from The Abolition of Man: teachers and students alike 
are subject to the Tao and therefore teachers cannot teach students differently from how 
the Tao prescribes. 
For Berry, this belief in a transcendent choosing informs his fiction. In his short 
novel Remembering, the beginning of chapter four (titled “A Long Choosing”) explores 
this belief in Andy’s thoughts: 
That he [Andy] is who he is and no one else is the result of a long 
choosing, chosen and chosen again. He thinks of the long dance of men 
and women behind him, most of whom he never knew…who, choosing 
one another, chose him. He thinks of the choices, too, by which he chose 
himself as he now is…. He knows that some who might have left chose to 
stay, and that some who did leave chose to return, and he is one of them. 
Those choices have formed in time and place the pattern of a membership 
that chose him, yet left him free until he should choose it, which he did 
once, and now has done again. (169) 
 
In this example, we see that Andy’s life was influenced by numerous choices that were 
outside of his control, many of which happened even before he was born. Because of 
these external choices, he has been born into the membership of a specific community 
                                                
72 Similarly, in J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings we find characters chosen for 
roles to which they must hold. For example, Frodo is “chosen” by the transcendent for 
the task of taking the Ring to Mount Doom. As Elrond tells him, “I think that this task is 
appointed for you, Frodo; and that if you do not find a way, no one will” (Fellowship 
264). Neither Gandalf, nor Elrond, nor any other authority figure forces Frodo to 
complete his task—Frodo chooses to do the task and then the others affirm this 
transcendent calling.  
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and he realizes that he has the opportunity to make choices of his own that will affect 
others. MacIntyre states, “What I am, therefore, is in key part what I inherit, a specific 
past that is present to some degree in my present. I find myself part of a history and that 
is generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the 
bearers of a tradition” (221). When referring to his own biography, Berry often uses the 
same term, “inheritance.” Referring to his home (the Camp), he states, “[T]here is a sense 
in which my own life is inseparable from the history and the place. It is a complex 
inheritance, and I have been both enriched and bewildered by it” (Long 171). What Andy, 
MacIntyre, and Berry all seem to share is an acceptance of a transcendent inheritance that 
informs their quest for health, or wholeness. In other words, the land outlives them (and 
by extension, us) and they are chosen as caretakers for a time. This phenomenon is 
transcendent because of the acknowledgment by these individuals of a larger, mysterious 
existence that lays claim to them beyond their physical human experience. 
Of course, a byproduct of accepting one’s chosen-ness by the transcendent to be a 
part of a community is also accepting the limits membership in said community imposes. 
It is difficult for our modern eyes to see limits as positive. We live in a world that does 
not want to hear such a message, a world that sees limits as chains keeping us from our 
full potential or progress. However, as Goethe says: “Mastery is revealed in limitation / 
And law alone can set us free again” (lines 13-14). We can see instances of this paradox 
all around us. For example, to get in shape a person must choose to accept the limits such 
a process would entail: limiting the amount and type of foods consumed, limiting the 
amount of lethargy allowed, and limiting the amount of time one stays awake in order to 
get enough rest. These limits may not always be easy or fun to abide by, but living within 
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them allows the person to be healthier. A popular weight loss program, with its daily 
point limits, is a great example of this principle. Likewise, our laws and regulations for 
how to operate automobiles on roads allow us to drive our cars with peace of mind, not 
paralyzed in the fear of what to do or what other motorists around us will do. I can freely 
drive through an intersection with a green light, knowing that the other motorists will 
stop at their red lights. In these instances, though, our freedom is determined by our 
obedience, and others’ obedience, to these limits. 
Likewise, for Chesterton, the limits to places, ethics, and things, are 
interconnected. For him, limits also created a paradox: by accepting them we enlarge, not 
shrink, our lives. He uses as his prime example fairy tales, in which the magic in the story 
always hung on a command, or limit. For example, Cinderella could go to the ball, but 
she must be home by midnight (Orthodoxy 77). Or, for artists, the frame of a canvas or 
the structure of a sonnet is not viewed as limits to begrudgingly obeyed, but fun 
challenges in which artists choose to operate. Chesterton states, “The artist loves his 
limitations: they constitute the thing he is doing. The painter is glad that the canvas is flat. 
The sculptor is glad that the clay is colourless” (52).   
Furthermore, limits are the key intersection between ethics, places, and things. As 
Chesterton points out in Orthodoxy, we must impose limits in order to love things. For 
example, he says, “I could never mix in the common murmur of that rising generation 
against monogamy, because no restriction on sex seemed so odd and unexpected as sex 
itself….To complain that I could only be married once was like complaining that I had 
only been born once….It showed, not an exaggerated sensibility to sex, but a curious 
insensibility to it….Polygamy is a lack of the realization of sex; it is like a man plucking 
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five pears in mere absence of mind” (79-80). In other words, to hold one’s spouse 
separate from all others is to value him or her. In the same way, holding to one place and 
rejecting all others demonstrates its value. In contrast, when humans move from lover to 
lover, or place to place, in the name of living life to its fullest, they find that they in fact 
devalue those things and do not experience the fullness of life that comes from limits and 
devotion.  
Lewis makes a similar point more than once in his writings. In Perelandra, 
Ransom reflects on this principle of limits regarding appetite when he has his first taste of 
the fruit on that strange planet. The fruit tastes unlike anything on earth and is so good he 
thinks “wars would be fought and nations betrayed” for just one sip (37). Finishing one 
fruit, Ransom reaches for another, but then hesitates: 
As he let the empty gourd fall from his hand and was about to pluck a 
second one, it came into his head that he was now neither hungry nor 
thirsty. And yet to repeat a pleasure so intense and almost so spiritual 
seemed an obvious thing to do. His reason, or what we commonly take to 
be reason in our own world, was all in favour of tasting this miracle again; 
the childlike innocence of fruit, the labours he had undergone, the 
uncertainty of the future, all seemed to commend the action. Yet 
something seemed opposed to this “reason.” It is difficult to suppose that 
this opposition came from desire, for what desire would turn from so 
much deliciousness? But for whatever cause, it appeared to him better not 
to taste again. Perhaps the experience had been so complete that repetition 
would be a vulgarity—like asking to hear the same symphony twice in a 
day. 
As he stood pondering over this and wondering how often in his 
life on earth he had reiterated pleasures not through desire, but in the teeth 
of desire and in obedience to a spurious rationalism, he noticed that the 
light was changing. (37-38) 
 
Ransom’s dilemma is an example of the “hyperrationality” that is part of Bryson’s 
definition of modern culture, above. As he was a highly educated academic, we can 
assume this hyperrationality would have been a product of Ransom’s education. 
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Ordinarily, we think of “the humanities” as a place of “liberation” (“liberal arts”). Here, 
however, Lewis suggests such rational thinking can lead us astray if it is not checked by 
particular concerns for what is best. 
Another obvious way limits are a valuable corrective to our modern culture is in 
the way they help temper our proclivity to consumption. As we have seen, Chesterton, 
Berry, and to some degree Lewis, all provide valuable contributions to discussions of 
economics. Their words are a corrective to the materialism and waste of our age. Arendt 
argues, “[T]he spare time of the animal laborans is never spent in anything but 
consumption, and the more time left to him, the greedier and more craving his 
appetites….so that consumption is no longer restricted to the necessities but…on the 
superfluities of life” creating “the grave danger that eventually no object of the world will 
be safe from consumption and annihilation through consumption” (133). She continues, 
“One of the obvious danger signs that we may be on our way to bring into existence the 
ideal of the animal laborans is the extent to which our whole economy has become a 
waste economy, in which things must be almost as quickly devoured and discarded as 
they have appeared in the world” (134). Who can deny that her warning has come about? 
In America, for example, tractor-trailers haul trash from our cities out to dump them in 
our rural areas, even cross-state. Even though manufacturers are increasingly packaging 
things in recyclable material, their products and packaging are still consumable and 
disposable. Our status as animal laborans stands.  
Of course, this transformation into animal laborans could not have come about so 
quickly without our advancements and reliance on technology. In fact, a key component 
to our consumerism is our acceptance and use of technology and the industrial system. As 
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we saw earlier, Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry remind us that the use of technology often 
comes at a price to our humanity. Also, to think and speak so looks foolish and 
backwards to moderns. In What Are People For? Berry states: 
I realize that, by now, my argument has crossed a boundary line of which 
everyone in our ‘realistic’ society is keenly aware. I will be perceived to 
have crossed over into ‘utopianism’ or fantasy. Unless I take measures to 
prevent it, I am going to hear somebody say, ‘All that would be very nice, 
if it were possible. Can’t you be realistic?’ ….To me, an economy that 
sees the life of a community or a place as expendable, and reckons its 
value only in terms of money, is not acceptable because it is not realistic. I 
am thinking as I believe we must think if we wish to discuss the best uses 
of people, places, and things, and if we wish to give affection some 
standing in our thoughts. (“An Argument” 113) 
 
Here Berry offers an important distinction: the goal is not to eliminate consumption 
altogether—this is impossible—but to check our consumption by making it subservient to 
issues of what is best for places, people, and things. Of course, we are not going to able to 
do so if we continue to see things as individual parts, not an interconnected whole. In The 
Unsettling of America, Berry states in the chapter titled “The Ecological Crisis is a Crisis 
of Character,” “The disease of the modern character is specialization” (19). He explains:  
Looked at from the standpoint of the social system, the aim of 
specialization may seem desirable enough. The aim is to see that the 
responsibilities of government, law, medicine, engineering, agriculture, 
education, etc., are given into the hands of the most skilled, best prepared 
people. The difficulties do not appear until we look at specialization from 
the opposite standpoint—that of individual persons. We then begin to see 
the grotesquery—indeed, the impossibility—of an idea of community 
wholeness that divorces itself from any idea of personal wholeness. (19) 
 
He adds, “The supposedly fortunate citizen is therefore left with only two concerns: 
making money and entertaining himself” (20). And of course, technology in modern 
media is such that we will never get this satisfaction. There is always “one more thing” to 
stay tuned in to see, keeping us distracted from a deeper anxiety. Here “anxiety” is 
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similar to the dissatisfaction of “desire” discussed earlier. Berry states, “He [the average 
citizen] ought to be anxious, because he is helpless. That he is dependent upon so many 
specialists, the beneficiary of so much expert help, can only mean that he is a captive, a 
potential victim” (21). Of course, we want our students to be better than average citizens 
and one of the primary reasons we teach the humanities is to help our students see 
themselves and their world within a larger whole. It is important, therefore, that our 
students study authors whose works help them recognize and resist this dependency on 
specialists, in order that they might find wholeness and health for themselves and their 
communities.  
 It is the way Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry dramatize the interaction of these 
hypergoods that makes study of their works the ideal way to understand and approach 
personal wholeness. As indicated earlier, this personal wholeness means more than self-
preservation and self-assertion. In order to be whole, humans need to have a proper 
relation to places, ethics, and things. As we have seen, Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry can 
help us experience a more communal, interdependent form of personal wholeness 
through the reading and discussing of their works. Personal wholeness, after all, is the 
goal of the humanities. These three authors enable us to read their fiction and creative 
non-fiction73 and “live out” these hypergoods in their characters. We do not just 
experience these hypergoods through them, but we see how rich the world really is. 
Unlike many of their contemporaries, these authors emphasize the productive, not merely 
the evil, parts of the world. 
                                                
73 And their poetry, especially in the case of Berry, though this genre is outside the scope 
of this dissertation. 
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First, though, we need to eliminate the false notion that our modern age has 
somehow progressed beyond the hypergoods of past ages. In Orthodoxy, Chesterton 
states, “We often hear it said, for instance, ‘What is right in one age is wrong in another.’ 
This is quite reasonable, if it means that there is a fixed aim, and that certain methods 
attain at certain times and not at other times” (44). With his typical humor, Chesterton 
underscores the irony inherent in the belief that ethics change between time periods: 
“[T]his idea of a fundamental alteration in the standard is one of the things that make 
thought about the past or future simply impossible. The theory of a complete change of 
standards in human history does not merely deprive us of the pleasure of honouring our 
fathers; it deprives us even of the more modern and aristocratic pleasure of despising 
them” (45). We need to recognize that perhaps the perceived changes in our ethics are not 
the pursuit of some new ideal, but rather the deviation from an old ideal that has never 
been replaced. Our hypergoods, therefore, are consistent across eras, and we should study 
modern literature that reflects this consistency. In chapter three we read Berry’s assertion 
that stories in the humanities should not be taught as artifacts, because the same external 
set of values should be shared. As such, I believe the writings of Chesterton, Lewis, and 
Berry tackle many of the key issues of any time, especially respectful engagement with 
tradition and family, fidelity, and belief in transcendence, and they must be included in 
the canon of the humanities.  
For example, when the characters in Chesterton’s works do unconventional, 
seemingly crazy actions that turn out to be quite reasonable once they are explained, 
readers are forced to confront the modern narratives (and hypergoods) that they conform 
to without question. In other words, Chesterton uses the unconventional in his works to 
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underscore the importance (taken lightly by moderns) of the conventions (hypergoods) 
that tradition has upheld. Innocent Smith is an excellent example of this paradoxical way 
of living—he does not sit around fragmented like the members of Beacon House, but 
rather lives exuberantly and freely in his beliefs in tradition, family, fidelity, and 
transcendence. His actions seem unconventional (and illegal), but are actually truer to the 
hypergoods than the actions of the other characters.  
In Lewis we see much of the same. In both the Space Trilogy and Chronicles of 
Narnia, his protagonists recognize the importance of tradition, family, fidelity, and 
transcendence, ordering their lives accordingly and living in the freedom circumscribed 
by these hypergoods. For example, when Edmund betrays his siblings in obedience to his 
natural desire for Turkish Delight, he transgresses the hypergood of respectful 
engagement with family and therefore severs himself from community. As a 
consequence, his health (wholeness) suffers in the White Witch’s palace until he repents 
and is accepted back into his familial (and Narnian) community. In recognizing that they 
cannot find wholeness in tackling their problems or seeking their desires as individuals, 
Lewis’s protagonists find their identity in community, whether of friends, family, or a 
shared belief in the transcendent (whether Aslan or Maleldil).  
Likewise, Berry’s writings affirm the same message. When his characters choose 
to acknowledge the hypergoods of respectful engagement with tradition and family, 
fidelity, and transcendence, they include themselves in larger human, natural, and 
metaphysical communities. This choosing to be a part of a larger community makes his 
characters whole, bringing them peace and contentment. We saw a strong example of this 
earlier in Remembering. The novel’s title implies this reconnection to wholeness—Andy 
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chooses to turn from his personal desires of self-fulfillment and return to his family and 
community. He chooses to adhere to the three hypergoods we have discussed and 
therefore becomes whole again, re-membering himself to the traditional, familial, natural, 
and metaphysical things he had severed. 
Taken together, these three hypergoods help to restore the connections between 
individuals and other people, places, and things. These restored connections create health 
for the community, a health measured by wholeness—both for the individuals and for the 
community. Respectful engagement with tradition and family forges connections to past, 
present, and future generations. It allows us to respect not only the cultural values of our 
human communities, but also the natural environment as well, because it is the 
inheritance of future generations. Fidelity forges connections between people in 
marriages, friendships, work, and family bonds. It also forges connections between 
humans and their natural environment—our commitment fosters our love. Finally, belief 
in transcendence forges connections between humans and other humans, places, and 
things by fostering humility in us, a humility that allows us to put our own self-interests 
aside for the health of the greater community. Working together, the overall health or 
wholeness of the community allows for the health and wholeness of the parts, human and 
otherwise, that make up the community. Reading and studying authors such as 
Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry helps us to see the importance of these hypergoods to the 
health of our communities, and ourselves, and therefore their inclusion in the humanities 
is paramount. 
In fact, in teaching these authors I would encourage my students to see in these 
authors’ characters the “embodiment” of this “wholeness” that is the humanities, 
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primarily in two ways. First, their characters are not acted upon, but, as we have seen, are 
actors who recognize their telos. So much of modern literature is full of protagonists who 
find themselves powerless to act and are therefore tragic because they cannot help being 
acted upon. This literature, of course, echoes a feeling that we moderns do tend to feel on 
a day-to-day basis—our government, our employers, our creditors, our family and 
friends, among others, all act upon us. For our students this is no different. However, the 
characters in the fiction of Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry are determined to act appropriate 
to their telos, regardless of what it might cost them, because they see themselves as part 
of a bigger story that has been defined for them. And so in Chesterton characters see 
themselves as part of an English and orthodox tradition, in Lewis characters are a part of 
the Great Dance, and in Berry characters are part of a “membership.” 
Second, their characters are not individualistic, but characters who see themselves 
as part of a larger community. In contrast to the self-made modern human that is so 
popular (rags to riches stories), the characters in Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry recognize 
that they need to rely on others to help inform their identities and actions. Their 
characters are not afraid to ask for help or give help, when appropriate. As a result, they 
recognize that the health of their community is just as important as their own personal 
well-being. And so in Chesterton characters risk imprisonment and death to protect their 
local communities and customs, in Lewis characters sacrifice for one another, and in 
Berry neighbors pitch in to help each other with their farm work. All three authors draw 
us to the possibility of personal wholeness found in looking past our individualism and 
seeing the world as inter-connected and inter-dependent. Their fiction offers therefore a 
rich and powerful addition to the humanities. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
By way of conclusion, I would like to assert that the hypergood acting as the 
impetus behind the returns of Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry to place is grace. According 
to the Oxford Dictionary, the word “grace” is derived from “Middle English: via Old 
French from Latin gratia, from gratus 'pleasing, thankful'; related to grateful.” Later, the 
term took on a more theological meaning of “a totally gratuitous gift [from God] on 
which man has absolutely no claim” (Catholic Reference). As we can see, the definition 
of grace has two important components. First, there is an unmerited action whereby one 
entity gives a gift to another. Second, there is in the gift-receiver a response of 
gratefulness for the gift. In addition, we can see that “grace” is rooted in the particular—a 
gift. Certainly we can see this in the Judeo-Christian tradition. For example, David writes 
in the Psalms: 
9 Thou visitest the earth, and waterest it: thou greatly enrichest it with the 
river of God, which is full of water: thou preparest them corn, when thou 
hast so provided for it. 
10 Thou waterest the ridges thereof abundantly: thou settlest the furrows 
thereof: thou makest it soft with showers: thou blessest the springing 
thereof. 
11 Thou crownest the year with thy goodness; and thy paths drop fatness. 
12 They drop upon the pastures of the wilderness: and the little hills rejoice 
on every side. 
13 The pastures are clothed with flocks; the valleys also are covered over 
with corn; they shout for joy, they also sing. (King James Version, Ps. 
65.9-13) 
 
We see clearly in this passage the practice of grace: God providing gifts to the land (and 
by extension, his people) and the land (and people) being grateful in return. How were 
they to be grateful? They were to demonstrate their gratefulness by extending grace to 
others: “Is not this the fast that I have chosen? to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo 
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the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke? Is it 
not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy 
house? when thou seest the naked, that thou cover him; and that thou hide not thyself 
from thine own flesh?” (King James Version, Isa. 58.6-7). Clearly God expected his 
people to extend grace to others—give gifts to those who do not merit them.  
Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry are all aware of this Judeo-Christian connection 
between grace and particularities and places. Through their writings we can distinguish 
the two types of grace described above: everyday “grace” (among creation) and spiritual 
“Grace” (between God and creation). What follows are some brief examples of this 
awareness in their writings. 
From “the autumn of 1894 to late 1896,” Chesterton kept a notebook full of ideas, 
including poems (Oddie 145). About this notebook Oddie states, “But The Notebook’s 
most powerful theme, insistently returned to again and again, is his gratitude for 
everything in his life” (150). Oddie then quotes a representative poem concerning 
Chesterton’s gratitude from The Notebook:  
You say grace before meals, 
   All right 
But I say grace before the play and the opera, 
And grace before the concert and the pantomime, 
And grace before I open a book, 
And grace before sketching, painting, 
Swimming, fencing, boxing, walking, playing, dancing; 
And grace before I dip the pen in the ink. (150) 
 
Here we can see quite clearly that for Chesterton grace was more than the more recent, 
limiting definition of a prayer before meals. Instead, we see that he understood Grace as 
gratefulness for every aspect of life—an attitude that acknowledges the gift giver. 
Decades later, Chesterton writes elsewhere, “I do not, in my private capacity, believe that 
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a baby gets his best physical food by sucking his thumb; nor that a man gets his best 
moral food by sucking his soul, and denying its dependence on God or other good things. 
I would maintain that thanks are the highest form of thought; and that gratitude is 
happiness doubled by wonder” (Short History 59). He calls this practiced grace “faith in 
receptiveness” and “respect for things outside oneself” (59). Here we see that Chesterton 
finds a direct connection between a life of gratitude (grace) and valuing others. The 
connection lies in the humility required to accept an unmerited gift, because we recognize 
that we share the same lack of merit as others. 
Likewise, Lewis understood the importance of grace, especially in how it shapes 
our understanding of others. In an interview with the actor and narrator Max McLean, 
Lewis’s stepson Douglas Gresham tells an insightful story regarding Lewis and grace. 
Once, Gresham says, some academics were arguing in the common room at Oxford about 
what one main thing separated Christianity from all other major religions. Lewis walked 
into the room (possibly to get a pint of beer, Gresham surmises) and the academics 
deferred to his opinion on the matter. Lewis said, “Well, that’s easy, that’s grace.” 
Gresham finishes his story by saying, “The undeserved love of God for man is what 
separates Christianity from all other faiths.” Lewis also writes about Grace later in his 
life, linking it to Charity, one of the four loves, in his book of the same title. He 
distinguishes between the two types I outlined earlier: Grace and grace. He says, “That 
such a Gift-love comes by Grace and should be called Charity, everyone will agree. But I 
have to add something which will not perhaps be so easily admitted. God, as it seems to 
me, bestows two other gifts; a supernatural Need-love of Himself and a supernatural 
Need-love of one another” (Four Loves 129). He adds, “What is stranger still is that He 
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creates in us a more than natural receptivity of Charity from our fellow-men. Need is so 
near greed and we are so greedy already that it seems a strange grace. But I cannot get it 
out of my head that this is what happens” (129). Lewis is making a distinction between 
the Grace that humans accept from God (and realize their dependence upon) and the 
grace that humans accept from each other (and also realize their, God-created of course, 
dependence upon). Grace, for Lewis, works itself out in a process: “Thus God, admitted 
to the human heart, transforms not only Gift-love but Need-love; not only our Need-love 
of Him, but our Need-love of one another” (133). 
Finally, we see in Berry’s poetry an explicit understanding between place and 
grace. In “The Peace of Wild Things,” Berry writes: “For a time / I rest in the grace of the 
world, and am free.” (10-11). In “The Gift of Gravity,” Berry writes:  
We are what we are given 
and what is taken away; 
blessed be the name  
of the given and taker. 
For everything that comes 
is a gift, the meaning always 
carried out of sight 
to renew our whereabouts, 
always a starting place. 
And every gift is perfect 
in its beginning, for it 
is “from above, and cometh down 
from the Father of lights.” 
Gravity is grace. (lines 11-24) 
 
Likewise, we see here that Berry understands Grace through the metaphor of gravity: just 
as everything falls through gravity, all of creation has fallen as a gift from God. This 
acknowledgement of grace has for Berry as serious obligation: to treat creation with 
respect and to care for it. He ends the poem thus: “This grace is gravity.” 
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This relationship between grace and Grace seems implicit in the writings of 
Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry. The experienced (and practiced) grace on earth is a shadow 
of the transcendent Grace these authors acknowledged. For instance, just as in Lewis’s 
writings heaven is a perfected form of what we experience now, the grace we have now 
points to the perfected Grace. To acknowledge the importance of grace may seem strange 
to moderns. Our society is all about the value of justice (as long as we’re talking about 
others, not ourselves), but sees grace as weakness. Of the two, however, grace requires 
more strength, because in restoring their relationship individuals must set aside their 
differences out of respect for the health of the community. This grace acknowledges an 
external communal good—community wholeness—just as Grace acknowledges an 
external communal Good—physical and metaphysical wholeness. In other words, both 
grace and Grace restore wholeness to communities, making them healthy. In chapter four, 
we saw that Berry describes health as “wholeness.”74 
Grace can be considered the quintessence of the hypergoods. It requires humility, 
acknowledges community (wholeness), and promotes health. Grace, therefore, should be 
valued in the humanities, and including these authors can allow us to better recognize the 
particularities—to stop and smell the roses, so to speak. Emphasizing particularities is an 
essential corrective to the issue of utilitarian “instrumentalism” we discussed in chapter 
three, exemplified by Narnia’s Queen Jadis and Uncle Andrew.75 These characters saw 
people, places, and things as “subjects” or “raw material” to be used up—abstractions, 
rather than particulars. 
                                                
74 See pages 117-18. 
75 See page 105. 
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As we have seen in their biographies in chapter one, grace played an essential role 
in helping Chesterton, Lewis, and Berry return home to their faith. For example, in 
chapter one we saw Berry say of his questions, “[T]hey are spoken in reverence for the 
order and grace that I see, and that I trust beyond my power to see” (Long 200). Grace as 
a value can also be seen throughout their writings, and in closing we will look at a new, 
summative example from each author of the kind of grace that, when “incarnated” in 
stories, poems, or reflective prose, can give new life and significance to the study of the 
humanities.  
For our example of grace in Chesterton’s writings, we turn to Father Brown. 
Perhaps more than any other character, Father Brown best embodies the spirit of 
Chesterton, and that is why he is the best known of Chesterton’s characters. Chesterton 
wrote his Father Brown detective stories over a long period of time, from 1910-35. Much 
more than a sleuth, Father Brown offered insight into the soul, not just the psyche, of 
humans. In several cases, Father Brown would, after getting a confession from the guilty 
party, let him or her go (if the crime was of a spiritual, rather than a legal nature). In an 
early story of this kind, Chesterton provides a clear picture of grace. In “The Queer Feet,” 
Father Brown catches the thief of some silver from a dinner party and, after the thief 
repents and returns the silver, he lets the thief go. When later asked if he caught the 
criminal, Father Brown replies: “Yes…I caught him, with an unseen hook and an 
invisible line which is long enough to let him wander to the ends of the world, and still to 
bring him back with a twitch upon the thread” (Penguin 50). Evelyn Waugh later 
borrowed this line to title the third book of Brideshead Revisited: “A Twitch Upon the 
Thread.” In the novel, Cordelia makes this speech:  
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D’you know what papa said when he became a Catholic? Mummy told me 
once. He said to her: ‘You have brought back my family to the faith of 
their ancestors’…. [T]he family haven’t been very constant, have they? 
There’s him gone and Sebastian gone and Julia gone. But God won’t let 
them go for long, you know. I wonder if you remember the story mummy 
read us…. ‘Father Brown’ said something like ‘I caught him’ (the thief) 
‘with an unseen hook….’ (200) 
 
Terry Teachout says of this passage: “Chesterton’s metaphor, so placed, announces the 
inmost theme of Brideshead; and, in a nutshell, it also manages to suggest all the poetry 
and spiritual depth of the Father Brown stories themselves” (1231). Chesterton’s stories 
remind us that we are never far from grace ourselves, so we should therefore extend grace 
to others. Such a focus is communal, not individualistic. Father Brown is a great 
exemplar for education, because he solves his cases with a strict adherence to reason, 
though this reason is as spiritual as it is scientific. That is, Father Brown’s reasoning is 
more holistic.  
 Similarly, Lewis’s fascination with grace was long-standing. As a young man, 
pre-conversion, he was struck by the beauty of the story of Cupid and Psyche, as told by 
Petronius in The Golden Ass, and he had a desire to retell the story. He finally did so, as 
the last work of fiction he wrote before his death: Till We Have Faces. His novel is told 
from the perspective of Orual, the eldest sister to Psyche who is jealous of her beauty. At 
the very end of the novel, Orual experiences a vision whereby she sees that she is one of 
a number of temptations Psyche has had to resist in order to obey the divine command 
given to her. Orual repents, telling Psyche: “Never again will I call you mine; but all 
there is of me shall be yours. Alas, you know now what it’s worth. I never wished you 
well, never had one selfless thought of you. I was a craver” (305). After this repentance, 
Orual is told by “a great voice” (God), “You also are Psyche” (308). Orual’s experience 
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here with grace changes her and allows her to see her past from a new perspective, 
especially how she had been living for the wrong things. She was  “craver,” a consumer, 
obsessed with the wrong values. However, her repentance, which allowed her to accept 
grace, restored health—wholeness—once again to her immediate relationship with her 
sister and also her larger community. 
 Turning to Berry, perhaps one of the best grace-filled stories in his canon is his 
recent novel Hannah Coulter. The novel is unique in that it is the only one of Berry’s 
“autobiographic” stories told from the perspective of a woman. Hannah begins her tale by 
saying, “This is my story, my giving of thanks” (5). This statement sets the grace-filled 
tone of the narrative, as “giving of thanks” is analogous with being grateful. To be 
certain, Hannah’s life has its share of miseries: her mother dies when she is a child and 
her stepmom is cruel to her, her first husband dies in WWII, her children all move away 
when they grow up, and she outlives her second husband. Through each tragedy, though, 
she maintains a humility forged by grace that allows her to respect her enemies and her 
community. She remains aware that her story is interconnected with those of others, 
whose stories have value too. She therefore focuses on the positives: a grandmother who 
with grace shields her from her stepmom, her first husband’s in-laws who with grace care 
for her when he dies, and a long, fruitful marriage by Grace to her second husband. 
Eventually, she even extends grace in the form of forgiveness to her stepmom and has the 
opportunity to receive with grace and open arms a prodigal son who leaves a reckless life 
of drugs and returns home. She is able to act this way towards others, to be an active 
agent for wholeness in her family and community, because she lives a life of grace. Her 
life of thanksgiving would be very familiar to Chesterton who, as we have seen, tried to 
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live each day with child-like wonder and thankfulness. As we saw earlier, after reading 
Chesterton and MacDonald, Lewis likewise saw particularities in the world as imbued 
with grace—sacraments for which to be thankful.  
Finally, let us return to our initial question, “What are humans for?” In chapter 
three we discussed how “humans should be valued because they are humans.”76 In other 
words, they are to be valued in themselves. As we have seen, the writings of Chesterton, 
Lewis, and Berry invite us to value ourselves and each other because we owe our very 
existence to grace—we did not speak ourselves into being. Their writings, therefore, are a 
valuable inclusion in a humanities curriculum, as they help interrupt the patterns of 
objectification and instrumentalism with which we, as moderns, are so used to thinking.  
  
 
                                                
76 See page 89. 
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